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ABSTRACT

A t t r ib u t i o n theory seeks to explain the ways in which humans a s c r i b e
causes to everyday ev en ts, e s p e c i a l l y the observed behavior of o t h e r human
beings.

This study seeks to apply the basic p a t t e r n s of soc ial a t t r i b u t i o n to

the a c t of "pre-forrnance"-—the a e s t h e t i c a c t in which a performer engages the
voice of a l i t e r a r y t e x t and, through r e h e a r s a l s involving a t t r i b u t i o n ,
embodies t h a t voice f o r some audience.
Theodore Newcomb's "symmetry t h e o r y , " a model t h a t c o nta in s the
e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of human a t t r i b u t i o n , i s disc ussed within the philosophical
p e rs p e c t iv e of phenomenology, and the transformed model i s used as the b a sis
f o r a" new theory of the a c t of performance.

Three e s s e n t i a l p a t t e r n s

of

a t t r i b u t i o n are defined (con s i s t ency, consensus, and d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s ) and
applied to the a u t h o r ' s "pre-formance" of William Fa u lk n er's sto ry "A Rose For
Emily."

Also, the fundamental a t t r i b u t i o n e r r o r i s defined as "the tendency to

o v e r a t t r i b u t e o t h e r ' s behaviors to d i s p o s i t i o n r a t h e r than to environment or
c o n t e x t , " and t h i s tendency of human perception i s revealed to be the

cause of

much l i t c . a r y (and s o c i a l ) m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
F i n a l l y , the t h e o r i e s of M. M. Bakhtin are a p p ro p r ia te d to the model, to
allow the engagement of the perform er/reader and the l i t e r a r y o t h e r (e.g .
n a r r a t o r s or c h a r a c t e r s ) t o be described as the complex e x p e r i e n t i a l phenomenon
that i t is.

The f i n is h e d model, which rep laces the "t extual other" with the

concept of " fig u ra l v o ic e ," d escribes a t t r i b u t i o n as the most important
p r i n c i p l e in the psychological c o n s t r u c t io n of a response to a l i t e r a r y t e x t .

.

Chapter One
LITERATURE AS PHENOMENON:
ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND THE ACT OF PERFORMANCE
Introduction
A professional actor is assigned the role of Hamlet. He picks up the tex t
of the play and begins the first of a long series of encounters with it.

The

clergyman experiences a fam iliar biblical tex t in a new way when he decides, for
the first tim e, to use it as a eulogy.

The poem th at meant nothing in

adolescence now gains a rich new layer of meaning each tim e it is encountered
by the maturing consciousness of a reader.

A perform er preparing Faulkner’s

story "A Rose For Emily" for the public decides that the narrator of the story is
sexist. All of these cases illustrate the transactional nature of our experiences
with literary texts.

When we read a tex t critically and sensitively, we are

engaging the voiced language of the tex t in much the same way that we
encounter other people in the social world. Nowhere is this relationship more
crucial than in the human embodiment of a tex t through performance and the
response to th at performance by an audience.
This study is based on the thesis th at the experience of a tex t, whether
printed or performed, is analogous to one’s human experience of an "other." That
is to say, we encounter new texts in much the same way th at we encounter
potential friends or acquaintances. This analogy is especially apt if we intend to
perform the work because, in such cases, we focus on the text not as an object, a
thing-out-there, but rather as an a c t of telling—a disclosing by a narrator,
1

character, or an implied author. Therefore, the methods of studying interaction
between two human beings are appropriate for studying interaction between
perform ers and texts.
Perhaps the best possible description of the act of performance then, is a
phenomenological description.

Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy th at

seeks complete and essential descriptions of human experience rather than a
testing of empirical laws. The goal of such descriptions is to fully describe the
activity of the human consciousness as it experiences and responds to the world.
As Sir William Hamilton defined it in 1866, phenomenology is a "purely
i
descriptive study of mind."
A phenomenological description of the a c t of
perform ance, then, would count as data only the experiential'records of the
perform er, her subjective but rigorous examination of her own m ental activity as
she performed or rehearsed, rather than employing any empirical tests. Only a
full and complete description of the experience of performing could be counted
as phenomenological data.

When people perform literary texts, they are

communicating to others the results of their intellectual and visceral encounters
with a unique "instance" of the tex t as it is mediated by a particular
consciousness a t a particular tim e.

The study of the consciousness of

perform ers, then, is of great importance to the understanding of the act of
performing. For this reason phenomenology is an appropriate methodology for
the study of the perform er’s experience of the "others" contained in a literary
work.
The a c t of performing literatu re is a phenomenon th at involves our
encounter with an other—the te x t.

Furtherm ore, it involves our conscious

*Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, (Boston:
Lincoln, 1866), p. 86.

Gould and

reflection on th at encounter, including pre-reflective or visceral responses of
which we may be only dimly aware. If I must embody Hamlet on stage, I must
intuit certain of his qualities; I discover other aspects of the character by
analyzing in my mind the critical thinking that was involved in the creation of
my perform ance. That is to say (phenomenologically) th at I literally present my
consciousness to my consciousness in order to think about how I have arrived a t a
characterization of Hamlet.
Phenomenology also assumes th at nothing is a true phenomenon unless it
is presented to the human senses for analysis. When we read a tex t, it exists
only as it is presented to us—th at is, as we experience it.

The dyadic

relationship between a reader and a tex t can be described phenomenologically;
moreover, a phenomenological description of a perform er’s a c t of "taking on the
tex tu al

voice,"

can

reveal

incom patible fields of inquiry.

unexpected

relationships

between

seemingly

In attem pting to fully describe a performer’s

experience of a literary other, this study will highlight some of these surprising
consistencies

in

the

communication

theories

of

dram atism ,

symbolic

interactionism , and particularly attribution theory.
I will focus on the la tte r theory, an increasingly im portant psychological
paradigm called attribution. Attribution theory deals with the ways in which
humans assign or attribute causes to the behavior of others in the social world.
Because it is a theory of perception, because it seeks to describe the often prereflective dynamics of our perceptions of others, because it focuses on
experiential records of those perceptions, attribution theory is firmly rooted in
th e phenomenological perspective.
essentially

phenomenological

This study will outline attribution theory's

underpinnings

and

will

then

describe

how

attribution functions in a perform er’s experience of the various "speaking” voices
of a literary tex t.

Highlighting the essential structures of attribution, as

revealed in studies of social communication will help to produce a model th at
reveals how attribution functions in the critical response to a work of literature.
Attribution theory can prove to be particularly helpful in describing the
a c t of performance—the human embodiment of a literary text—especially when
it is coupled with the perspective of symbolic interactionism ; this la tte r
perspective will be introduced briefly, in order to lim it our application of
attributional principles to the linguistic channel of communication.

This

linguistic param eter is necessary because the communication of literature to a
reader, the type of communication th at occurs when a perform er "studies" a text
she intends to perform, is almost exclusively verbal. When I read a soliloquy of
Ham let's, I am denied the nonverbal channel, and must depend solely on my
perceptions of Hamlet’s words, his "linguistic behavior," if I am to get to know
him well enough to recreate him on the stage or platform .
The subject of this inquiry is specific, although the implications are far
reaching.

My subject is the perform ative act:

th at is, the human activity of

"conversing" critically with a tex t in order to create a performance of it for
some audience.

The act of perform ance can be divided into two distinct

phenomenal phases: (1) "pre-forming," the formation of the performance by the
perform er during which aesthetic and critical choices are made and acted upon,
a phrase commonly called "rehearsal," and (2) "performing,"

the physical

embodiment of the tex t by the perform er for an audience.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model th at will describe how
attribution functions in the act of perform ance. I will concentrate on the pre-

form ative phase and the "interpersonal" relationship between the "voice” of the
tex t and the perform er. I will trace the development of the phenomenological
theory of attribution and will apply it to this reader/text relationship. Several
significant attribution patterns will be identified in the current literature of the
social sciences.

These patterns will also be revealed in selected student

responses to literary texts. However, since this study seeks a phenomenological
description of performance, I will rely heavily on my own response to exemplary
tex ts, particularly the opening passages of William Faulkner's "A Rose For
Emily.”
At the core of the proposed model is Theodore Newcomb's widely known
"symmetry model," an attributional paradigm. This model will be placed in the
context of the performer's lived experience of a text, forming a completed
paradigm that will provide both a philosophical description of the act of
perform ance as well as some practical prescriptions for the perform er.
A ttribution Theory and the Act of Performance
The perform ative act is a complicated process. Performance studies seek
an understanding not only of the tex t being performed, but also of the a c t of
perform ance. One behavioral theory th at is particularly fruitful when applied to
the perform ative act is attribution theory.
Briefly, this family of psychological theories is concerned with how human
beings arrive a t determinations of the causes of everyday events—particularly
the causes of the behaviors of other humans.

It is a basic human tra it to

perceive th at our own actions and the actions of others are the result of either
some external force or some human disposition. Attribution theory posits th at

people insist upon attributing causes to the effects they observe in the world.
Often, the assumption of cause is pre-reflective. I would add th at performers
and readers often attrib u te "causes” to the "behavior" of the speaking voice
inherent in a work of literature.
The particular attribution paradigm used in this study is Theodore
Newcomb's symmetry theory, which seeks to explain the essential ways in which
humans achieve feelings of "balance," "symmetry," or "cognitive consistency"
with an object or another person. Newcomb uses the term symmetry to mean a
general understanding of where a communication partner stands in relation to (a)
oneself, and (b) to whatever happens to be the subject of the discourse a t any
given moment. When discussing a Republican governor with a dem ocrat, I might
attrib u te qualities to the dem ocrat based on (a) how she feels about me
personally, and (b) how she stands in relationship to this particular Republican
governor.

This feeling of "symmetry"

is not unlike

the

feeling that
2
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger refers to as "unconcealedness," in th at it

suggests that the motives of the other's behavior "stand forth" to me,
unconcealed.

Such feelings of consistency are crucial in our understanding of

literary others as well.
Newcomb's symmetry model, when applied to the transaction between
perform er and tex t, would suggest that ambiguities in the tex t, such as gaps in
the plot or multiple word meanings, or even ambiguities in a character's motives
for "linguistic behavior," create a dissonance or feeling of psychological
imbalance. Often, the attribution of causes or motivations for these ambiguities
is a common method of resolving such imbalances between perception and

^Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, (trans. Albert Hofstadter
(New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), p. 53.

understanding. For example, I might wonder why my prospective employer is
explaining the company’s retirem ent policy in such detail during the employment
interview. During the employer's discourse I might attribute the cause of her
details to the fact that she has already made up her mind to hire me. Likewise,
in my reflections on Faulkner’s story "A Rose For Emily," I might wonder why
the narrator is so careful to conceal the shocking ending of the story until the
final line. In both cases I am seeking a cause for the behavior of an other with
whom I am engaged.
The Phenomenological Approach to Attribution Theory
Phenomenology provides an excellent method for describing critical and
behavioral responses to texts. Attribution theory, in its focus on interpersonal
perception, is a phenomenological theory that can illuminate the relationship
between a performer and the fictional persona he embodies.

As stated

previously, the essential description of literary response that is the core of this
study will be lim ited to "pre-formance," concentrating on the perform er’s
perception of the text as th at text is prepared for performance.
Attribution, like many other theories of communication, while often
tested empirically, is concerned with human perception—including the perception
and evaluation of literary personae. In an effort to introduce attribution theory
here, it might be

helpful

to

clarify

its

philosophical underpinnings in

phenomenology. Stephen Littlejohn has summarized what might be called some
phenomenological principles of humanistic communication theories:
(1) What is happening to an individual or a group is best understood
subjectively in term s of the individual's perceptions and feelings.
(This suggests the use of subjective, paper-and-pencil responses

8
th at describe a subject's experiences rather than scientifically
controlled experiments.)
(2) Principles governing communication behavior should be
discovered inductively by examining personal experience rath er
than by applying abstractions deductively. (That is, we begin with
the raw data of experience, and construct theories to explain them
without reducing the varieties and complexities of the
experiences.)
(3) Communication behavior is best understood in its complexity
rather than rigid simplicity.
A ttribution theory seeks to describe the ways in which we ascribe causes
to observed behaviors of others.

This study applies such descriptions to the

communicative transaction which can be shown to exist between perform er and
te x t (as well as between perform er and audience).

The proposed essential

description of the experience of a tex t, by a single reader or by an audience, will
be based on a modified model of attribution th at will be derived according to the
methods of phenomenology.
Of course, books and people do not communicate in exactly the same way.
Language is the sole medium through which a tex t speaks its meanings. When we
converse with flesh-and-blood others we a t least have one other primary
medium—the nonverbal channel. For this reason, the relationship between a tex t
and a reader is essentially linguistic. If we are seeking an understanding of a
n arrator in a piece of prose fiction, our experience of th at narrator is primarily
an experience of her or his linguistic behavior. Texts ’’a c t’' via language. And
even when we think about a te x t, when we contem plate it critically, we use
language to do so.

Therefore, the perspective of symbolic interaction, another

3
Stephen Littlejohn, Theories of Human Communication, 2nd ed.,
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.), p. 194.

phenomenological communication theory, provides helpful support for an
attributional theory of literary response.
Symbolic Interactionism as Support for the Phenomenological Perspective
The theoretical perspective of symbolic interactionism reinforces the
phenomenological dynamic of the experience of another person (in this case a
textual persona) or object (the text). This perspective, widely credited in the
social sciences, posits human interaction as being conducted primarily through
shared meanings conveyed by way of language.'* This interaction is dynamic and
processual.

Symbolic interactionism assumes a dialectic structure as an

essential feature of communication; it is my thesis that such a structure also
exists in a person/text dyad or in the perform er/audience "partnership."
Stephen Littlejohn describes the goals of the researcher in symbolic
interactionism as requiring him or her to "empathize with the subject, to enter
the subject's realm of experience, and to attem pt to understand the value of the
person as an individual."

The aesthetic goals of the perform er are no different

in th at they too rely on empathic understanding and what Wallace Bacon has
called "a sense of the other."
This project rests on the argument of four claims.

The first two are

related:
(1) Attribution (a phenomenological theory of how humans ascribe
causes to the behaviors of others) in the imaginative and critical
act of forming the performance of a text is a phenomenon in the
phenomenological sense.
4

Littlejohn, p. 45.
5
Littlejohn, p. 45.
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(2) A ttribution, specifically th at described by Newcomb’s
"symmetry model," is an important part of the phenomenon of
responding to the performance of a text.
(3) Symbolic interactionism (particularly the Burkean paradigm)
helps to clarify the phenomenological term "intentionality." This
term is im portant in describing which literary persona we are
attending to or focusing on a t any given moment of the reading
process.
(4) Theodore Newcomb’s symmetry model, a model th at contains all
of the essential features of attribution, can be modified so as to
make it specifically applicable to the act of pre-formance and to
justify its description as a phenomenological model.
Phenomenology posits four essential criteria for a phenomenon to exist.

8

First, phenomena are essences. They are constituted by those very qualities th at
make them the objects they are instead of some other, essentially different
object.

That is to say, humans recognize phenomena; we know th at our

experience of a flower is essentially unlike our experience of a novel; likewise,
we may sense th at our experience of the death of King Lear is not unlike our
experience of the death of a flesh-and-blood leader such as Dr. Martin Luther
King. Such experiences (such essences) are not discovered empirically, but by "a
scrutiny of particular cases by seeing, intuition, or intuition of essences"
(Wesensschau).

The importance of intuition lies in its ability to free truth from

the necessity of empirical proof. According to Richard Schmitt:
The point of introducing intuition is not psychological but
epistemological.
To appeal to intuition is not to make a
psychological statem ent about the causal origins of certain
statem ents but an epistemological one about the sort of evidence
that will be relevant to them . To say we know essences by
g

Richard Schm itt, "Phenomenology," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 13940.
7Schm itt, p. 140.

intuition is to say, negatively, th at the truth or falsity of
statem ents about essences is not dependent on the truth about
empirical statem ents.
This is not to say th at empirical statem ents are not true or not self-validating.
But the self-validation of the phenomenological description is th at its goal is
inherent in its object; one can search for the ontological essence (eidos) of an
object only within the object itself.
The reader who prepares a short story, say "A Rose For Emily," for public
perform ance, must be able to fully respond to the work as a separate entity, a
thing-out-there th at is presented to his/her consciousness.

The intuitive

description of the essential qualities of the work might contain many levels: it is
a short story; it is in the inimitable style

Q

of Faulkner; it is a story of the

American South; it is Southern Gothic; and, it is a mystery story. Anytime th at
we place a work into a category we are beginning to intuit something about its
form al essence. We know th at "A Rose For Emily" is not a sonnet, a novel, a
play, or a fantasy; it is not a comic story—or in Hemingway's style.

From

generic essences, we move on to attem pt to realize in performance, those
qualities which exist only in this particular story. What qualities, we ask, make
this story unique.

^Schmitt, p. 140.
Q

M. M. Bakhtin, a theorist whose ideas will figure prominently in my
proposed model, suggests th at prose style is largely a function of an author's
particular way of combining different voices (social, literary, professional,
ch aracter voices, etc.) within a te x t. What Bakhtin says about the style of the
English comic novel, might be applied, to a lesser degree perhaps, to all prose
fiction: "It is precisely the diversity of speech, and not the unity of a normative
shared language, th at is the ground of style." Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981). p. 308.
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Much of the answer to this seminal question lies in the attributions we
make about the behavior of the teller of the story.

We might constitute this

teller as the implied a u th o r^ or as a more or less defined narrator who exists in
the context of the epic situation. The richest understanding of the work would
likely come from investigating our attributions about both narrator and implied
author. In order to focus this study, however, I will lim it it to the performer’s
attributions concerning the n arrator, mainly because perform ers embody
narrators, whether they are fictional characters, whether they are interested or
objective, whether they are neutral entities or implied authors. The style of the
narrator, the "manner" of the telling, is the crucial determ inant of the essential
phenomenon of our experience of a specific tex t, and therefore, a focus on the
narrative voice, a voice constituted as a communicating other, is appropriate and
of paramount importance.
The Phenomenological Reduction
The particular phenomenon under consideration then, is the perform er’s
experience of the narrator of "A Rose For Emily." We begin by constituting th at
narrator as an other who is communicating with us through the shared system of
language.

We focus on the text as the voiced behavior of that narrator.

In

phenomenological term s, when a perform er holds any aspect of a text, say a
n arrator, in the mind, that perform er is said to be "intentionally focused." The

I am grateful to Wayne C. Booth for his illumination of the idea of
dyadic encounters between texts and readers. His approach to the metaphor of
"engagements" with a tex t, however, posits the implied author as the other in the
dyad. This is true, perhaps, when we read our favorite authors, but I would
suggest th at in a "pre-formative" reading, the relationship between the reader
and the narrator’s voice is more crucial. To embody a text we must embody the
narrator; only indirectly do we engage the implied author, a t least in many cases.
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principle object of consciousness then, the narrator, is formed in the perform er's
mind, constituted in part by the language of the tex t, and in another part by the
lived experience of the perform er. The perform er in this case would concentrate
on the voice of the narrator, allowing th at voice and all th at it suggests of th at
physical narrator, to become the figure in the field of his or her immediate
experience.
authorial

Conversely, other elements of the tex t, such as typography,

intention,

formal

qualities,

would

remain

in

the

performer's

consciousness but would form the background against which the performer
constitutes the figure of the narrator.
What we have done in such an act of intentionality is to bracket, or
suspend for the moment, all critical perspectives other than dram atism , in order
to fully experience the tex t as the utterance (the linguistic behavior) of a
narrator. This step allows our intuition of the essential qualities of Faulkner’s
story.

We are now interested in the essential qualities of this type of literary

experience, what we know of the narrator from the tex t, and what we attrib ute
(often by intuition) about th at narrator as we attem p t to fully constitute him in
our mind. Our experience of the story-teller as a story-teller is the phenomenon
to be described.
Accepting th at phenomena are essences and intuited, th at they have
necessary elements which we can recognize, leads us to a self-reflexive,
essential (eidetic) description of the phenomena of literary response.

This

description is derived by performing an operation called the phenomenological
reduction (or epokhe).

The crucial step in this method is "bracketing’’ or the

"suspension of existence."
Phenomena, says Husserl, can only be described when we have suspended
our belief in the existence of objects. To describe our experience of a table, for
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example, we might suspend all previous experience of tables and begin our
description of the object naively. In such a way its essential features would be
revealed to us without any experiential interference. In a sense, performers of
literatu re bracket or suspend the physical text, the book, as an entity when they
perform th at text from memory. Perhaps such an act is easier when performing
prose than when performing poetry; in the form er case the physical image of the
words on the page is less im portant; in the case of poetry however, the physical
image of the text is more essential to the ontology of the work of literature and
is therefore much harder to bracket. To use a more specific example, we would
probably be unlikely to look a t a page of Thomas Wolf’s Look Homeward Angel
and call it poetry. We have been trained to call paragraphs prose. However, if
we had never read the book, and heard a descriptive passage performed well, we
might easily experience its sounds, rhythms, and perceived ’’shape" for poetry.
R eflecting on such an experience might provide us with many clues as to what
we intuit the essential qualities of "poetry" to be.
We do not doubt the existence of things when we bracket, we simply put
all presuppositions about existence "out of action" so th at they do not enter into
our eidetic description of the object of our intention.
"Bracketing" in this sense means th a t I become aware of the
possibility th at something which I believed to exist does not exist
as I thought it did, th at a statem ent which I considered true is not,
or th at some a c t which I considered right when I did it might have
been wrong. Once I have become aware of th at possibility, I am
ready to reflect.

^ S c h m itt, p. 143.
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Certainly, no perform er completely forgets the sense of the complete
work of literature when he or she performs it. However, while the performer is
embodying the narrative voice, the "act of telling," he must, of necessity,
concentrate to an extrem e degree on the unfolding words of the text, as they
issue from his mouth. The constantly shifting present moment of the "telling" is
the focus of the performing consciousness while it performs the text.

The

objectivist perspective to the literatu re is therefore not possible in the unfolding
embodiment of the tex t. It is this sense of the work as a complete whole, then,
th at the perform er "brackets" or suspends when he performs. In rehearsal, the
perform er can stop and ask himself or herself about the causes about the
linguistic behavior of the narrator he or she is embodying. This is where the
reflection occurs in the act of pre-form ance.
This reflection is the next step in the phenomenological method.

We

refle ct about the essence of an object, and in bracketing the presuppositions of
the world-as-we-know-it (Husserl’s term is "natural standpoint"), we are able to
discover those features without which the object would cease to be what it is.
Husserl describes this reflection as an "attem pt to doubt."

The cognitive

activity involved in attem pting to doubt he called "free fancy" or "free
variation," a kind of "counter-example" in which
we describe an example and then transform the description by
adding or deleting one of the predicates contained in the
description. With each addition or deletion we ask whether the
amended description can still be said to describe an example of the
same kind of object a& th at which the example originally described
was said to exemplify.

12Schm itt, p. 14.
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Bracketing has a more specific and relevant application to the preformance method I hope to describe in the fourth chapter of this study. If we
posit a transactional flow of communication between tex t and reader, or, more
specifically between narrator and reader, we are arguing th at the perform er’s
encounter with a narrator is governed by the same attributional behavior as
encounters between flesh-and-blood beings. If we concentrate on the narrator
and attend to th at narrator as the sole source of the discourse, then we are in
effe ct bracketing the implied author (along with formal qualities, typography,
and other conventions of writing). In order to embody the narrator of ”A Rose
for Emily,” it is not required th at we know anything about Faulkner himself.
Faulkner's life and other works, particularly the intertextual history of
Yoknopatawpha, might illuminate and inform a performance, but they would be
likely to remain on the periphery of the perform er’s (or audience's) experience of
the narrator.

When I rehearse a narrator's voice I am playing out a dialogue

between myself and the narrator.

In the rarefied solitude of solo rehearsals,

Faulkner ceases to exist as I imaginatively enter the narrator's consciousness and
his world. This is, a t least, one possibility of the perform ance.
The third step in the phenomenological reduction is the free variation of
ideas. Once the bracketing step of the reduction has been performed, free fancy
takes over. Husserl's concept of free fancy is simply the procedure of positing
counter-examples to the phenomenon under inquiry. It is, incidentally, by this
Nietzschian reversal in subject and predicate th at the post-structuralist critic
seeks to deconstruct the language of texts, offering various different readings by
the sheer force of logical, free, cognitive variation. A similar deconstruction
occurs in the current trend of "reader-response" criticism , in which the a priori
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privilege of the text is suspended in order to fully concentrate on readers’
experiences of th at text.

The phenomenological suspension of the natural

standpoint leaves us with a world-out-there that can only be described as
"correlates of consciousness," as something not separate from, but presented to
consciousness. The cognitive act of bracketing forces us to direct our attention
to the acts of consciousness (cogitationes) which become the experience of
consciousness involving objects (in the present case, a narrator).

We are now

only interested in this object as an intentional a c t of consciousness.
A fter determining the essential qualities of a phenomena, and suspending
the world as we know it in order to allow for the free variation of ideas, we must
focus on the narrator’s behavior. In phenomenological term s we must attend to
the narrator’s linguistic behavior.

The fourth and final phenomenological

requirement for a phenomenon is intentionality. Pure reflective consciousness
(cogito) means th at "which is capable of intentional action."

According to

Husserl, we are always conscious of something. The perform er in the process of
building the performance is conscious of the details of the tex t (the images,
sounds, allusions, forms, etc.). Consider for a moment the individual performer
who prepares a public reading from H am let. The perform er chooses the second
scene of the play, in which Hamlet listens to Claudius' address to the court a t
Elsinore. The perform er is conscious of the fac t th at Hamlet is conscious of his
uncle's insincerity in the scene. During the actual performance, the perform er
must "live through" or embody Hamlet's intentional a c t at this particular
moment in the drama.
Intentionality can be clarified by reflecting on Richard Schm itt's
comments on the intentional act in term s of our specific subject.

Consider the

acto r or reader who is trying to determine the object of Hamlet's intentional
focus when he first enters his uncle's presence in the aforementioned scene. Is
he "self-conscious?" Is his mother the focus of his attention or is it Claudius or
Ophelia perhaps?

What is the figure and what constitutes the background or

context of his lived experience a t this moment?

In this case there are many

intentional choices that can be made in the performer's encounter with the
character,

many of which would involve

the

embodiment

of

Hamlet's

attributional behavior. In fac t, we can read Schmitt's theoretical description of
the intentional act in light of these different "pre-formative" choices:
Of some performances I can say: This time I did it right; last
time I did it badly. Therefore, I possess criteria for proper
performance. If asked what these criteria are, I may not be able to
put them into words, but I know them in the sense that I use them
and, in many cases, I can, upon reflection, sta te what they are. I
have then, by means of reflection, produced knowledge th at
___________corresponding to the knowledge how __________ which I
possessed all along. This is what happens when I vary an example
freely in imagination: I am always able to discriminate between
the thing th at I would recognize as a certain object and the thing
th at I would either take as a different kind of object or about
which I would not know what to say. But only upon reflection can I
verbalize the criteria implicit in such a recognition by stating the
essential features of any given kind of object.
This description of phenomenological intentionality reads very much like an ideal
description of what the perform er does when she or he tries out different
interpretations and performance choices during the rehearsal period.
Contrary to popular belief, Husserl did not think that a person is always
conscious of some thing, but that a focal object is always present to
consciousness. The m ental a c t of constituting this focal object is what Husserl
refers to as intentionality.

^ S c h m itt, p. 142.

A person is conscious of a peripheral "ground" as
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well, or what Husserl called a "co-present margin."

This margin can be

transcendent such as the performer's awareness of is own clenched hand as he
performs his opening scene as Hamlet or, it may be immanent, as in the
perform er's marginal awareness of Hamlet's memory of his father when he first
addresses Claudius. Put simply, Husserl is saying th at we are always conscious
of a ground as well as a figure, of the whole field of consciousness as well as the
intentional focus, just as this young prince in scene two must be aware of
Elsinore as well as of Ophelia, of God as well as of Gertrude.
L iterature as Phenomenon
As we read a tex t, as it unfolds in our consciousness, we attend to it, word
by word, image by image, device by device, one experiential moment a t a tim e.
As we prepare a tex t for performance, we attend to different nuances in each
critical re-reading of the tex t.

L et us illustrate this by describing the

imaginative creation of a performance of a specific tex t, say H am let. The
essential features of the tex t, those features th at define and characterize it, are
intuited by the perform er who can bracket any presuppositions about himself and
in doing so can "experience" the text through the use of choices derived from
free fancy.

Intentionality is the key to the essential description of such a

method. The reader is "intending" the tex t as a blueprint of choices; but, in an
experiential sense, the tex t is intending the reader as well. They enter into a
unique transactional relationship in which they constitute each other. They do
this by way of mutual attributions, as I will show later. The reader seeks to
discover the essential features of the tex t in order to communicate them to an
audience; the "gaze" of the reader, to use a Husserlian image, is returned by the
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tex t which is constituted, not as a thing-in-itself, but as the reader’s intentional
experience of it.
In phenomenological term s, what we intend is present to us. The tex t is a
presence to the reader, and presence is the beginning of clarity. David Michael
Levin has stated succinctly the relation of the phenomenological presence of
te x t to its apprehended clarity: as is often the case with the perform er, Levin
sees the presence of the tex t as visceral and pre-reflective.
Presence is not discursive; it is an unspeakable lucidity, a dis
closing so close to the truth th at the mediation of language, of
concepts, could only be an intervention, hiding the truth forever.
Obviously then, presence cannot be represented; nor can it
represent, unless what it represents is mere absence. Presence is
therefore an event; or, more specifically, it is a performance: for
it in-stances and reveals an essence, being so close to the essence
of what it instances that it suffices, and is there instead.
In all fairness it must be pointed out th at Levin is here discussing the
embodied presence of the theatrical perform ance of avant garde dance, but his
description of presence

applied to a textual presence as well. Only the tex t can

fully present itself; the totality of any tex t cannot be captured by a performance
(as

any actor of Hamlet can appreciate).

But an individual instance of an

encounter with the text of Hamlet does indeed possess essential features unique
to th at perform er with th at text a t th at particular moment. By bracketing the
world, in this case critical presuppositions about Ham let, performing techniques,
and so forth, the perform er can ’’attend to" or reflect on his or her experiential
relationship to the tex t through free fancy.

14

This method of deriving a

David Michael Levin, "The Embodiment of Performance," Salmagundi,
31-32 (Fall, 1975-Winter, 1976), p. 129.
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performance strategy contains all the necessary features of a phenomenon and of
the creative, individualized a c t of forming a performance.

A perform er’s

reflection on his relationship to the character he will embody involves
attribution in a fundamental way.
Roman Ingarden has developed a detailed and interesting perspective of
the structure of a pre-form ative encounter with a tex t.

Fictional objects, he

maintains, possess a unique kind of ontological incompleteness.
objects,

even

concrete

ones,

cannot

be

considered

Of course, all

ontologically

or

epistemologically complete.*® Husserl, Heidegger and others constantly remind
us th at the back of the object of our gaze, that is, what is behind what we see, is
cognitively assumed rather than constituted in sensual reality. But, as Ingarden
1C

says, the tex t contains ’’spots of indeterminacy”

due to the nature of the

lim itations of literary form. The author carefully selects and arranges images,
plot elements, time sequences, e tc . The reader fills in (or simply accepts) these
gaps according to his or her experiential intention. Pre-formance of a tex t then,
is a phenomenon involving an intuiting of textual essences in conjunction with
the conscious reflection on the discrete details (such as events, characters,
objects) of the text as the intended objects of that reflection.
The Phenomenology of Attribution
My second claim is that attribution, or more specifically the "symmetry"
model of Theodore Newcomb, describes an essential elem ent in the experience of

15
Barry Smith, ’'Ingarden vs. Meinong and the Logic of Fiction,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41 (Sept.-Dee., 1980), p. 97.
^ S m ith , p. 96.
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a tex t.

Given Levin’s description of the tex t itself as a "performance" and

Ingarden's description of its "ontological incompleteness," we might assume that
a given reader fills in those gaps of indeterminacy and thereby performs an act
which is intentional and dialogically related to the a c t of telling th at is
represented by the words on the page.
Another way of describing this phenomenon is to see the encounter with
the text as a series of effects. E ffects are perceived to be related to causes in
the human mind; and, the causes given to explain critical choices in a
performance are never simply assumed; rather, they are correctly or incorrectly
attrib uted by the reader or the audience member. These attributional choices
may involve intrinsic m atters ("Why does Hamlet insult Ophelia?"), or extrinsic
m atters ("Why don't I, as perform er, like Laertes' behavior at his sister's
funeral?"). On a more mundane level, many an audience member has attributed
a staged fall to the accidental clumsiness of an actor instead of to the cra ft of a
good fight director. Attribution theory seeks to define the structure of human
attributional behaviors such as those involved in critical or performance
responses.
Newcomb's symmetry

model is an attem p t

a t a diagram of an

intersubjective human experience. Its focus on the structure of the experiential
phenomenon of social encounters renders it legitim ately phenomenological.
There are only three essential elem ents in the model: a person (P), and other
(O), and an object (X). The model can function without the other (O), in which
case it is a simple schem atic of the Husserlian paradigm with P focusing
intentionally on the object (X) and X returning the gaze of P. The double arrows
between P and X connect the object experientially to P, so that they cannot
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exist independently of each other and retain their "is-ness." X is X only as it is
presented to P's consciousness. 17
P

The model is complicated yet made more relevant and generalizable by
the addition of another person (O) to the experience. The model now diagrams
an interpersonal encounter, a particular type of phenomenon in which two people
(or one person and a text) ''discuss” or encounter some other object. This object
can be either transcendental or immanent. For example, two critics discussing
the performance they are watching are mutually encountering a transcendental
object; they can both see and hear the object of their discussion. On the other
hand, an actor who "questions” the tex t for clues to Hamlet's "problem" is
attending to an immanent object—Hamlet's disposition. That is, the character
Ham let exists only in the perform er's imagination as it is mediated by the
physical tex t, the words on the page.
The situation in which a perform er reads a poem to an audience is another
excellent example of the interpersonal encounter involving an immanent object.
The perform er encounters the audience and the mutual intentional subject of
th a t encounter might be, for example, the textual images of Hamlet's father's
funeral.

17

In the theatrical situation, a perform er (P) engages an audience (O)

Newcomb actually labels his dyad A and B rather than P and O as his
predecessor F ritz Heider labelled them . For our purpose the la tte r designation
will be retained in order to emphasize the experience over the theory.
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concerning a tex t (X). In these circumstances, the tex t becomes an immanent
object, or rather a series of immanent objects, which are subject to the valid or
invalid attributions of perform er and/or audience. The P and the O must intuit
the essence of X as they imaginatively focus their attention on it. An eidetic
description of the pre-form ative act or the perform ative act must privilege the
term s, tex t, perform er, and audience.
Because the symmetry model is phenomenological, it allows us to probe
the ’’interpersonal" experience of performing. It requires th at we focus on the
arrows th at represent the structure of the ’’lived’’ encounter—the encounter of
the actor with the character of Ham let, or the encounter of a perform er with
the narrator of a short story.
Newcomb’s symmetry theory asserts that "we attem pt to influence one
another to bring about symmetry (balance or equilibrium)."

18

Newcomb argues

th a t the attem pts to influence another person are a function of the attraction
one person has for another.

Newcomb is in no way referring to physical

attraction

the

only

here,

but

feeling

of

psychological

comfort

and

consubstantiation (or lack of these qualities) th at the perceiver experiences in
regard to the other consciousness with whom he or she is engaged. If we fail to
achieve symmetry through communication with another person about an object
im portant to both of us we may then change our attitude toward either the other
person or the object in question in order to establish symmetry.
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The

^ L ittlejo h n , p. 203.
^W erner J . Severin and Jam es W. Tankard, Jr., Communication Theories
(New York: Hastings House, 1979), p. 157.
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perform er who rehearses Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily" seeks to achieve a
feeling of symmetry if not only between himself and the narrator, but also
between the narrator and the objects and events of the narration (for example,
Miss Emily’s house). The perform er must be able to embody these relationships
for an audience.

To accomplish this, the perform er completes the symmetry

model by "coming to an understanding" of his own relation to objects immanently
present in the te x t. To realize the narrator’s ambivalent feelings towards Miss
Emily’s house, the perform er must go beyond empathy.

Not only must the

narrator's relation to the house be embodied, but it must be balanced by the
relationship between the listener/perform er and th at very house.

How the

perform er feels about the narrator (or the implied author), and how th at narrator
feels about the house, will determ ine how the perform er feels about the house.
According to most theories of attribution, a person perceives and collates
information about an other's behaviour from three sources:

consistency

information ("How often has the actor done this in the past?" or "What is the
proper 'behavior' of a sonnet?"); distinctiveness information ("How often has the
acto r or the text done this sort of thing in different circumstances?" or "Does
the text remain the same when assuming different modes of given-ness such as
individual versus group performance?"); and consensus information ("How many
other people or texts have done th at sort of thing in those sorts of
circumstances?"). All of these three bear on one question:
covary equally with the actor?" 20

20

"Did the behavior

Stated phenomenologically, people use the

Charles Antaki and Chris Brewin, Attributions and Psychological
Change (New York: Academic Press, 1982), p. 8.
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three aforementioned attribution patterns to direct their intentions of other
people or objects.
A ttribution as Symbolic Action
My third claim is proposed primarily to provide support for my first two
and to remind us th at literatu re is primarily a linguistic construct.

I will

appropriate the theoretical presuppositions of symbolic interactionism to reveal
th a t movement's phenomenological analysis of intentionality. As stated earlier,
symbolic interactionism is a theoretical perspective th at sees interpersonal
encounters as a humanizing social process in which people become active in
shaping their own behavior through the medium of symbols and their meanings. 21
Kenneth Burke's particular form of symbolic interaction is called ''dramatism''
because it is based on a theatrical metaphor. People, says Burke, perform for
each other in everyday communication. He sees humans alone as possessing what
he calls "action" and which he differentiates from anim alistic "motion." "Action
consists of purposeful, voluntary behaviors of individuals.

Dramatism is the

study of action in this sense. Burke believes th at a dram atistic (teleological)
view of people is needed in all of the human disciplines, for human behavior
cannot possibly be understood without it."

22

Burke's theory contains several key parallels with attribution theory and
phenomenology.

Burke sees human communication as "a direct function

of . . . consubstantiality,"

23

or shared meaning of signs and symbols.

The

attem p t to achieve consubstantiality is similar to Newcomb's "strain toward

^ L ittlejo h n , p. 45.
22Littlejohn, p. 56.
23Littlejohn, p. 56.
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symmetry” and the attributional behaviors we employ to reach this sta te of
balance (i.e. consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness) have been shown to be
analogous to phenomenological intentionality. Burke uses a "pentad" to analyze
communication.

It consists of five elements:

act, scene, agent, agency, and

purpose. The essential structure of the act of encountering a tex t is our subject
of inquiry.

The scene of this encounter, whether immanent or transcendent,

whether pre-form ance or perform ance, is analogous to the phenomenological
concept of the horizon or situatedness.

Once again we are reminded th at

context is crucial in encounters. Burke’s third component, the agent, is the P of
our attribution model, the consciousness th at engages the text. Burke
uses the term agency to designate the means by which the agent carries out the
a c t. In the pre-form ative a ct, the agency is no less than the transcendental ego
as it makes reflective critical choices based on the information presented to it
by the tex t. In an actual perform ance, the agent also would include the physical
body of the actor or perform er as it mediates between tex t and audience.
Burke's fifth and final elem ent is the reason for the a c t itself, the purpose, or
the goal of the communication. An actor preparing the role of Hamlet intends it
as a full perform ative embodiment of textual m aterial and the audience
watching such a performance often intends it in the same way.

M isattribution

can occur when spectators intend the textual Hamlet as heroic and are present
with an actor's anti-heroic intention of the same tex t.
Burke's theory of dramatism is, therefore, a context-oriented theory of
communication that privileges the shared system of language. These qualities
allow

us

to

view

symbolic

interactionism

as another

phenomenological
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perspective on the performance of literatu re. Richard Schm itt, in defining the
"intentional act" of consciousness makes obvious some of the parallels:
The intentional act, having four elem ents, is a tetradic relation.
So, for instance is the relation described in the sentence "I placed
the book on the table." Here also there are four elements: the
subject or agent (myself), my action iplacing, what I place (the
book), and the table on which I place it.
Likewise when I, as the perform er of Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily,"
atten d to the narrator of that story as a communication other, I listen (act) to
the language (agency) of the narrator (agent). In another sense, the narrator is
performing the principle act (the a c t of "telling").

In the transactional flow

between narrator and performer, it may often be difficult to tell whether the
listening perform er or the speaking narrator is the principal actor a t a given
moment. Here we will concentrate on the narrator as the primary agent, for it
is the act of telling that the perform er must eventually embody and "live
through" in performance.
Some purpose can usually be attributed to this narrator—a reason why he
is telling the story in a particular way. Also, the telling usually takes place in
some more or less highly defined context or environment (the scene, in Burkean
term s). If the scene is not highly defined, it is often helpful for the perform er to
imaginatively flesh out and specify the real or psychological context of the
telling. In any case, the perspective of symbolic interactionism simply reminds
us th at we are looking a t the encounter between a perform er and the fictional

24Schm itt, p. 144.
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personae as a transactional dialogue, meaning th at both parties in the encounter,
in the above case a narrator and a perform er, mutually influence each other as
the communication progresses. The structure of this transaction will be shown
to be essentially the same in structure as those social encounters described by
Theodore Newcomb's symmetry model of social communication. And, the strain
toward symmetry diagrammed by the model, m otivates the attributional patterns
through which we determine the motives or causes of the fictional speaker.
By modifying Newcomb's symmetry, th at is, by replacing the flesh-andblood other (O) with a fictional speaker and adding to the model the
figure/ground concept of intentional consciousness, we can render the model
phenomenological and specific to the pre-form ative experience of a tex t. This
can be done with the simple addition of the phenomenological "ground," context,
or horizon to the existing model.
First, and perhaps most im portant, is the communicative context, or what
Husserl might call the "co-present margin" of the performer; this would include
any past or present experience or knowledge that consciously or even
subconsciously affects the perform er's perception of the text.

Perform er
All co-present experience
of the reader/perform er J
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As stated above, this attributional theory of the act of performance, will
privilege the perform er’s constitution of the text as the voiced utterance of an
other consciousness (O).

Newcomb’s model also includes the subject of the

discourse or the subject of the ’’conversation" between the two parties in the
communication. This subject may be a concrete object (a house, an other person)
or it may be an idea or a concept (such as love, honor, the South). Of course,
this element of the model changes from moment to moment as the tex t is
performed or read.

Further, the speaking voice of the tex t, whether it is

constituted as the voice of a narrator, a character, or an implied author, also
exists in a communicative context, a field of fictional co-present experience
th a t influences the communication of, say, a narrator, with a perform er.

P - ir—

Perform er

arrator

THE
TEXT
Subject of the discourse
between P and O

The dynamic and intersubjective nature of the pre-formance of literatu re
is illustrated in the model by the two-way arrows th at will be shown to represent
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the flow of attributions between perform er and, in this case, a narrator. The
arrows remind us that the perform er’s encounter with a literary text is a
transactional process. It is dynamic, ongoing, and ever-changing. Both parties in
th e "dyad" mutually constitute each other, primarily by attributing causes for
each other’s behavior.

If we view a perform ative encounter as a "dialogue"

between a narrator, say, and a perform er, both partners—the narrator as well as
the perform er—are intentionally focused on the specific events, images, and
ideas in the text.

When the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" describes the

Grierson house, th at narrator could be said to be intentionally focused on th at
house, as is the "listening" reader. This experience may well be heightened when
the perform er has advanced sufficiently in the building of his or her performance
to put away the tangible script. A fter this point the individual constituents of
the tex t, its ideas, images, language, characters, and so forth, are immanent
objects in the perform er’s mind. Likewise, in the recital hall, both audience and
perform er attend to the tex t as the tem poral flux of word, image, symbol, and
gesture.
Certainly, the individual constituents of a tex t are never the whole
experience of that text; rather, they are figures in an experiential ground. The
perform er is also aware of his or her audience, of the stage, the lights, and his or
her own distracting thoughts or lapses of attention during the perform ance. The
audience often has similar distractions. Bert O. S tates has w ritten cleverly and
insightfully about the phenomenon of the theatrical performance. He cites the
phenomenological example of how the sight of dogs, children, or fire on state
often forces the audience to lose its intentional directedness to the tex t by
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suddenly bringing into focus the "theatrical convention.”

In such cases the

te x t is replaced in intentional consciousness by the "production."
The arrows in our first model indicate all the complicated and numerous
relations that exist between perform er, tex t and immanent objects of th at text.
What must be added to complete the experiential picture in the model is the co
present margin, the horizon or ground of the intentional experience. When the
parties in the communicative transaction of a performance, that is the reader
and the audience, focus their consciousnesses on the text, the "other" recedes
into the co-present margin.

An audience member, for example, may have

watched Sarah Burnhart give dram atic readings from H am let. The spectator,
having in a sense bracketed the natural standpoint in order to achieve the
"willing suspension of disbelief," attends to the words of the tex t as Hamlet’s
words, not the actor’s. Burnhart becomes part of the ground in which the figure
o f the tex t functions. For this reason, the co-present margin is situated in the
model so as to place the perform er and the "other" (the text) in respective co
present margins. The immanent content of the text, the text as it is constituted
in the consciousness during the pre-form ative and the perform ative a ct, is the
aesth etic goal of the intentional gaze of each
perform er’s and the other’s.

consciousness involved, the

Only when this intentionality remains on the

imm anent tex t can the world of perform ance technique, theatricality, authorial
intention, and the like stay firmly within the brackets allowing the tex t to
present itself to be appropriated by perform ers and audience members.

25

Bert O. States, ’T he Dog on Stage:
L iterary History, 14(Winter, 1983), pp. 373-88.

T heatre as Phenomena," New

33
It has been demonstrated th at human beings attrib u te causes to the
behavior of others. It has been suggested that such attributional behavior is a
phenomenon manifested in the perform er's response to a tex t or the audience's
response to a performed text. The perspectives of phenomenology and symbolic
interaction have been presented as viable descriptions of the structure of preform ative and perform ative events. In these two aesthetic "situations" the tex t
is mediated by human experience, particularly the experience of attribution in
determining

the

causes

of

a

text's

"behavior."

The

tex t,

as

it

is

phenomenologically presented to the intentional consciousness, assumes the
privileged position which enables it to become the subject of reflection, a
reflection that justifies the original purpose of most performances: the mutual
sharing and enrichment of literary encounters thorough human experience.
Directions for this Study
The following chapters will attem p t a phenomenological description of
how attribution functions in the perform ance of literatu re, concentrating on
"pre-form ance" encounters with a tex t. The second chapter will provide a more
detailed analysis of attributional patterns described in current literature.
C hapter three will explore the concept of the text-as-an-other, and introduce
some helpful theories of M. M. Bakhtin and Martin Heidegger. Chapter four will
place Newcomb's symmetry model into a phenomenological context, and produce
a descriptive model of the "pre-form ative" encounter with a literary work. A
brief concluding chapter will review the new attribution-based theory and will
adapt the model to the situation of the public performance of a tex t. It is the
goal of this study to produce a model th at will illuminate the experience of
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performance, and also to suggest some rehearsal methods which will aid
perform ers in fuller, richer interpersonal experiences with the narrators they
m eet in literature.

Chapter Two
THE FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTION IN THE PERFORMER’S
EXPERIENCE OF A NARRATOR
An unemployed man is turned down for a prospective job. He comforts
himself with the knowledge that the employer "must have been trying to fill a
quota of women." A high school student with high math scores on standardized
aptitude tests is failing algebra.

When questioned by her guidance counselor

about a possible explanation, her reply is th at she "has just never been able to do
math."

The

dem ocrat-on-the-street

decides th at he "just doesn’t like

Republicans" and term inates his weekly racquetball game with a Republican
friend. A perform er preparing a public reading of William Faulkner's "A Rose
For Emily" decides that the story's narrator is sexist.
All of these individuals are exhibiting an extrem ely common psychological
behavior called attribution. Attribution theories are concerned with how human
beings arrive a t determinations of the causes of everyday events, particularly
the causes of the behavior of others. A person's attribution of cause may be in
response to an event ("Why didn't I do well on th at test?"), to an object ("Why
can't I learn about cars?"), to the perception of some other person ("Why is she
hiding the fac t th at she doesn't like me?"), or even to one's self-perception ("I
just don't get along well with children").
Any one of these beliefs about causation is an example of one of the many
varieties of attribution.

In the last tw enty years, research and inquiry

concerning attribution has become increasingly important to such varied
disciplines as psychology, sociology, communication, education, and even
35
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philosophy. Kelley and Miehela report th at there have been approximately 900
pieces of work in attribution theory since its official beginning in 1958.* Another
recent text asserts th at, "Based upon the sheer volume of empirical research, the
attribution theory perspective can be regarded as the primary paradigm in
o
contemporary social psychology."* Most attribution studies concern either
intrapersonal or interpersonal communication.

Not surprisingly, attribution

theory incorporates several im portant interpersonal theories into its field of
inquiry,

particularly

the

theories

of

cognitive

dissonance,

balance

and

congruence.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief history of the
development of attribution theory in order to describe

the concept of

psychological imbalance (assymetry) which is central to this study. This short
review of attribution literature will provide the basis for the summary list of
attribution patterns that conclude the chapter. This list is prefatory to chapter
three,

which will describe how these attribution patterns work in the dyadic

encounter between a perform er and the narrator of a given text, William
Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily." At the end of this chapter, a basic model of
attribution (Newcomb’s Symmetry Model) will be proposed as the core of a model
th at will describe how attribution functions in the engagement between narrators
and perform ers.

Charles Antaki, "A Brief Introduction to Attribution and Attributional
Theories, in Attributions and Psychological Change, ed. C harlies Antaki and
Chris Brewin (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 19827, p. 6.
2

Marvin E. Shaw and Phillip R. Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 232.
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Basie Assumptions of Attribution Theory
Stephen

Littlejohn

reports

th at

attribution

theory

"uses

a

phenomenological view of interpersonal perception, investigating the processes
by which people make inferences about themselves and others."5* Unlike other
psychological

theories

of communication, attribution

experiential rather than an empirical world view.

theory

assumes

an

That is, its subject is

experience rather than objective phenomena. At the risk of over-simplification,
this world view may be described as subjective (as opposed to empirical) or
inductive (as opposed to deductive). The attribution theorist assumes th at "part
of knowledge is a priori; th a t reality results from human interpretation. Reality
is in flux and exists only in context. Most knowledge is implicit or tac it. Reality
is in personal experience."

4

The world view of such theorists then, sees human

knowledge as a construct of the individual which results from the "symbolic
interaction" between persons or, more generally, from "transactions between the
knower and the known."5’ It is crucial to the understanding of the attribution
process to keep in mind this experiental view of the subject because it accounts
not only for the broad range of attribution studies, but also for the difficulty
researchers have had in measuring and quantifying results of the more
empirically-styled experiments.
Bernard Weiner, one of the more empirical researchers, defines another

3

Stephen W. Littlejohn, "An Overview of Contributions to Human
Communication Theory from Other Disciplines," in Human Communication
Theory, ed. Frank E. X. Dance (New York: Harper and Rowe Pub., 1982), p. 264.
4Littlejohn, p. 264.
5Littlejohn, p. 264.
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basic assumption of attribution. Weiner's field of inquiry, like that of the actor
or performer, is human motivation, and in his description of attribution he
echoes other theorists in aligning the m ental process of attribution closely with
logic:
A central assumption of attribution theory, which sets it apart
from pleasure pain theories of m otivation, is th at the search for
understanding is the (or a) basic "spring of action." This does not
imply that human beings are not pleasure-seekers, or that they
never bias information in the pursuit of hedonistic goals. Rather,
information seeking and veridical processing are believed to be
normative, may be m anifested in spite of a conflicting pleasure
principle, and, a t the least, comprehension stands with hedonism
among the primary sources of m otivation.6
Weiner is referring to dyadic encounters between human beings here, but
his description can also be applied to the experience a reader has with the
narrator of a novel, short story, or poem. This observation is particularly true
when the reader is planning to give a performance of the tex t. In such cases, the
reader experiences the narrator many tim es during rehearsals and must
consciously reflect on th at narrator's verbal behavior if the perform er is to
successfully embody, or become, the narrator in perform ance.
When I seek a full understanding of a prose tex t, one that I wish to
perform for an audience, I might do well to begin dram atistically. I might ask
myself who this narrator is. I must also make inferences about who the narrator
is addressing and about the situation or context in which the utterance occurs.
Weiner implies strongly th at logical cognitive processes have a great deal to do

g

Bernard Weiner, "A Theory of Motivation for Some Classroom
Experiences," in Perspectives on Attribution Theory and Research: The Bielefeld
Symposium, ed. Deitmar Gorlitz (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1980), p. 40.
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with the attributions we make about an other’s behavior. This "logic" is present
even if the other's behavior causes us discomfort, sadness, pain, outrage, or any
other emotion that is not pleasurable in the simplest sense of that word.
William Faulkner's novel The Sound and the Fury, for example, is narrated
in part by Benjy Compson, a retarded man in his thirties.

As a perform er, I

experience Benjy primarily on a verbal level, since I must read rather than hear
his discourse. His behavior may exasperate or shock me; but if I am going to
fully know Benjy's experience, I must infer motives for his actions. In doing so, I
will be using the quasi-logical process called attribution.
Other than the fac t th at attribution is experiential, phenomenological and
closely related to logical cognition, there are widely differing perspectives on
the attribution process which are perhaps most apparent in the descriptions of
models of types of attribution. These models have evolved in the direction of
increasing complexity, but have revealed a surprisingly small number of
attributional "patterns." A brief chronological overview of the development of
these

models

reveals

the

richness

and

diversity

of

this

generic

and

comprehensive "m other-theory." Such a history will also reveal the degree to
which

intrapersonal

experience

depends

on

deep

feelings of "balance,"

"congruence," or "symmetry" within the perceiver. Finally, this summary will
introduce the seminal work of F ritz Heider and Theodore Newcomb, which is
crucial to my proposed model.
A Very Brief History of Attribution Theory
The study of the causes of human behavior is a t least as old as recorded
history; Tragedy (arguably the oldest form of literary art) seeks to justify (i.e. to
discover the causes of) "the ways of God to man." However, the contemporary
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investigation into the process of attribution can be said to have had its genesis in
the balance theories of F ritz Heider. In 1958, Heider, an early German G estalt
psychologist who emigrated to America in 1931, published his major statem ent
on what was to become a primary theory of attribution. Heider's proposition was
th at "a major, if not the major job of the perceiver in understanding the world,
social as well as physical, was to find the underlying causes of the things th at he
or she saw happening within it . . . ."^

Heider's work has channeled all

subsequent research into two primary attribution patterns. What Heider did was
to break down ordinary explanations into two sorts—personal and environmental
causes. In other words, Heider believed th at persons find the causes of things to
be the product of either external environmental forces or internal behaviors of
individuals. This breakdown has been a common elem ent in most of the recent
work in attribution.
Heider arrived a t his theory in an interesting way. In his very first paper
on attribution, published with Marianne Simmel in 1944, he describes an
experiment in which deaf children were shown a film in which several abstract
geom etric figures (a circle and two triangles) moved about randomly.

When

questioned about their reactions to the film, nearly all of the children perceived
Q
the movement "in term s of some kind of give and take between persons." Heider
reports that the subjects found it all but impossible to discuss the film without
anthropomorphic descriptions of the interaction of the geom etric shapes. This

7

Charles Antaki and Chris Brewin, Attributions and Psychological Change
(New York: Academic Press, 1982), p. 6.
g

Fritz Heider, "On Balance and Attribution," in Perspectives on
A ttribution Theory and Research: The Bielefeld Symposium, ed. Deitm ar Gorlitz
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980), p. 12.
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study made Heider realize "the great importance that attribution places in
person perception, attribution understood here as the connection between a
perceived change (Geschehen) and a person conceived of as causing the change by
some action."

g

There is an abundance of more recent studies which similarly suggest our
human

tendency

towards

anthropomorphism

and

attributions

of

cause.

Experiments such as those of Michotte reinforce the notion th at our perceptions
of real or fictional others, are quite similar.
The Belgian psychologist Michotte (1963) reports a number of
simple experiments which show that people immediately perceive
causality. A small object, A, glides along and touches a stationary
object, B. A stops and B immediately begins moving in the
direction A would have taken. In this situation subjects say th at A
pushed B or caused B to move. If, on the other hand, the
movement of B is delayed for a brief tim e (more than 0.2 seconds)
a fte r A strikes it, the perception of causality is destroyed. From
this small demonstration we can a t least say th at subjects have a
bias toward using causal language; moreover, there is every
evidence th at the perception of causality in this situation is direct
and immediate.
If humans perceive geom etric objects anthropomorphically and attribute
causes to the "behavior" of these objects, likewise we may do the same thing
when we encounter Faulkner’s Benjy, Melville’s Ishmael, or even Jane Austen, as
she narrates her novels.

Phenomenological descriptions of our experiences of

real or fictional others can help us to focus on the m ental processes which
control our perceptions. If I wish to embody my perception of Ishmael, I must be

9Heider, p. 12.
^ A lb e rt H. Hastorf, David J. Schneider, and Judith Polefka, Person
Perception (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 63-64.
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able to describe it, and my description is likely to include what I perceive are
causes.
Attribution theory can reveal to me the structure of th at perception,
allowing me to study my own response to Ishmael.

If I can discover why I

perceive his behavior in a certain way, I can clear my mind of presuppositions,
prejudices, and expectations, and perhaps get closer to the inner life of this
character by attributing motivations for his symbolic actions. Only then can I
honestly embody him in performance.

Heider's work, since it is essentially

intrapersonal, can aid the perform er in categorizing his or her attributions
concerning a narrator’s behavior.
Heider's second paper, also published in 1944, is based on Wertheimer’s
famous laws of unit-form ation which sta te th at ’’parts of a visual field which are
close together or are similar to each other will be seen as belonging together, as
forming one unit.'’** Heider extends these factors to influence any phenomenal
causation. For example, an aesthetic judgment of high artistic value will carry
more weight if given by someone of high prestige because th at ’’prestige’’ will
place the critic in closer proximity to the concept ’’a rt’’ or ’’g reat a rt’’ than one
would perceive an unknown critic.

Similarly, in Browning’s poem "My Last

Duchess," the narrator, the Duke of F errara, is placed in close proximity to his
a rt collection. But it is this very closeness th at causes me to perceive him as
distanced from human and personal considerations.

I feel a psychological

imbalance or lack of moral sim ilarity between myself and the Duke. The Duke's
closeness and affinity to his wife's portrait are causes of my attribution of

1B e id e r, P. 12-13.
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coldness and aestheticism to his character.

On a more literal level, a man

running down a stre e t one block from a bank th at has just been robbed could
easily be perceived as a suspect simply because of the physical proximity
between object (bank) and person. Heider's formula for this im portant law of
attribution is written thus:

If a ^ p , there is a tendency to attribute a to p.
(a=act, p=person,/-^= "is related to").
Heider's term "balance" then, deals with the fundamental human tra it of
attem pting to make order out of the chaos of sensual phenomena. This attem p t
often takes the form of attributing sim ilarity to objects because they are close
in proximity, or attributing close proximity to objects because they are similar.
All human stereotypes are based on this principle.

A ttitudes, feelings and

emotions are not considered in Heider's balance model, only "interactions
between causal units and other units. For instance, how may the appearance of a
causal unit be induced by sim ilarity or how may a belief in a causal unit induce
phenomenal similarity?"

13

A freshman who believes that a major interest in the

fine arts induces snobbery, may actually perceive the phenomenon of snobbery in
graduate students of the music departm ent. The fac t that Browning's Duke is so
much prouder of the painting of his wife, than he was of the lady herself, causes
me to attribute coldness and aestheticism to his character. Describing reasons
for the behavior of others makes it possible for me to understand them b etter. I
am lead to a feeling of psychological balance when I can say "I know why he did

12Heider, p. 13.
^ H eid e r, p. 16.
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th at and I can cite the behavior that lets me know it."
As Heider himself defines it, "balance deals with relations of relations;
and dyadic arrangements in which the relations of the two items are all positive
1A
or all negative will be harmonious,"1
and seem to have order. When I see the

Duke's relation to the portrait and to his wife as negative, I feel th at I
understand his essential character and therefore feel comfortable with my
attributions because I understand their causes.
Attribution and Person Perception
In 1965 Jones and Davis developed a more specific model based on
Heider's balance theory.

Their model was restricted to human behavior and

concerned itself with "how people decided th at what a person did was due to
some long lasting tra it the person possessed."

15

The major proposition of the

model, called the Theory of Correspondence Inference, is th at the more a
perceiver could discount external causes, the more he or she could explain
another's behavior by internal or dispositional causes.

Here again is the

distinction between the two basic types of attributions, external/environm ental
and internal/dispositional. The form er is how I come to understand situations.
The la tte r is how I come to know characters.
The correspondence model is based on two simple formulas.

The first

deals with the number of unique features of a behavior, which Jones and Davis
refer to as non-common e ffe c ts.

The perceiver first calculates the range of

effects likely to be produced by the other's action, then reckons the effects of

^ H eid e r, p. 18.
^ A n tak i, p. 7.
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whatever actions he or she had decided against.

If there is little or no

overlapping in the two sets of effects, those actually produced and those which
were consciously decided against by the other, then the perceiver cannot be
accurate in deciding "which of the effects of the chosen action had been
specially significant in making the (other's) mind up."16 In other words, the less
unique the effects of a person's actions are, the less likely is an observer able to
decide on the motivation for that action. In the Browning poem, the Duke insists
th a t only he can draw the curtain revealing the portrait of his last duchess. This
action is distinct enough to allow me to attrib u te a disposition for "ownership"
and "privilege" to his character. The Duke's most reasonable alternative would
be to allow a servant to draw the curtain, but he has consciously decided against
this action.

His insistence about reserving this particular task for himself

produces an effect of submission on the part of the emissary who is the listener
to the Duke's discourse. It is the uniqueness (i.e. the degree) of this e ffe ct of
submissiveness that allows me to attrib u te dispositional qualities to the Duke.
The second formula in the Jones and Davis model concerns desirability;
How socially desirable is the unique (or non-common) e ffe ct of a particular
action? For many years in this country, "pornographic" literatu re was defined as
literatu re th at was consciously designed to have one (and only one) unique
e ffe c t—to arouse sexual desire in the reader.

This e ffe ct was socially

undesirable. Many writers of the realistic period (such as Ibsen, Gorky, or Zola)
d ealt with socially undesirable subject m atter such as venereal disease and
prostitution.

These writers might have chosen to explicitly describe physical

^ A n ta k i, p. 7.
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symptoms of syphilus or the details of the sexual a c t.

According to the Jones

and Davis Model, the fact that these w riters did not choose to be explicit about
these m atters, is not likely to be due to some particular disposition on their part
to avoid such description, but rather to the external constraints placed on them
by social desirability. In short, "people use information about a person’s choices
and their consequences to arrive a t a decision about his or her personal
dispositions."1^ These inferences are rationally connected either to dispositions
of the person, or to environmental and social forces beyond the person’s control.
Both Heider and Jones and Davis assume th at perceivers make logical (if
not always correct) inferences based on received information. But it was H. H.
Kelley who, in 1967, devised a model th at combined Heider’s internal and
external bases for attributions under the principles of logical m ental analysis.
Kelley's work analyzed a particular type of communication situation. Whereas
Jones and Davis had dealt with instances in which the perceiver could discover
information about only one behavior of the other, Kelley extended his model to
include those cases in which the perceiver knew something about the history of
the other person’s previous behaviors. This is often true of our experience of
literary narrators. Even in so short a poem as "My Last Duchess," I infer th at
the second wife's fate may be similar to th at of the first wife because I have
already attributed certain stable dispositions to the Duke. As I read a novel, I
build up in my memory a repertoire of narrative behaviors and use them to infer
future behaviors.

For example, I have grown accustomed to Jane Austen's

tongue being in her cheek when she makes unqualified pronouncements. I know

^ A n tak i, p. 11.
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th at it will be profitable to read Austen's novel Emma, even though I am familiar
with a le tte r of hers describing the heroine as a character "no one but myself
will much like."

Irony is a consistent behavior of Austen's narrators and of

Austen herself.

Anyone who has read much Austen knows to take the first

sentence of, say, Pride and Prejudice with a grain of salt.
Kelley states that the perceiver collates information about behavior from
three sources: consistency information (how often has the actor done this in the
past?), distinctiveness information (how often has the actor done this in different
circumstances?) and consensus information (How many other people have done
th a t sort of thing in those sorts of circumstances?).*®’*® All these three bear on
one question:

Did the behavior covary

isomorphically) with the actor?

equally

(that

is, did it

vary

In other words, Kelley is stating that in

searching for the causes of other people's behaviors, a person tends to look
(either consciously or unconsciously) "for the causal candidate which is most
closely associated historically with the event being explained." 20
Thus far I have concentrated on how attribution functions in the preform ative a ct, when the actor is the textual narrator and the observer is the
rehearsing perform er.

But attribution is also a t work in the recital hall or

th eatre during the performance; the only difference is th at the perform er

*®Antaki, p. 8.
19These three elements are combined into "high Consensus" and "high
consistency" in Robert Raron and Don Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding
Human Interaction, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1977).
20Antaki, p. 8.
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becomes the "actor" of the model, and the audience takes the part of the
observer.
Actor’s Versus Observer’s Attributions; The Performance Situation
The term s actor and observer can become confusing unless we remember
the dual focus of this study. We are investigating the functions of attribution in
(1) pre-formance and (2) the actual situation of public perform ance.

In the

form er situation, the narrator is the actor, and the perform er is the observer
who listens and attributes causes to the narrator’s behaviors. In the recital hall,
the performer becomes the actor as she/he embodies the narrative voice. The
audience members observe the perform er’s behaviors and attrib u te them, either
to the environment of the perform ance, or to the "stable" disposition of the
performer.
As a performance progresses, audiences usually shift the focus of their
attention from the perform er to the fictional personal embodied by th at
perform er.

That is, audiences privilege the fictional characters over the

perform er as perform er. When this event occurs, the audience’s attributions are
to these fictional persona and are still of two basic types—dispositional or
environmental. In the former case we a ttrib u te a character’s actions to some
stable disposition of his or her personality; in the la tte r case, we see the fictive
world as the primary cause of a character's actions.
Of course, in the performance of non-dram atic texts, there is often little
or no conscious differentiation in the minds of the audience, between the
perform er and the narrator. In the eyes of the audience, the two often coalesce
into one actor: the narrator of the tex t. Nevertheless, when we attend to the
performance as the actions of a fictional narrator, we do not forget the
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perform er, we simply de-privilege th at perform er, placing him or her in the
peripheral

consciousness

while

we

attend

to

the

fictional

persona.

Experientially, audience members often enter into a "dialogue" with the fictional
narrator more than with the performer who embodies that narrator. It is true
th at we usually encounter the perform er as perform er first, and then gradually
th a t perform er recedes into the peripheral consciousness as we focus on the
embodied narrator.
Consider, for example, the theatrical situation in which a well-known
acto r (a "star," if you will) steps out onto the stage in the role of Hamlet. It is
not uncommon for an audience, upon recognizing the actor, to burst into
applause, momentarily interrupting the dram atic

illusion.

The audience

collectively experiences the actor as a perform er, not as Ham let. It may take
several moments of concentration by both the perform er and the audience for
the "star" to recede and the audience to focus its attention on the character of
Hamlet.
Attribution research suggests th at the attributional patterns of actors
differs from those of observers. This is true whether the actor is performing
Ham let or simply interacting symbolically through language in the course of a
social conversation. In both interpersonal and fictional encounters, an actor is
placed in relation to one or more observers. The current trend in attribution
theory is to distinguish between the attributions of observers and those of actors.
Using the terminology of attribution theory, we may define actor as anyone who
is performing an action, whether in real life or in fiction. In this study, I am
reserving the term "performer" to designate anyone who takes on and embodies
fictional persona. The term "actor," while it includes the "performer" is simply a
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broader generic designation that can also include social encounters.
There is one crucial difference in the attributional tendencies of actors as
compared with those of observers.

K. G. Shaver, in attem pting to summarize

research on the actor/observer distinction, concludes that "actors tend to
attrib u te the causes of their behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation, while
observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the a c t o r I n
other words, during those relatively passive moments when we observe others,
we tend to look for personality tra its to explain their behavior. But when we are
acting (in everyday life or on a stage), we tend to see the social or physical
environment as the primary cause of our behavior.
When perform ers embody the narrative voice in a work of prose fiction,
they often focus their creative consciousnesses on the epic situation, the
"telling" of the story.

In such instances the narrator becomes the actor.

Perform ers would do well to become aware th at it is a human tendency to
attrib u te one’s own actions to environment and to possibly forget the
dispositional causes for their own actions.

It is also true that narrators, like

characters in a traditional play, are responding to a situational context rather
than simply responding to their own internal dispositions. They tend to respond
to the world rather than to themselves. Likewise, when I embody the narrator of
"A Rose For Emily," I must place myself imaginatively in th at narrator's
experiential context and respond to th at rather than to my own personal
insecurities as a perform er.

I must forget my struggles with the narrator’s

southern accent, for example, and respond to the audience as if they were the
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narratee implied in the story. Or, if I decide to place a narratee on stage with
me, and focus on him, I would bracket the audience and locate my fictional world
solely on the stage.
In many ways, attribution is a process of mirroring, a mirroring of
ourselves. We look to the others in literary texts for confirmation of our own
beliefs, for reassurances about our fears, for advice, and for fulfillment of
certain fantasies.

One of the most basic problems of literary criticism is the

tendency of readers to see in texts only those elements with which they can
agree or feel com fortable.

Psychological balance is something we all seek

between ourselves and the others we encounter. There is ample evidence th at
people will go to great lengths to rationalize another's behavior in order to
justify it, or to in some way bring it into balance with his or her own inner sta te .
One of the most common errors made in encountering others is projection.
There is disagreement among psychologistat as to just what this term means,
but, for our purposes projection refers to the tendency to attribute to others
feelings th at are really our own.

22

If I know, for example, th at as a Southerner,

I am chronically critical of what I assume to be the racial prejudice of other
Southerners, I must be careful not to project those holier-than-thou feelings onto
the Southern narrator of "A Rose For Emily." In this case projection (attributing
to others attitudes that are really our own) is merely a very strong form of
attribution. Too much projection in social engagements is aberrant and can lead
to

m isattributions with negative communicative consequences.

For the

perform er, not only can projection result in the serious m isinterpretation of a
te x t, but it can prevent the perform er (or the general reader) from the empathic,

99

Antaki, p. 10.

52
experiential involvement that is required if literatu re is to expand our lived
experience as human beings.
I must allow the narrator's discourse to disclose itself to me; and, in order
to do this I must bracket my presuppositions, allowing the other to be as he or
she truly and fully is.

To avoid projection or other misattribution we must

refle ct carefully on our attributions about literary others. A knowledge of the
structures and functions of attribution can aid the perform er in the self
reflection necessary to his or her understanding of the behavior of a narrator.
Many of the attribution theorists, regardless of their individual emphases,
agree th at the conscious m ental processes of humans are essentially rational,
th a t is, th a t the structures

of our responses to others are logical structures,

based on perceived connections between actions, dispositions, and environments.
It must be mentioned here th at several researchers such as E. J . Langer and
Daryl Bern have called this notion into question. Bern (1967) goes so far as to
suggest th at attributions are often no more than "guesses based on overt
behavior." 23 Bern brings the theories of attribution to bear specifically on self
perception, using the models of Kelley and of Jones and Davis. In doing so, Bern
opens up a new line of inquiry in the study of attribution. Kelley's and Jones’ and
Davis' models concentrate on the judgments of an observer; Bern extends their
models to cover the actions of the actor as well, suggesting th at, in some cases,
acto rs cannot rely on their own private information (about consistency,
distinctiveness, or consensus) in explaining what they are doing or what is

23Antaki, p. 11.
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happening to them.

"They use what they can see or hear (in the contextual

moment), just as an observer would

9d

This concept may prove helpful for the perform er of literature. During a
public performance, the good perform er "forgets" or places into the peripheral
consciousness her/his own ego and personality in order to become the narrator in
the tex t. That embodied narrator does not reflect on his/her own attributions
but rather, as Bern suggests, on the contextual moment, the "is-ness" of th at
moment. The narrator is caught up in the world of the story or poem.
However, what one experiences in performance, i.e. the lived experience
of the literary other, is the result of a long process of self-reflection during preformance.

As I prepare a perform ance of "A Rose For Emily," I react to a

narrator; but I also reflect on my reaction and analyze my own attributions
concerning the narrator's behavior. During the rehearsal period, a knowledge of
the structures of attribution can being the perform er to a fuller understanding of
the interior life of the narrator and can also help the perform er analyze his or
her own deep response to that narrator.
Attribution theory is phenomenological in its insistence on the importance
of context. As a perform er, a knowledge of attribution can help to remind me
always to check to see whether the other's behavior is a simple result of his or
her own stable disposition, or, as is more often the case, a result of complex
situational and dispositional factors.

When I live

through a narrator's

dispositional tendencies and his or her situations context, I am doing something
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close to what professional actors refer to as "creating a subtext." I am looking
behind the narrator's utterance for the motivations and internal thoughts th at
cause the utterance.
Festinger and the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
One of the several important researchers who have concentrated on the
attributions of actors rather than observers is Leon Festinger. He has proposed
two theories crucial to the understanding of attribution. The first, published in
1954, is Festinger's theory of social comparison which "assumes the existence of
a basic drive within individuals to evaluate their own opinions and to compare
their abilities with those of other people."

25

Festinger maintains that, when we

can find no objective or nonsocial means for evaluating our own behavior, we
must resort to comparison with others.

26

Admired people, whether real or

fictional, become mirrors of what we hope to become and our self-esteem is
largely dependent on the comparison of ourselves to these others. For example,
an adult son might attribute professional failure to himself if he was not "as far
along as his father was" a t the same age. Likewise, a reader might dismiss his or
her own carefully considered interpretation of a soliloquy of Hamlet's because it
was in opposition to the views of Coleridge, A. C. Bradley, or Northrop Frye.
In the pre-formance situation, the actor is the story's narrator who speaks
to an observer, the reader.

It may seem close to ridiculous to speak of a

fictional actor, the narrator, say, of "A Rose For Emily," as making attributions.
This difficulty is overcome if we keep in mind the phenomenological perspective
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which breaks down distinctions between subject (reader) and object (narrator). I
constitute the narrator as an other and, although denied the crucial non-verbal
modes of person perception, I am peripherally aware of that narrator’s
"perception” of me, the reader.

This concept has surfaced in recent literary

theory as the "implied reader" or the "narratee." In many texts there are obvious
clues that signal such narrative attributions to the reader or listener. A brief
example will serve to illustrate.
There are many indications that the narrator of "A Rose For Emily,"
attributes a certain age and sex to the listener to his discourse. The women in
the story are consistently referred to as "they" or "them" and are obviously a
class of people from whom the narrator and the listener are excluded. Given the
historical setting of the narrator's telling of this story, and the implied sexism of
his language, it is probable th at the narrator attributes "maleness" to the
listener.

Likewise, when the narrator refers to the "next generation, with its

more modern ideas," it would not be irrational to infer that he is excluding the
listener from that "next generation." Indeed, part of the power of this story lies
in the comfortable relationship between the narrator and the listener, who seems
to share the narrator's subtly sexist viewpoint as well as his approximate age. In
short, the narrator attributes dispositional sim ilarities to himself and the
listener, making the narrative contract masculine, com fortable, and almost
intim ate. There are, of course, other possible readings of this tex t.
could be made for a female narrator, for example.

A case

This reading is a good

example of textual probabilities arrived a t via attributional behavior.
All of these conclusions might be debatable. It is true th at attributions by
a reader are more frequent and obvious than those "attributions" made by the
narrator within the text.

The point here is th at interpretations were achieved
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through attributional behavior of the part of the reader/perform er. Knowledge
of attributional patterns makes it possible for the performer to reflect more
critically on his or her own interpretative strategies.

In the above example,

attributions about the narrator were based largely on the reader’s "social
comparison" of himself with the narrator just as Festinger suggests people
behave in the social world.
Festinger’s second theory, th at of "cognitive dissonance," is closely
related to his first. Published in 1957, the theory states that two elements of
knowledge "are in dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse
of one element would follow from the other."

27

The feeling of dissonance in

such a case would be psychologically uncomfortable and the person would be
impelled to rationalize this dissonant tension into a feeling of consonance or
balance.

This rationalization process is, of course, attribution.

A famous

historical example of dissonance occurred when the playwright Chekhov, who
was on his death-bed, sent his final play to his long-time friend and collaborator,
the director Stanislavsky. The production of the play, The Cherry Orchard, was
one of the few theatrical failures of Chekhov's career.

This failure was due

largely to the fact that Stanislavsky did not receive Chekhov's instructions th at
the play was intended as a new kind of comedy, assumed that a dying man would
w rite a tragedy, and therefore m isinterpreted the play.
m isinterpretation had occurred during the

In fact, a similar

Moscow Art Theatre's earlier

production of Chekhov's The Sea Gull. The playwright's dram atic works up to
this point had been plot-oriented farces such as The Bear and The Marriage
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Proposal. The attributional principle of consistency lead the company to expect
a similar kind of plot-oriented drama in The Sea Gull. "The director and actors
were unable to understand the concept of a drama in which mood and talk was
OO

more im portant than plot and action, and the play was a failure."'2'0
Congruity Theory
The concept of psychological imbalance as a primary cause of attributions
has taken many theoretical forms th at are more apparent than real. According
to Severin and Tankard, "a relationship may be logically inconsistent to an
observer while psychologically consistent to an individual who holds the obverse
beliefs."

OQ

The doctor who is waiting for permission from parents to administer

life-saving medication to a dying child, might experience extrem e dissonance
when confronted with the parents' refusal due to religious convictions.

This

doctor might go so far as to attribute negative qualities to religion in general
and might angrily express his or her feelings to the already suffering parents.
This action would be in line with Festinger’s idea th at "the greater the
dissonance, the greater the pressure to reduce it, hence the greater the chance
for attitude change in the direction of the public act or behavior."

30

Similarly, a

young person with a feminist viewpoint, preparing to embody the narrator of "A
Rose For Emily," might attribute negative sexist qualities to the narrator when
he says that "only a woman would have believed" Colonel Sartoris's story to Miss
Emily about her tax exemption.

An older male reader, influenced by the
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ideology of his generation, might attrib u te no conscious cause to this narrative
behavior. Obviously, attributions are a cause of rich interpretive possibilities in
d ifferent performances of the same tex t. Further, an awareness of attribution
patterns helps the perform er to overcome her/his presuppositional biases and
blind spots, ultim ately allowing a richer and fuller performance.
- A ttitude change has-been associated .with- attribution 'from the outset.
Wayne Booth and others have recently brought the idea of attitude change into
respectability again in the field of literary theory with their new emphasis on
ethical criticism . In 1956, two years before Heider's seminal paper, Osgood and
Tannenbaum identified what they later called "a special case of Heider's Balance
Theory."^ * Their Congruity Theory "deals with the attitudes persons hold toward
sources of information and the objects of the source's assertions." 32 In the preform ative situation, the source of information is, of course, the narrator and the
objects of the narrator's assertions are the events and existents of the story.
The Congruity Model is based on the assumption th at simple (i.e. extreme)
judgments are easier to make than refined or highly sophisticated ones. It is
perhaps easier for the feminist reader to attribute sexism to Faulkner's narrator
and the more conventional male reader to perceive a humorous shared attitude
about the gullibility of women. A person feels a sense of congruence when the
message th at person receives and/or the source of the message agree with his or
her world view. It has been shown, for example, th at people tend to attrib u te
feelings of dislike to bearers of bad news and vice versa.

31
32

As a hypothetical

Severin and Tankard, p. 158.

Severin and Tankard, p. 159. In this sense their theory is similar to th at
of Cartwright and Harari (1953), who first introduced the term "degree of
liking."
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example one might point to the blasphemous old joke about Easter being
cancelled because the body of Christ had been found. The telling of this joke
would be more than enough to create a lasting and extremely negative
impression from millions of people. Osgood and Tannenbaum are interested not
only in the facility with which people form extrem e opinions, but also with the
"degree of liking a person may have for a source and the object of an
a sse rtio n ."^ it is easier, according to these theorists, to identify closely with or
re a c t strongly against persons, sources, or objects than it is to discriminate fine
differences between ourselves and them . Attribution research suggests th at we
tend to make extrem e attributions, such as "good" and "bad" rather than see the
complex and sometimes contradictory motives or situational factors th at govern
behavior. It is easier to see the sim ilarities between ourselves and Ishmael than
to see those between ourselves and Ahab.
One of the common causes of the novice reader's m isinterpretation of a
character in a novel is stereotyping.

Often, we tend to place characters in

extrem e categories such as "good" or "bad," "protagonist" or "antagonist." In the
complex form of the novel, such unqualified distinctions are often no more than
simplistic stereotyping. Similarly, a common fault of the beginning performer is
to decide on a given (dispositional) quality in relation to a character, say
"nobility" or "greed," and to perform only th at quality rather than the actions of
the character which are richly complex and constantly changing. The perform er
of the novel must attend to a great deal of m aterial.
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The principles of "selective exposure" and "selective attention" are more
well-known aspects of congruity theory. In the complicated process of selecting
what messages, persons, or objects to which we will give attentional priority, we
often avoid those elements which are not congruent with our world view. There
are many behavioral devices (such as denial, incredulity, or attacking the
credibility of the speaker) which we employ to deal with feelings of incredulity.
All of these devices are attributions of causes for effects we cannot accept.
Dr. Francine M erritt, a professor of oral interpretation a t Louisiana State
University, often tells her students a story of a former pupil's reaction to a
particular poem, which will serve as a good example of the congruence principle
a t work. The poem being discussed in class was W. E. Henley's Invictus. Nearly
all critics agree that the speaker of the poem takes a pointedly agnostic stance:
t

Out of the Night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever Gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.
A young nun in Dr. M erritt's class presented a lengthy discussion of the poem as
an exemplar of Catholic dogma.

This is, a t best, a highly questionable

interpretation, but it reveals the power th at an individual's world view holds over
his or her perceptions.

The nun had brought this agnostic and humanistic

statem ent into consonance with her religious beliefs and maintained her
simplistic viewpoint rather than admit to subtleties of interpretation. The nun
was experiencing cognitive dissonance with the world view of the poem's speaker
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and attributed meanings to it which would bring it into balance with her personal
religious convictions. This is the kind of "doctrinal adhesion" th at I. A. Richards
oc
so often warns interpreters to try to overcome.
A knowledge of our own
personal attributional tendencies can help us in this effort.
Process Versus Content in Attribution
In discussing Robert F. Bale's book, Interactional Process Analysis, John
C. Condon sees as one cause of attributions a dissonance in the "dialectical
them e of 'procedure and substance' or 'process and content.'"^® The implication
is th at we tend to read the discourse of others in term s of either the
communicative process or simply in term s of the contents of the discourse. For
example, the newcomer in a group of old friends will often experience dissonance
and make attributions based on the fac t th at he or she must pay a great deal of
attention

to

communicative

procedure,

whereas

the

old

friends

simply

concentrate on content or substance. In such a case the newcomer (essentially
an observer) would selectively perceive and attrib u te different causes to the
behaviors of the group than would the old friends.

To repeat Shaver's

observation, the observer would attrib u te behavior to stable dispositions of the
actors (e.g. "They're all just a bunch of football nuts.") while the actors would
attrib u te behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation ("This is the first tim e
we've all been together since the Alabama game.")

^ A n ta k i, p. 5.
Og
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For example, let us say that I am placing myself in the position of the
listener to the narrator in "A Rose For Emily.” The narrator begins with the
statem ent ’’When Miss Emily Grierson died our whole town went to her funeral."
If I am going to use an interpersonal metaphor in my attem pt to live through the
epic situation, I must assume that the telling of this story begins in medias res.
That is, I have to assume that the opening line of the text is not the first
utterance in this interpersonal encounter. There must a t least have been some
social amenities th at the author has chosen to leave out. I must fill in these
interpersonal gaps in the narrative if I am to fully create the situational context
of the telling.

Therefore, I ask what this opening statem ent by the narrator

might be in response to, that is, what has happened between the narrator and the
listener just prior to this first sentence. I intuit th at the listener has just made
some reference to Miss Emily Grierson, and perhaps has even asked the narrator
to tell him about her.

In such a case, I could consider the narrator's first

sentence a "process statem ent," delivered specifically in response to the
listener's question. It is intended by the narrator to carry on the communication
situation.
However, the following paragraphs of the story are expositional and could
therefore be interpreted interpersonally as "content statem ents" th at are
intended primarily to convey information. Content statem ents do not have much
to do with the quality of the communicative relationship between the narrator
and the listener. That is why the average reader would be likely to experience
this story strictly as "content" or "exposition." But the perform er might benefit
greatly by asking whether the lines of the tex t imply content or relational
messages, or both.
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The experienced reader of Faulkner revels in the constant references to
other plots and characters of Yoknopatawpha, phenomenologically gathering
more and more of the Faulkner canon into the reading experience; the hapless
virgin Faulkner reader, attem pting to comprehend the narrators of Absalom,
Absalom, is like a newcomer in a long-standing group.

He or she may be so

overwhelmed by the substance of the plot, th at the process of the novel, th at is,
the narrator’s verbal behavior, is beyond his or her comprehension. This is why
Faulkner readings, whether pre-form ative or in actual performance, are often
problem atic. The perform er who addresses the audience in his/her own person
and explains carefully the necessary allusive background to difficult passages in
Faulkner, is helping that audience to gather the requisite m aterials for adequate
understanding.

A fter such an introduction, the

perform er might more

successfully recede into the horizon and allow the audience to foreground the
narrator.
A ttributional Theories: The Effects of Attribution
The ubiquity of attribution in the commonsense daily social lives of
humans is apparent.

However, simply investigating the ways in which people

search for the causes of their own or others' behaviors fails to take into
consideration one im portant aspect of attribution:
attributions affect the individuals who made them .

th at is, how these

How do my pre-form ative

attributions affect my final performance?
A family of theories closely related to attribution has appeared more
recently to deal with this question.

Attributional theories, as they are called,
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have appeared primarily in the field of motivational psychology.
influential

branch

of

attributional

theory

is

probably

07

The most

Bernard

Weiner’s

attributional theory of motivation. As Antaki and Brewin sta te it:
Weiner takes Heider's internal-external cause division and cross
cuts it with two others: stability (a cause can be long lasting, like
habitual laziness, or likely to change or go away overnight, like a
causal mood) and control (a cause can be brought under someone's
control or it cannot—effo rt, say, is something one can control, but
luck is not). Once one has these three dimensions one can see what
people attribute their successes and failures to, and one can make
predictions about how th at attribution is going to affe ct their
future work. . . . unlike the first two dimensions, control is
more applicable to attributions of other's behavior than it is to
one's own.38
Weiner's experiments have dealt primarily with students' motivations (or
lack of motivation) for tasks encountered in the

classroom

experience.

Principally his experiments have sought to answer the question ''How do
attributions of success or failure influence students' performances on classroom
tasks?"

Stated briefly, Weiner's results strongly suggest th at "ability, effort

(both typical and immediate), and task difficulty are among the main perceived
causes of achievement performances."

OQ

To evoke again an example involving the response to a literary tex t, a
pre-med student who has made a low grade on a poetry analysis in an English
class might rationalize her performance on the grounds th at her ability lies in
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the sciences rather than the humanities, th at she would have done better if she
had just expended more effort or th at it was the instructor’s fault for assigning
such a difficult poem. The effects of these attributions on this student’s self
perception are obvious.

The perceived causes are also in line with Heider’s

balance theory and the congruity theory of Osgood and Tannenbaum.
Difficult or problematic author’s are often neglected by performers
because of similar attributions. A general knowledge of attribution can help in
the performance of these difficult but rewarding works by providing performers
with a means by which they can analyze and reflect on their own response to the
narrator of the text.
Summary
Attribution theory is based on three assumptions about people’s behaviors:
(1) We attem pt to determ ine the causes of behavior.
(2) We assign causes system atically.
(3) We are affected by the assigned cause.
Further, the theory assumes th at humans are essentially homeostatic, balance
seeking creatures.

Attribution is the process by which we often achieve this

desired feeling of balance, consonance, or congruity in relation to objects
including literary texts. We look for information about the consistency or the
distinctiveness of behaviors in order to arrive a t conclusions about the causes
and motivations of th at behavior.

Another prominent attribution pattern is

consensus or the degree to which the behavior of the other, in our case the
n arrator, complies with social and literary norms or conventions. But the most
fundam ental patterns of our attributional behaviors are the tendencies to see the
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actions of others as results of either some personal quality inherent in the other's
personality, or of some element in the social or physical environment.
Attribution theory is a broad subject which can be applied to a vast range
of intrapersonal and interpersonal human actions. It is crucial in our perception
of others, whether real or fictional, and in our perception of ourselves.
Attribution allows us to make order out of the chaos of our sensual world, and to
achieve balance, congruity and identification with th at world by refining our use
of logic in discovering the causes of what we do and who we are. If attribution
can so greatly inform our knowledge of our experience of the phenomenal world,
it can do the same for the lim itless worlds of fiction and poetry, allowing those
worlds to present themselves to us not as objects, but as experiences.
Summary; Patterns of Attribution in L iterary Response
A perform er in rehearsals of a non-dramatic tex t must embody the
speaker of that text. It makes no difference whether the narrator is constituted
as an implied author, as omniscient or lim ited, as actively or only peripherally
involved in the story or poem. What does m atter most to the perform er is the
character's actions and the motivations th a t prompt them . To embody a narrator
we must understand the motivations and live through the actions of that
narrator. A knowledge of how attribution functions in our perception of others
can provide the performer with a means of structural analysis of what she/he
may already know intuitively; th a t humans seek a rationale for human behavior
and we employ a kind of logical process in order to explain the causes of others'
behaviors.
Attribution theory can aid in our understanding of narrators, and it can
also help us to examine and reflect on our own interpretive strategies.
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Attributions to other's behaviors provide our principal means of knowing
narrators; attributions to his or her own response can provide the performer with
a self-reflexive tool for examining interpretive strategies and for making
informed, less biased performance choices.
Attributions, whether to our own behaviors or those of others, fall into
two basic categories: those actions th at we attribute to the personality of the
actor (dispositional attributions) and those actions that we attribute to the
immediate context or environmental pressures on the actor. A major theoretical
distinction exists between what Heider called internal and external causality.
Internal causality is more subtle, complex, and harder to analyze than
external causality because it requires some degree of understanding of the lived
experience of the other.

Heider further divides internal causality into two

subtypes: First, there is perceived personal causality,

which means th at the

observer believes that the actor consciously tried to cause a particular effect.
In contrast is what Heider called "perceived impersonal causality,"^* which
suggests th at, although an effect was produced by a narrator's actions, and those
actions were motivated by his or her personality, the perform er believes that the
narrator did not consciously seek to produce those effects. Questions concerning
what a narrator wants to do (intention) and how hard th at narrator tries to do it
(exertion) are crucial determ inants of our attributions of cause for the narrator's
lived experience. Some recent theorists have summarized Heider's distinctions
this way:
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In his discussion of how people analyze action, Heider points to
variables which are im portant determinants of our attributions of
dispositional properties to others.
We take into account
information regarding the strength of environmental forces in
describing whether or not the other caused the effects, and we
then infer both how able he is and how hard he is trying. Heider
focuses attention on the distinctions between internal and external
causality, personal and impersonal causality, and on the fact that
our perceptions regarding can and tr^ determine to a great extent
the attribution of both intent and dispositional properties to
others.
If we, as perform ers, attem p t to embody narrators, then we must live
through the narrators' experiences.

We must come to an understanding of the

narrator's conscious or unconscious rhetorical strategies.

To do this we must

bracket or suspend the commonsense idea that the narrator is a fictional
construct of words on a page, a compilation and expression of the real author.
We must believe in that narrator, and constitute him or her as a living,
breathing, m otivated other. Therefore we must attend to a narrator's actions
just as we would reflect on the behavior of a real friend or acquaintance. The
perform er must see narrative actions, then, as behaviors. It is when we are most
attendant to a narrator's strategy that we become conscious of the behavior of
the narrator and infer causes for th at behavior.
When we gather these internal and external causes into our experience of
the narrator, we are creating an inner life th at allows us to live through the
imm ediate experience of the narrator's telling of the story. Attribution theory
can provide the perform er with the knowledge of structures of behavior that can
help th at perform er enter the narrator's experience.

Rather than indicate the

narrator's experience, we, as perform ers, should make every attem p t to live it.
This is perhaps the central goal of interpretation:

to allow students, through
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performance, to live through the experiences of literary personae and therefore
widen their own experiential knowledge.
Toward an Attributional Model of the Pre-form ative Experience
The goal of this study is to produce a model that will describe and
illuminate the performer's experience of narrators and audiences. I have argued
th a t, because attributional behavior is a t the center of our experience of
narrators in literary texts, it can be situated a t the core of my proposed model.
Although there are a number of variations, the basic attributional model is either
intrapersonal, involving a person's (the performer's) experience of an object (the
narrator), or interpersonal, in which case the narrator becomes the "other" in a
dyad which now stands in relation to an object (X ).^

Performer

/O th e r
.Narrator)

Subject of the discourse
between P and O
(fictional events and existents)
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Newcomb, p. 12. Newcomb presents the "strain toward symmetry" as
an attributional law:
"In propositional form, the stronger A's attraction toward B, the
g reater the strength of the force upon A to maintain minimal discrepancy
between his own and B's attitude, as he perceives the la tte r, toward the same X;
and, if positive attraction remains constant, the greater the perceived
discrepancy in attitude the stronger the force to reduce it. We shall refer to this
force as strain."
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The object (X) in the above model is understood to be the subject of the
discourse, or the immanent, imaginative events and existents of the text.'*'* If I
decide to "study" a famous nursery rhyme, for example, I might find myself as a
perform er (P) engaged with the rhyme’s narrator (O) concerning a little girl
named Mary (Xi) and her lamb (X2>-

Or, I (P) might engage the narrator of

Faulkner's story (O) about Miss Emily Grierson (Xj) and the town (X2 ). In the
pre-form ative situation, there is usually a perform er, a narrator, and a large but
finite number of events and existents concerning which the narrator addresses an
audience.
These three elements are the basis of Newcomb's Symmetry Theory, the
attributional paradigm discussed in chapter one th at forms the basis of my
adapted model. If we remember th at attributions are controlled by the degree of
liking th at exists between and among the three elem ents, we can begin to
suggest how the model describes the experience of pre-form ance. If I come to
tru st the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" and even to like him to a certain
degree, this positive relationship will obviously a ffe ct my degree of liking for
(i.e. my experience of) Miss Emily Grierson.
A positive relation between P and O will increase the likelihood th at P
will also perceive X positively.
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According to Newcomb this triangular

relationship is controlled by a strain toward symmetry, the tendency of humans
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Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse (Ithaca Cornell University
Press, 1978), p. 19.
Chatman identifies the event of a tex t as its "actions and happenings";
the existents of a text include its "character and item s of setting."
45
Newcomb, p. 12.
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toward balanced (i.e. similar) perceptions of the people with whom they
communicate, and the subject m atter of those communications.
When I read Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, I am presented with four
different narrators:

Benjy, Quentin, and Jason Compson, and the omniscient

narrator of the final section. All of these narrators would be different others (Q)
when I (P) encounter them.

All have a very different relationship to Caddy

Compson, who becomes the (X) of the model. Benjy worships Caddy and, because
I encounter Benjy first in the novel and sympathize with him, I am inclined to
sympathize with his sister also. However, I may question the inarticulate Benjy's
ability to convey his true feelings. There is a positive symmetrical relationship
th a t governs the "degree of liking" I have for Benjy and for Caddy.
By the time I have reached Jason’s section of the novel I have formed a
very negative perception of him.

When Jason, as narrator, engages me in

reference to Caddy, the relationship is asym metrical.
controlled by my negative degree of liking for him.

My relation to Jason is
So that when Jason

derogates Caddy, I attribute his remarks to generally negative and stable
dispositions in his character.
This attribution is prompted by the assym etrical relationship described in
the above model. Newcomb's general principle is that conscious rationalization
or attribution is most likely when the observer (P) has different qualitative
perceptions of the other (O) and the object (X).
My perception of Caddy Compson must gather in all the perceptions of
her three brothers as well as the perception I form based on their descriptions of
her, and the view of her I get in the final section from the omniscient narrator
(who I may also constitute as the implied author).
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This example illustrates one of the most important ways in which
attribution functions in the performer's pre-form ative encounter with a narrator.
It is not difficult to see similar relationships existing in the actual performance
situation, wherein the audience (P) observes the mediated behavior of an
embodied narrator (O) about one or more objects (X). The only major difference
is literally who the audience is encountering.

A given audience member may

constitute (P) as a "performer" and never enter the tex t imaginatively; whereas
the person sitting next to him may constitute the other as Jason Compson,
allowing the perform er-as-perform er to recede into the phenomenological
horizon. In either case, attributions are controlling the audience's experience of
the tex t.
Conclusion
Attribution theory informs us about how we all tend to behave in relation
to others. It can also inform us about how we "read," both literally and how we
in terp ret the actions of others. A knowledge of the attributional patterns that
influence encounters with literary others can aid the perform er in his or her own
responses to texts.

In term s of the pre-form ative experience of a text,

attribution theory alerts the perform er to common patterns of thinking th at
might easily lead him or her to reductive or unlikely interpretations.
If a perform er remembers th at psychological imbalance or any feelings of
uncertainty about the events and existents in a text can produce a "drive state"
th at causes attributions, then th at perform er is more likely to reflect more
carefully on his or her attributions, possibly making those attributions less
reductive, simplistic, or extrem e.

When a narrator or character behaves in

unexpected or "non-common" ways, the perform er is wise to reflect on all of the
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possible causes for th at behavior.

Attribution theory provides the performer

with some good questions to ask in analyzing his or her response: Is the behavior
consistent for this speaker? Is the behavior normative or likely to be performed
by other types of characters or narrators as well (consensus)?
Finally, the symmetry model of Theodore Newcomb alerts the performer
to the dynamic, mutable structure of the triangular relationship that exists
between perform er, literary speaker, and the object of that speaker’s discourse.
These three entities are not mutually exclusive in the act of pre-form ance. They
interpenetrate one another and influence one another.

Major patterns of

attribution, particularly dispositional and environmental attributions, gather in
rather than reduce the experiential perception of literary others. The following
chapter will investigate in more detail the role of symmetry and attribution in a
pre-form ative encounter with the narrator of William Faulkner's "A Rose For
Emily."

Chapter Three
THE TEXT AS OTHER:
THE MANY VOICES OF PROSE FICTION
The complexities of the reading experience will not be reduced in our
attem pt to focus on attributions in pre-formance.

Rather, we will keep

constantly in mind the G estalt of the performer's experience and make sure th at
our proposed model does not reduce it.

It is precisely for this reason th at

attribution theory, with its complex phenomenological base, is such a felicitous
paradigm for the study of literature in performance.

Our goal is an eidetic

description of pre-form ance, not a parsimonious theory.*

The experience of

performing literature is extrem ely complex and phenomenology, particularly as
it is manifested in attribution theory, can help to clarify those complexities. A
phenomenological description of the conscious act of pre-formance can highlight
the function of attribution in the interpretation of literary others without
reducing the experience to summary theoretical statem ents.
When we encounter narrators, characters, and implied authors in texts, an
im portant part of our experience is attributional. If we attribute motives to the
behavior of one of these others, we are, in effect, interpreting the tex t.
Attribution then, is fundamental to the conscious experience of literary
interpretation. And we know from experience that every reading of a text is but
an instance of that text.

No two readings are exactly alike. Therefore, our

description of the experience of literary others must embrace complexity rather

*This search for description rather than theory is, of course, the primary
reason I have employed the methodology of phenomenology.
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than avoid it. This chapter, in attem pting such a description, will discuss various
ways in which critics have constituted texts as other (i.e. separate) entities, and
then will break down those distinctions between self and other by revealing how
attributions of the individual perform er actually help "create" a particular
instance of a tex t.
A Phenomenology of Pre-Formance
Humans tend to concentrate their attention on one thing a t a tim e, even
though this focus may change drastically from one second to the next.

When I

reflect on Faulkner's intentions during a reading of "A Rose For Emily," I am, for
the moment, only peripherally aware of a dram atistically conceived narrator, the
physical milieu of the story, or the way I might use dialects in a performance of
the tex t. These are all a part of my G estalt experience of the story a t a given
moment, but they form a background or m atrix for my focalization of authorial
intention.
One of the cornerstones of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is the fact
O
th at human consciousness is always conscious of something.
When we
adequately prepare a great text for perform ance, we might attend to any number
of intrinsic or extrinsic elem ents, all of which are inseparable parts of our
experience of the text—an experience we hope to translate into performance.
Human experience is fluid, m utable, and many-layered. It is controlled to
a large extent by the flux of tem porality and the environment of the perceiver.
If, while preparing "A Rose For Emily" for perform ance, I focus my attention on

o
Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (1913; rpt. New York:
Collier Books, 1962), p. 108.

76
the physical appearance of Miss Emily Grierson, I would, in Husserl's term s, be
"intending” Miss Emily as a focal object a t that particular instant. However, in
the background of my consciousness, I might also see the room in Emily's house
where I picture her standing, or I might dimly sense the narrator's valuation of
Emily, my own personal experience of eccentric senior citizens of the South, and
many other related perceptions.

In phenomenological term s, I would be

"intentionally focused" on the face and body of Emily, but this experience would
also include the aforem entioned related perceptions as part of the "ground" of
my experience of the figure th at is grounded in the general consciousness of the
person—a combination of all of his or her lived experience up to and including
th at

particular

moment, and

even

incorporating

the

hopes

and

future

expectations of the person. And at the instant that my consciousness focuses on
another object in the tex t, such as Emily's eyes "like two lumps of coal," my
intentional focus changes but retains the ground of Miss Emily's face within the
field of my perception. My intentional gaze can shift from eyes to face to room
to South to world as I think about what I read and intend to embody in
perform ance.
Husserl used the term "intentionality" to denote the focus or the figurein-the-ground of general consciousness:
It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual
cogito to be a consciousness of something . . . In so far as they
(internal experiences) are a consciousness of something they are
said to be "intentionally related" to this something.
As a perform er reads a tex t, his or her intentional focus can shift an

3

Husserl, p. 108.
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almost infinite number of tim es. But the various intentional objects cannot be
separated from the contextual ground of the performer's consciousness.

The

ground can give rise to figures and these figures are what they are because of
the ground in which they are set. An eighteenth century whaling manual has less
than universal appeal. But when it is set in the midst of a novel its essential
nature as a whaling manual is changed; it becomes part of an artistic work of
epic proportions; and when we read this manual in exerpts in Moby Dick, we
constitute it differently because of its context. It is, incidentally, in the same
manner that our attributions about people are so heavily influenced by the
context or environment.

We often perceive others as figures in a complex

contextual ground.
Phenomenologist Calvin O. Schrag provides an exemplary description of
the essential inter-connectedness of figure and ground. He refers to experience
as a "configuration" in which the various constituents of the experience are
woven inextricably together. Schrag says th at these constituents
. . . include experiencer, a c t of experiencing, figure, and
background. The presentational complex of the experiential field
is th at of experiencer-experiencing-figure-with-background. The
insertion of hyphens between the words is neither arbitrary nor
accidental.
They are gram m atical indices of the bonds or
connective tissues within experience and are essential for grasping
the field notion itself. Experience, in its lived concreteness, is
the act of experiencing figures (objects, events, situations, persons,
moods, chimeras, hallucinations) not in isolation but contextualized
within both determ inate and indeterm inate backgrounds. Every
experience has its figure and background.
The way in which these constituents are interconnected, says Schrag, is

^Experience and Being (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), p. 18.
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the primary subject of the description of any experience. There is no way to
separate the listener from the narrator in "A Rose For Emily" because objects
and perceivers are part of the organic whole of the experience of perception.
Everything th at influences the perceiver—values, attitudes, beliefs, distractions,
environment—is an essential part of the experience. We may focus on one part
of the experience a t a tim e, say our attitu d es toward the author, or the South,
but as we do, we are seeing those attitudes themselves as figures in a contextual
ground. We attend to the pattern of the weaving, even though our momentary
gaze is on an individual thread. The pattern is primary to consciousness; the
thread itself is secondary.
The consciousness of a perform er constantly shifts from primary to
secondary levels during pre-form ance. One moment I might "see" the image of
Miss Emily as the narrator does, but if, in the next instant, I reflect, however
briefly, on the narrator’s valuation of her, I have shifted my intentional focus
from a primal "living-through" of the narrator’s telling to a secondary level of
attention to the narrator’s attitude towards Emily.

That is, I have shifted

attention from an existent in the tex t (Miss Emily), to the narrator's reasons for
describing her in the way that he does.

This secondary attention, involves a

reflective or pre-reflective attribution as I mentally posit reasons for the
narrator's attitu d e.

Either intentional object (Emily herself or the narrator's

attitu d e toward her) is a momentary focus of my attention, and, as such, exists
only in its relation to its phenomenal field. This field or "horizon" contains every
constituent of consciousness, including memories and expectations, that have
contributed to the complete experience of the figural object.
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Nowhere is the interpenetration of figure and ground more revealing than
in the human experience of language. Words exist within context. They gather
meaning from the historical, social, and psychological ground in which they are
used.

Prior to World War n, the word "aryan" had few, if any, negative

connotations. As a word, that is, as a linguistic symbol that names one of the
world’s numerous racial groups, the word produced a relatively neutral effect.
But, for anyone who has lived through the middle of this century, the word
cannot be divorced from the context of Nazi racial policies in the Third Reich.
The word "aryan” now summons an entire world to our consciousness—a world
th at most of us never experienced directly, but which nonetheless produces
powerful resonances th at are an essential part of our experience of that word.
If it is to avoid reductivism, our proposed model of pre-form ance must
account for the complex figure-ground relationships in our experience of literary
language. In order to accomplish this, I will borrow a literary theory proposed by
M. M. Bakhtin, a Russian critic who also maintains that a given word or phrase
summons many different contexts.

He calls the theory "dialogism" because it

stresses the inter-relatedness of the various contexts in which a particular word
can figure. L ater in this chapter Bakhtin's conception of literary language will
be set forth and applied to "A Rose For Emily."
It is because of the situatedness of language th at our literary experiences
can be as rich and as personally stamped as they are. Narrative is language and
language gathers worlds unto itself. N arrators in prose fiction can communicate
with us only through language. As others, these narrators are inextricably bound
to the world th at their language summons. World and narrator constitute each
other, in the same way th at the image of an old woman is altered drastically
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when we place an infant in her arms.

The juxtaposition of youth and age

summons the temporal world, the human life cycle, the vague memory of our
own childhoods and the expectation of death, and brings the poignancy of life's
final moments into the "now" of our experience.

Woman and child constitute

each other and our intentional focus can shift from one to the other and then to
a secondary level of more abstract and universal meaning.
When I, as a perform er, undertake the first critical reading of "A Rose
For Emily" prefatory to performance, the intentional focus of my consciousness
is in a sta te of constant change, flowing, and gathering the events, images,
voices, and devices of the tex t into a complete experience. I hear the narrator's
voice in the opening paragraph; in the second paragraph I sense the voice of the
implied author; I see Miss Emily's corpse, vaguely, for she has not yet been fully
described to me as a living being; I see for an instant, her funeral; I see the
townspeople, the stiff men and the curious women; I see the Grierson house and,
a sentence later, I set this house amidst old cotton gins and gas stations. With
each new detail of the tex t, my intentional focus changes, and yet retains all
th at I have read up to th at point. As the text unfolds in my consciousness, the
words of the text call the peculiarly Southern world of the story into living
presence within my consciousness.
If, on a second or third reading, I constitute the tex t as the speaking voice
of a narrator, my experience of the text is no less complex. I begin by focusing
on the narrator, and on his language as "speaking," as verbal "behavior."
However, when the narrator describes something, such as the Grierson house, I
momentarily attend to th at house, making the reported architectural details the
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figure of my consciousness, and allowing the presence of the narrator to become
p art of the ground, or "setting" from which those details emerge.
Language is one of the principal modes by which we apprehend other
human beings. However, in literature, language is the only mode of encountering
the other consciousnesses contained in the tex t. In attem pting to know fully the
narrator of a story, we are denied the nonverbal channel of communication and
must therefore depend on the language employed by that narrator, constituted as
his or her verbal behavior, to reveal the narrator to us.
At the same tim e, I experience the words of the tex t as a speaking th at is
much more than the expression of a narrator. Language does more than express
thoughts. In the case of the literary work, language literally calls the fictive
world into being. In the words of Martin Heidegger, "Language speaks."

5

Heidegger's simple proposition, th at "language speaks," is deceptively
complex in its viewpoint. We might argue, for example, th at language does not
"speak," but, rather, it is people who speak by way of language. But the language
of a literary text, is not the actual utterance of another consciousness. It can be
attended to as such, and embodied as such, but it also remains as the original
words on

the

consciousness

printed page.
behind

literary

As Georges Poulet characterizes it, the
language

differs

from

a

flesh-and-blood

consciousness in that it
is open to me, welcomes me, lets me look deep inside itself and

5

This concept is explored a t length by Heidegger in "Language," in Poetry,
Language, Thought, trans. Albert H ofstadter (rpt. New York: Harper and Row,
1971), pp. 189-210.
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even allows me, with unheard of license, to think what it thinks and
feel what it feels.
It is in this way th at printed words "speak.”
They speak, according to Heidegger, because they "name."^

Language

names things; this naming calls the named things into presence and presents
them to the consciousness of the listener. When I read the first paragraph of "A
Rose For Emily," the words of the tex t call into presence and place near to me
the once-living, but now dead Emily Grierson, her funeral, the men and women
who attended it, and the "inside of her house." Moreover, it calls a social world
into being. I read, "When Miss Emily Grierson died," and, as I read it, the use of
the word "Miss" calls the world of Southern courtly traditions into living
presence within my consciousness.

It is in this way, Heidegger says, th at

language itself speaks:

The naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls. However this
bringing closer does not fetch what is called only in order to set it
down in closest proximity to what is present, to find a place for it
there. The call does indeed call. Thus it brings the presence of
what was previously uncalled into a nearness. But the call, in
calling it here, has already called out to what it calls. Where to?
Into the distance in which what is called remains, still absent.
The calling here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does

g

"Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The Struturalist
Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard
T. Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1972), p. 57.
7
Martin Hiedegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 191ff.
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not wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is
kept by the calling there.
The calling calls into itself and
therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into
absence.
Miss Emily and her world are made present to me through the naming
accomplished by the language of the tex t. This language brings her world near to
me, and yet allows it to remain rem ote and separate from me a t the same tim e.
The text literally calls the world to me by naming its parts, but somehow this
te x t remains immanent and "other" within my consciousness.
Heidegger makes the point that everyday discourse is no less a naming and
a calling than the language of literary works. In this he reinforces our analogy
between social and literary engagements. However, he argues, literary language
is often perceived as dwelling on a higher level, more ordered, more complete,
and richer than everyday language.

And y et, ontologically speaking, the

language of a poem and the language of everyday discourse, differ only in the
degree to which they call a world and make it present.
Mortal speech is a calling th at names, a bidding which, . . .
bids thing and world to come. What is purely bidden in mortal
speech is what is spoken in the poem. Poetry proper is never
merely a higher mode (melos) of everyday language. It is rather
the reverse: everday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up
poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer.
The opposite of what is purely spoken, the opposite of the
poem, is not prose. Pure pnose is never "prosaic." It is as poetic
and hence as rare as poetry.
To illustrate Heidegger's concept, le t us look briefly a t the narrator's use

O

Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 198-99.
Q

^Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 208.
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of one definite colloquialism in "A Rose For Emily"—the use of the title "Miss" in
front of Emily’s name.

This device is used throughout the text.

It is a

nomination with which I am very fam iliar, because I grew up in a small Southern
town not unlike the one described by the language of this story. When I return to
my home town and hear about "M iss___________ " and "M iss____________ I do
not experience the calling of a world. I have become so used to the title "Miss,"
in the social context of my home town, th at the word has used up its potential
for gathering the world of that town into it.
But when the narrator employs the term in the first sentence of the story,
it calls to mind an essential quality of the old South:

that is, the courtly

deference and distance between men and women of the upper classes. The word
also exists in a dialogic relationship with my experience of the current usage of
the word in contemporary society—a t least in those social circles in which I have
gained my experience. From the perspective of 1984, the word "Miss" conjures
up the social condition of sexism, and when it is used in the historical context of
the story, the word gathers into itself the tension between the pre- and post
fem inist views of unmarried women.
Indeed, as I reflect on the narrator's use of it, the title "miss" calls into
being the tragic essence of Faulkner’s story.
When Miss Emily Grierson died . . .
I am confronted a t the outset of the story with a doomed woman—a
"fallen monument."

The tragic elem ent in the story involves the reader in

significant environmental attributions, for, if we see Emily as controlled to a
large extent by fate or social forces beyond her control, our estim ation and
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valuation of her will likely be less critical than if we attribute all her actions to
her own dispositions. Emily is described as old (I attribute age to her based on
the word "monument") and she is also unmarried.

I gather my post-feminist

perspective on the social concept of "old maid," and my attribution of the
narrator’s view of it as well. "Old Maid" is a term rarely used today because of
its sexist connotations. But the use of "Miss" by this narrator calls into being the
sexism of the old South, a social condition which contributes significantly to the
tragic irony of Emily’s life—an irony th at is crystallized in the final macabre
description of the "bridal chamber" of Emily and Homer Barron.
I could reflect on the term "Miss" as a behavior of the narrator that
places him in a comfortable relationship with the unintentional sexism of his
tim e. In other words, I attrib u te his verbal behavior, i.e. his use of "Miss," to the
social and ideological context in which he exists. Because of my knowledge of
attribution theory, I realize th at here I am making a typical "observer
attribution."

That is, I tend to see environment as the primary cause of an

acto r’s behaviors. However, I might also attrib u te dispositional qualities to the
narrator based on his use of the term .

He is respectful of "women’s place in

society;" he is unconsciously sexist; he probably places himself a t some
emotional distance from Emily herself, seeing her more as a symbol or a
"monument" than as an other consciousness.

As I attem p t to embody this

narrator in perform ance, the language of the tex t, in Poulet’s words, lets me
"think what it thinks and feel what it feels." As I move from reflection on the
tex t to embodiment of it, I move from my own field of figure-ground relations to
the experience of the narrator's consciousness of figure-with-ground. That is, I
experience the narrator's experiencing Miss Emily.
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As Martin Heidegger says, individual "things" do not exist separately from
the worlds in which they exist.
. . . world and things do not subsist alongside one another. They
penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a middle. In it, they
are a t one. Thus a t one they are intim ate.10
This narrator, likewise, does not exist apart from the fictive world of Faulkner’s
story. He is not merely an element in that world. Narrator and world penetrate
and depend on each other.

There is no b etter example of this than the

Heideggerian notion that language—language conceived of as (the narrator’s)
expression and language conceived of as fictive world—speaks by calling both
thing and world into presence.
First, consider language as expression.

It might be the expression of

implied author, character, or, in our present case, language as the expression of
a narrator.

In one sense, language is narrative behavior, but it is much more

than just that.

As Heidegger suggests, language calls the world of a literary

work into a living presence by naming that world; it is a presence th at brings the
world near and yet, a t the same tim e, lets it remain absent (i.e. other and
immanent). Language is expression, but language is also literally, world. In "A
Rose For Emily," language functions as both thing (narrator) and world—and
n arrator and world interpenetrate and depend on each other. They cannot exist
separately because they are formed from the same thing.

In term s of

phenomenology’s figure-ground perspective, language-as-narrators-expression is
the figure in a groundwork of language-as-fictive-world.

10 Heidegger,

Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 202.
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When I focus on language as the expression of a narrator, I must
rem ember that not only does the narrator speak, the language of the text speaks
as well.

Similarly, attributions are of two primary types—dispositional and

environmental. As I proceed to constitute the tex t of "A Rose For Emily” as the
expression of a narrator, I must be careful to uncover the world called forth by
the language of the text. For it is this world th at is responsible for much of a
narrator’s behavior.
At some stage of pre-form ance, it is common for a perform er to focus on
the text as an utterance—the spoken word of a narrator, an implied author, or
characters. As intentional objects any one of these different expressive voices
exists in relation to the other levels of voice th at form part of the ground of the
reader’s experience. I may, throughout much of my pre-form ance, focus on the
voice of the narrator in ”A Rose For Emily" and attrib u te qualities to th at
narrator based on his or her verbal behavior.

But, these attributions to the

narrator force me to consider other voices in the tex t—voices th at call forth the
fictive world. For example, if I attrib u te sexism to this narrator, I will likely be
impelled to ponder the implied author's attitudes about feminism as well, and,
perhaps more importantly, to speculate on the sexist attitudes and qualities
inherent in the world of this story. Any sexism in the narrator is interpenetrated
by the sexism of Yoknapotawpha.

They traverse a middle; they are, in

Heidegger's sense, intim ate.
As the chapter progresses, I will explore more fully the ways in which
attributions about narrators urge us to set the narrator in an experiential field
th a t includes implied authors and characters as well as other textual and
subjective constituents. As I proceed, I will attem pt to keep in mind that all of
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these constituents—implied authors, characters, narrators—are intim ately and
inextricably bound up in the world called forth by the language of the text.
Attribution will enter the analysis as I speculate on dispositional qualities of
individual constituents such as implied authors and narrators, and as I reflect on
the degree to which the fictive world, the context in which these individual
others a ct, is responsible for their actions.

What follows, then, will be a

phenomenological exploration of the ways in which attribution functions in my
own pre-form ance of the opening paragraphs of "A Rose For Emily."
Attribution in the Experience of Reading
I encounter a new tex t in much the same way th at I encounter a potential
acquaintance or friend. I have decided to engage that text in some detail or a t
some length, just as I engage a person to whom I have decided, for whatever
reason, to give a fair degree of attention.

So, the initial "attraction" to the

poem, the prose, or the play is determined by the degree of my attractio n and
interest in the speaking voice of the text; perhaps I like the title , the implied
subject m atter, or I like the author because I have encountered him or her in
other texts, or perhaps I like the form. In most human interpersonal encounters,
the first attractio n is largely physical or based on presuppositions. Of course,
there is always the im portant "contact" one "should" m eet, the tex t one "ought"
to know. Such encounters I approach with an open mind (at the beginning). Some
of my best "friends" and worst "enemies" were assigned rather than selected
personally.

I have grown to love teachers I first thought were pedantic, or

affected, or even elitist. The same description applies to my maturing readings
of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury or "A Rose For Emily."
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As I read a new tex t, I try to keep an open mind. But first impressions are
powerful.

Often, I find I must struggle with difficult language or syntax, with

archaism, elliptical form or content, verbosity. Despite my rational intentions
to overcome such obstacles, they often overcome me and I put the text aside.
Frequently, it is for no other reason than the fact th at I do not feel drawn to the
way the author (or the text) expresses himself (itself). "When the rash mood is
on" I don't want to have to work too hard.
But the greatest pleasures in my literary "acquaintances" have come, of
course, from those texts with which I have had to struggle the most. I fear I may
never have loved Faulkner, Joyce, Chekhov, or Henry Jam es if I had not been
assigned to read them in college. On the other hand, I somehow made easy and
early friends of Homer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot.
As I read the first few words or lines of a work, rarely is my imagination
immediately rivetted.

It takes a t least a few seconds for the physical

environment in which I am reading to recede and the text to become
foregrounded in my consciousness.

Works which open with a vivid image, a

concrete m ental picture, are easier for me to "enter," whether they are good
literature or not. This initial impression on my imagination makes it easier for
me to fall into the flow or the rhythm of the work, something which seems to
take more effort somehow than the simple "picturing" of literary images.
In cases of densely rich literatu re, I must constantly go back, reread,
change first impressions, "try out" new interpretations and generally enter into a
dialogue with the work.

During this process, I posit causes for the text's

behavior and am therefore attributing.

Once I am engaged, the greater the

expenditure of intellectual and imaginative energy, the greater the rewards.
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But, again, I must come to these rich works in the proper frame of mind: open,
refreshed, anticipatory, with a desire to encounter the particular work, just as in
the social world my desire to understand the other person is the prerequisite to
my comprehension of her or him. A ttributional behavior is most apparent when
it becomes the means of knowing an other we have a strong desire to know.
When I engage a story th at I intend to perform for an audience I must
•listen" to the discourse of th at story many tim es. I will first listen to the text
in order to be able to speak it.
story's characters and its world.

I must gain an experiential entrance into the
This encounter exists over a tim e period

beginning with the first pre-form ative reading and possibly ending a t the
conclusion of the final public perform ance.

I can hope th at during this

performance I have done more than get close to the text; I can hope th at I have
lived for a tim e inside it. One means of doing this is to understand the causes
for the effects of the tex t by reflecting on my own attributions concerning it.
Despite the fact th at I might experientially inhabit the tex t while
performing, during the rehearsal period I have periodically constituted it as a
separate other to be known and understood.

My attributions of causes for the

story's effects, the narrator's behavior, and the actions of characters have been
an integral part of my gradual breaking down of this distinction between my self
as perform er and the tex t.

As I read and reread the tex t, I gather the

constituents of my experience, reflecting on them in turn, thereby enriching the
experiential m atrix of the text as I proceed. During these rehearsals, the idea of
the tex t as a separate other is gradually broken down as I seek to weave myself
into the text, to embody th a t other within myself. In the case of the narrative

91
voice, I move from a dialogue with an other—the narrator—to the embodiment of
th a t narrator within my self.
Of course, there are many levels of "voice" in a tex t other than that of
the specific narrator.

As readers and perform ers, we constitute the various

voices of literary texts in many different ways. The following pages will present
a partial list of the possible others inherent in a text such as William Faulkner's
"A Rose For Emily." This investigation is intended t.o focus on the performer's
experience of only one of those voices. However, by revealing how attribution
functions in the performer's experience of the narrator's voice, we can devise a
model that can be generalized to describe the experience of any discrete voice
on the text. But first it may be helpful to view various literary approaches to
the question of the "other-ness" of the text.
The Development of the Interpersonal Metaphor in L iterary Criticism
A work of prose fiction can be many things to many people. An individual
consciousness may constitute a text in various different ways. Modern literary
theory and criticism has been concerned with the problem of different responses
to texts, especially since the publication in 1929 of I. A. Richards Practical
C riticism .**

This im portant study showed us that responses to texts not only

vary greatly with the individual reader, but that the logic (in the sense of making
logical connections between causes and effects) behind many such readings
produces misguided or inadequate readings.

When we attribute causes to the

behaviors of others, we are making what we tacitly assume to be viable

**I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism (New York:
Co., 1929), p. 3-16.

Harcourt, Brace and
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connections between actions and the situational or dispositional forces that
impel those actions. These connections may or may not follow rules of formal
logic; the point is that we assume that they do.
Different readings of texts are what make them exciting, renewable
sources of creative raw m aterial for the perform er. And yet, a story such as "A
Rose For Emily” cannot be validly read in any way a reader chooses. However,
the perform er can approach the story by alternately foregrounding an astonishing
number of different elements, levels, or "voices.” This study concentrates on the
perform er's creative experience of just one of those voices:

the voice of the

narrator, the story-teller, the epic speaker. But if the model I am building from
attribution theory is to be valid and worthwhile, it must also be applicable to the
perform er's constitution of any of the voices inherent in a text. These might
include the voices of implied authors, characters, or even ideological "voices"
such as the voice of religious doctrines, social causes, or political movements.
These la tte r voices, while not literal utterances in the sense of the "spoken
word" of narrators or directly quoted characters, do exist within the context of
the te x t. That is, they are dwelling within the language of the text, within the
words that the performer will embody. They may not "speak" in the literal sense
th a t a narrator does as he tells the story or that a character does in direct
discourse, but they inform the literally spoken discourse and are therefore an
integral part of our experience of the performed text.
Perhaps the most common way in which readers experience a literary
work is simply to conceive of it as a separate and complete entity, a "thing-outthere" th at we call the "text" or the book. The New Criticism and its relatives
(e.g. the Prague structuralists and the Russian formalists) are primarily
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responsible for this view of the tex t during the middle years of this century.
Edward P roffitt has recently taken the New Criticism to task for the failure to
balance the idea of the inviolable text with the idea that literary works,
particularly poems, are experiential, requiring active engagement by a r e a d e r.^
The image of the critic as a scientific close reader studying the poem for its
meaning may have led to the renunciation of the sanctity of the text by the
recent schools of reader response criticism and deconstruction.
But the experiential reality remains.

Rehearsals for a performance of

literature are more properly studied as experiences than as the contemplation of
an object. If I am asked to write a critical essay on some aspect of "A Rose For
Emily," I would probably begin with some analysis of the constituents of the
story and end by describing how those parts fit into the tex t as a whole. In such
a case I think of the text not as discourse, not as experience, not as
communication or dialogue, but as an object called the text:

a complete and

separate entity whose parts I must come to understand. But a performance of
th at text goes beyond the understanding of an object, because once the object is
understood it must be embodied as human experience.
The objectivist approach to literary study is useful in its insistence on
logical close readings of particular works. But, for the perform er who seeks a
more experiential entrance into the tex t, the objectivist model is often too one
sided, suggesting that a system atic analysis of the part of the reader can most
adequately explicate the work. A perform er must always remain open to all of

12

Edward P roffitt, "In Mid-Career:
L iterary Study and Individual
Growth," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 16 (Spring, 1982), p. 29.
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the possibilities of a work in rehearsal, but he or she cannot deny the affective
experience of that work. To do so would be to suggest that a "right reading" of a
tex t never includes the reader's response.
The perspective of the symbolic interactionists, particularly th at of
Kenneth Burke, has done a great deal to adapt the objectivist paradigm so that it
becomes much more felicitous for the perform er who views the literary
experience in term s of interpersonal communication.

Burke, Don Geiger and

their successors extended the objectivist model to include the dram atic context
of the utterance that is the literary work. Their perspective allows us to view
the tex t as the comlete and objectified utterance of an implied speaker.
Because it is based on a theatrical metaphor, this new perspective came to be
called dram atism . Dramatism was not yet an interpersonal perspective in th at it
focused almost entirely on the speaker of the utterance. But it did represent a
move in an interpersonal direction.
Dramatism requires that I ask, first of all, who the speaker of the text
is.

13

This posits a concrete other in the text, a persona to whose discourse I

listen and respond. I must also ask about the identity of the implied listener to
this discourse.

Answering these questions will cause

me

to

attrib u te

dispositional qualities to the narrator/speaker and to the implied listener.
If approaching the text dram atistically, I would also ask quite specific
questions about the intentions (purposes) of the speaker's actions and about the

13For a concise explanation of the elem ents of dramatism (who, to whom,
what, by what means, for what purpose) see Kenneth Burke, "The Five Master
Terms," View, ser. HI, no. 2 (June, 1943), p. 52.
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situation or context (scene) in which those actions occur. These questions will
elicit my critical attributions concerning environment.
The dram atistic perspective of performance requires the reader to make
attributions about a tex t’s behavior. I use the term behavior here advisedly as
the symbolic actions of the speaker of the tex t. As I have shown in the previous
chapter, these attributions will concern individual dispositions of speakers or of
characters, and the literary world or environment in which they exist.

The

dram atistic analysis of literary works was a t the forefront of an evolutionary
period in literary criticism that focused more and more on the interaction
between texts and readers, thereby increasing the relevance to criticism of
interpersonal communication theories like attribution.

A selective glance a t

several other ’’interpersonal" views of literary response will reinforce my
proposed interpersonal model of the a c t of pre-form ance.
It would seem that speech act theory has taken a vital place in the recent
evolution of literary theory. This theory, promoted by scholars such as G. D.
Searle, A. L. Austin, and Mary Louise P ra tt has, like attribution, been
appropriated from the social sciences. Speech a c t theory can be described as a
focusing on the acts or the actions, both literal and metaphorical, of the literary
u tterance. The basic premise of speech a c t theory is th at words often stand for
real or psychological actions.

14

In literary response, speech a c t theory could

lead us to a concentrated examination of literal or m etaphorical verbs.
The narrator of "A Rose For Emily" begins his utterance this way:

14
J . L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, ed. J . O. Urmson (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 108.
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When Miss EmUy Grierson died our whole town went to her
fu n e ra l. . . 5
Using a speech act approach, the perform er of this sentence, seeking to embody
this narrator and make the narrator's actions clear to an audience, would
concentrate on the action on this particular line. That is, the performer would
attrib u te causes for this particular utterance of the narrator.

One performer

might perceive the action as "to protest," suggesting th at there has been some
negative criticism of the townspeople's reaction to Emily immediately prior to
this utterance.

Another perform er might attrib u te the action as "boasting,”

implying th at one of the narrator's motives in telling this tale is to gain a
positive reaction from

the listener concerning the people of Jefferson,

Mississippi. Many other interpretations of the action of this line are possible.
The point here is that we can experience the language of a tex t not only as the
utterance or the discourse of an other, but also as the actions of that other.
Concentration on the actions of literary others means that we, as readers,
respond to those actions.
attributional:

As perform ers, the structure of our response is

we infer causes for the interpretated actions of narrators,

authors, or characters.

"Why,” we must ask, "is the narrator boasting?"

Inferring motives is the primary interpersonal dynamic of a perform er's attem pt
to know the other in the te x t.

And without knowing there can be no

embodiment.

15

William Faulkner, "A Rose For Emily," in Collected Stories of William
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 119.
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The decade of the seventies witnesses an extraordinary growth in reader
oriented criticism .

This type of criticism , while it has taken many different

forms, is important to the perform er because it seeks to understand the
subjective nature of individual responses to literary works, including the
subjective pre-form ative responses of a perform er. Again, subjective responses
to others are controlled, to a large extent by attributions.

Many disparate

critics have been grouped together under the aegis of reader response criticism .
Their perspectives range from conservative to radical and reveal other ways in
which readers and performers constitute literary others. Dramatism’s objectivist
view has been incorporated into the more pragm atic context of reader response
critics and it is here that attribution theory can be particularly helpful in
informing us about the dyadic communication between the work and the reader.
Many of the so called reader response theorists have also drawn on
interpersonal metaphors to describe our reactions to literary texts.

David

Bleich, a radical exponent of the subjectivity of literary response, has based his
subjective paradigm in part on D. W. Harding’s study of the sim ilarities between
the situation of social gossip and the response to literature.

16

Both, says
17
Harding, are in the mode of response of an "onlooker at actual events."
In
characterizing the other in the tex t as analogous to a social gossip, Harding
maintains that the correspondent of the gossip-reader is not a collection of real
people "but only a personae created by the author for the purpose of
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David Bleich, Subjective Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 1978), p. 101.
17

D. W. Harding, "Psychological Processes in the Reading of Fiction,"
British Journal of Aesthetics, 2 (April, 1962), p. 147.
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communication."

1 ft

While this is but one example of the use of an interpersonal

metaphor in literary criticism, it is not an uncommon perspective. It supports
the view of the narrator as a definite other for whose verbal behavior we posit
causes.
Georges Poulet, a leading phenomenological critic, also sees a close
resemblance between social and literary encounters. He describes the reader’s
interaction with
. . . the consciousness of another, no different from the one I
autom atically assume in every human being I encounter, except in
this case the consciousness is open to me, welcomes me, lets me
look deep inside itself and even allows me, wiHi unheard of license,
to think what it thinks and feel what it feels.
Here Poulet has identified a fundamental difference between social and literary
encounters, but this is not a problem.

An attributional theory of literary

response would welcome the fact that we can reflect on literary language more
carefully than on transitory social discourse. The longer we reflect, the more
"verbal behaviors" we can isolate and attend to; the more verbal behaviors on
which we intentionally focus, the more attributions we can make; and the longer
we study a literary discourse, the more careful those attributions can become.
The task of the performer is to somehow manage to clarify his or her
attributions during the performance.

When a text is embodied, the literary

discourse becomes much closer to everyday discourse in its rapid and inexorable

18Harding, p. 147.
19

Georges Poulet, "Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The
Structuralist Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man,
ed. Richard A. Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 1972), p. 57.
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delivery.

In performance, the fundamental distinction between permanent

w ritten discourse and ephemeral human speech almost ceases to exist. It is for
this reason that clarity of intention on the part of the perform er is so important.
Whatever methods of literary analysis the perform er uses, he or she will embody
the textual voices for an audience who will not have time to go back and gaze at
length into an "open consciousness."

Performance is never static. That is its

richness and its danger.
Whether

the

critical

perspective

is

dram atistic,

speech

act,

phenomenological, or some pluralistic combination of all of these, the performer
must first constitute the textual other in order to embody him, her, or it. And
somewhere behind the fictional others in a tex t (e.g. narrators and characters)
there is the voice of the authors

a voice of which we are aware even as we

attend to narrators and characters.
Wayne C. Booth is a critic who, for the past twenty years, has provided
literary perspectives that are of particular value to the perform er. His theories
have grown out to the rhetorical tradition of the Chicago Aristotelian school and
have embraced dramatism as well as ethical criticism (which he refers to as the
after-e ffec ts of a text).

20

Booth’s perspective is remarkably pluralistic and

tolerant of other critical positions.

For the purposes of this study, Booth is

im portant as an exemplar of the reader’s constitution of the other in the text as
an "implied author." We often reflect on authorial intentions when we read. The
w riter's intentions are a valid clue to meaning.

Experientially, the implied

author is yet another of the textual voices that can arise in a reader's

^®Wayne C. Booth, "'The Way I Loved George Eliot': Friendship With
Books as a Neglected C ritical Metaphor," The Kenyon Review (Spring, 1980), p.
4.
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consciousness against the background of the Gestalt experience of literary
response.
When I prepare "A Rose For Emily" for performance, I concentrate on the
narrator’s voice. However, I am familiar with other works by Faulkner and a t
times during my pre-form ative reading, I reflect on (or constitute) a voice in the
tex t

asFaulkner’s voice.

Gathering Faulkner’s voice into the multi-level

experience of the text is, according to Booth, a requisite critical method.
Particularly when you read three or four books by the same
author, you s ta rt making inferences [attributions] th at go beyond
the individual imaginative a ct. You can’t resist and I don’t think
you should resist the tem ptation to sta rt thinking about the
qualities of the creature behind all that. I think that because of
certain modern dogmas about ruling out the intentions of the
author, we have needlessly ruled out some very .interesting kinds of
criticism by saying th at’s none of our business.
Put briefly, the implied author is the reader's perception of the person
who wrote the story. The implied author, then, is not to be confused with the
real author, the flesh-and-blood human being who wrote the story. R ather, she
or he is a construct of the reader of that particular story or work. Booth implies
th at the constitution of this implied author is an integral part of the reading
experience.
The value systems we attribute to implied authors are most im portant.
For example, we might attribute a high degree of intelligence and rhetorical
sophistication to Faulkner, a sense of humor to Twain, a sense of worldliness to
Fitzgerald or Thomas Mann, or a sense of detachm ent to Hemingway or Robbe-

Mary Frances HopKins, "Interview with Wayne C. Booth, L iterature in
Performance, 2 (April, 1982), p. 49.
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Grillet. The social ideologies of a w riter are certainly a part of these implied
value systems, especially in activist w riters like Steinbeck or Alexsandr
Solhenitsyn. The values and attitudes that we attribute to the implied authors of
literary works are key determ inants of our eventual interpretations and
performances. In term s of attribution, the degree of identification we feel with
the implied author’s voice, th at is the degree of ’’balance'’ between ourselves and
the implied author, often directs our response to the events and existents of the
story.
Booth's theories, grounded as they are in the rhetorical tradition,
appropriate the idea of "shared meanings" between readers and the various
voices of a tex t.

Booth takes the idea of like-mindedness or shared meaning

from Plato (whose term is homonoeia) and sees it as a prerequisite for
establishing "friendship" with implied authors.

22

Booth’s scheme is to determine

the degree of (1) intensity and (2) reciprocity in the relationship between the
implied author and the reader based on the work's apparent purposes or
intentions. These might include the simple production of pleasurable response,
utilitarian or pragmatic response (as in "social" works such as Upton Sinclair's
The Jungle or the feminist works of Simone de Beauvoir, works designed to have
some rhetorical social purpose), or the intrinsic value of the relationship between
"poem" and person.
Although my project focuses on the constitution of a narrator's voice, it is
often impossible to bracket the implied author as I form a performance. When I
prepare "A Rose For Emily" for the public, I cannot forget my previous reading
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of and thinking about William Faulkner. A good example is my pre-form ative
choice about how to convey both the narrator’s and the implied author’s
intentions on the line about how Colonel Sartoris had
fathered the edict th at no Hegro woman should appear on the
stre e t without her apron: . . .
As I

ponder this problematic and ambiguous phrase I position myself

philosophically in relation to two significant others in my life:

my father and the

William Faulkner I have come to know through his works. Both are Southern men
whom I feel th at I know, regardless of the fact that one is real to me and the
other a construct of my own consciousness. I have, in a sense, constructed them
both in term s of their relationship to the idea of historical racial relations in the
South. The chief instrument with which I constructed them was attribution. I
attrib u te their behavior to the contextual influences of Southern racial issues.
My personal reaction to the edict mentioned in the story is to call up the
concept of ’’inherited guilt.” The concept that all white Southerners are, to some
extent, guilty for the social persecution of black Southerners was first presented
to me in Faulkner’s works. Although the concept is not integral to this particular
story, I cannot help but gather it into my reading experience, a t least
peripherally.
I recall, as a teen-ager, discussing these concepts with my father, who
would often become almost violently angry a t the idea that he, as an individual
supportive of civil rights, should feel guilty for the racial inequalities produced
by Southern society. In term s of Newcomb’s symmetry model I (P) was engaged
alternately with two others (O), my father and William Faulkner, concerning the

9^

Faulkner, p. 119.

103
inherited collective guilt of white Southerners (X). At this time in my typically
rebellious youth, I felt more affinity with Faulkner on this subject than I did with
my father. My positive ’’degree of liking,” that is, my respect and admiration for
the intelligence and accomplishments of Faulkner, brought me into balance with
his ideas about collective racial guilt. In the language of attribution theory, my
positive relationship to Faulkner caused a ’’strain toward symmetry" th at urged
my positive response to his ideas about collective guilt.
My stormy relationship with my father was comparatively negative on this
subject. At the time I did not know how to articulate "why" this was so. Now,
because of my knowledge of the structures of attribution, I do.

I attributed

dispositional qualities to my father based on the intensity of his denunciation of
the collective guilt idea.

Although I did not have a word for it a t the time, I

could easily sense or intuit the dissonance, imbalance, and distress the idea
caused my father. I decided (attributed) th at the cause of this intense reaction
was a suppressed individual guilt th at my father felt about racial conditions and
his personal prejudices against blacks.

I believe th at my father had brought

himself into psychological balance with this concept, by insisting on his own
individual innocence.

I attributed Faulkner’s ideas to his egalitarian social

stance and his admiration for Southern blacks expressed primarily in his famous
Nobel acceptance speech, a speech th at I know well and that I gathered into my
reading of all his works.
In performing the narrator's comment about the edict in "A Rose For
Emily," I must gather in my attribution of where both Faulkner and the narrator
stand in relation to the edict. And, as the symmetry model (P-O-X) requires, I
must determine where I stand qualitatively in relation to the edict, and why I
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stand there. In performance, I must embody or become the narrator’s voice and I
must also embody his stance in relation to the constituents of the story. I must
both "be" the narrator and, somewhere on the horizon of my consciousness,
objectify that narrator. It is the tensive pull between these two intentions of the
narrator's character that has long distinguished the essential nature of the
performance of literature.
The pull between the constitution of the narrator as an objectified "other"
and the narrator as a voice to be embodied, also distinguishes pre-formance from
actual performance. As I prepare to perform "A Rose For Emily" I reflect on the
nature of the narrative voice. I attrib u te causes or reasons for the narrative
behavior. I possibly consult outside sources for critical insights into the tex t. I
vary performance choices in order to see which ones most honestly support and
illuminate the text.

I seek to understand the words of the tex t as I rehearse

them . In short I focus my intention on the tex t as an other; that is, I conceive of
the narrator as a part I must play, a role I must take on, a t least during part of
the rehearsal process. But as I near perform ance, the text as an entity recedes
as I move closer to an embodiment of the narrative voice. When I successfully
embody that text, when I "become" the narrative voice, the figure in the ground
of my consciousness is whatever object or idea is figural in the narrator's
consciousness.
For example, when the narrator imagines Emily Grierson framed in the
distance between her father's legs I (as the narrator) "see" this image also. I see
what the narrator sees because experientially I am the narrator. And yet, a t the
same tim e, I am dimly aware of any extrinsic criticism or personal experiences
during the rehearsals th at have prepared me to see this narrative image in the
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idiosyncratic way that I see it.

Performance of the speaker's voice always

gathers in the whole pre-form ative experience.
Obviously, shared meanings have a great deal to do with our degree of
attractio n for and our communication with the various others in a text, whether
we constitute the principle voice as implied author, an objectified text, a
narrator, or a character within the discourse. Stanley Fish has argued th at when
different readers constitute a text they must, of necessity, constitute different
texts. The reason, according to Fish, th at different readers' interpretations of a
given tex t are as similar as they are is that the readers belong to shared
interpretive communities.

24

I share social tendencies with William Faulkner, but not necessarily with
the narrator or the characters in his story. An interpersonal perspective on the
perform er’s response to literature allows a perform er to reflect on how he or she
perceives and interprets the behaviors of the individuals who populate the great
literary works. If we constitute these literary others as beings whose behavior
we must understand, we may find the attem pt to embody them through
performance more complex, more relevant to our own human behaviors. In the
final analysis, performers do more than embody the printed page; they allow the
others in the text to inhabit their physical selves, making performance a
synthesis of text and performer.
Attribution theory can provide a viable means of accomplishing this
synthesis. If, in pre-form ance, we refle ct on the causes of the verbal behavior of
the narrator, we are going to think about the pre-reflective m ental activity th at
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has resulted in the narrator’s behavior—word choice, tone, stance, imagery, level
of linguistic sophistication, or any other rhetorical device for which we attribute
a cause. If we can use the structures of attribution as a guide to thinking about
the causes of a narrator’s discourse, we are doing something similar to what an
actor does when he or she creates a subtext for the spoken lines of a character.
When the causes of a narrator’s behavior are attributed to environment, we are
constituting the world of the tex t.

When we attrib u te verbal behavior to a

narrator’s disposition we are building the inchoate, pre-reflective basis for our
own embodiment of that narrator. In both cases, we are seeking a psychological
balance between ourselves as perform ers and the narrator with whom we are
engaged.
Psychological Balance in the Pre-Form ative Constitution of
Textual Voices
Most of our great literature resists simple interpretation.

Perceptive

readers are constantly finding valid new perspectives on the classic texts
because these works are open to us only to the extent to which we can infer
reasons

for

their

contents,

strategies,

and

structures.

Analysis

and

interpretation of a given work are in a perpetual sta te of becoming and this is
particularly true in the forming of a perform ance.
When a performer rehearses she or he varies performance choices on
individual lines or phrases in order to eventually gather some of these
possibilities into a performance th at does not simplify the rich interpretive
possibilities in the work. Stanley Fish has w ritten that the very act of literary
criticism often involves a desire to ’’come to the point.’’ This desire is similar to
what attribution theorists call a ’’strain toward sym m etry.”

Although Fish
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apparently does not know attribution theory, he says that if we are to allow the
tex t to ’'become,” we must resist the strain to "come to the point:"
Coming to the point fulfills a need that most literature frustrates
(if we open ourselves to it), the need to simplify and close.
Although Fish seems harsh in his implied criticism of the objectivist
position, his statem ent is in support of the basic premises of performance
studies: the performance of literature allows the text to present itself in various
living modes and, more im portantly through as many living consciousnesses as
there are potential perform ers. The experiencing of literature is never static.
And if, in pre-form ance, we come to an interpretive point and insist on staying
there, we run the risk of arresting our experience of the tex t.

Our need for

balance and understanding is usually enhanced rather than frustrated when we
allow literary experience to be the essentially temporal thing th at it is.

The

linguistic symbols (i.e. words) of a tex t may be static, but our experience of
them never is.
It is the fact th at we communicate through these shared linguistic
symbols th at allows for the much touted "free play" of linguistic meaning in
recent criticism .

Certainly language perm its and encourages free play up to a

point. Still, the fact remains that one could view an infinite number of different
perform ers playing Hamlet; no two would be exactly alike; all would be a
presencing of the text, mediated by an individual perform er; but, all would
remain recognizable as Hamlet; not even a novice critic would mistake the
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perform er for Macbeth. For all its free play of meaning, the language of Hamlet
presents us with something that is essentially the character of Hamlet and no
one else.
Performance involves the mediation of the tex t by the lived experience of
the perform er. That performance involves many interpretational choices from
all of the probable and possible readings of th at text. If we bracket or suspend
the notion of the tex t as a printed page and try to understand the narrative as
the behavior of a narrator, our readings will be produced largely by way of our
educated but subjective attributions.

An attributional theory of the act of

performance implies the same. Whether we constitute the tex t as an object or
as the utterance of an other, we have only the text itself as the guide to
interpretation. The only difference is that the perform er constitutes the tex t as
the utterance of a living other rather than as a printed tex t. The other in the
te x t can be constituted in a number of ways, by alternately focusing on the
different voices of that tex t and engaging them as one would another human
being.
Thus far I have discussed only three primary voices in a narrated prose
tex t: the voice of the narrator, the implied author, or the characters.

All of

these discrete voices are contained in the text-as-it-calls-forth-a-w orld (a kind
of synthesis of all the possible voices, but chiefly constituting the tex t only as a
text); more im portant for the perform er is the tex t constituted as the voice of a
narrator and/or an implied author. Recent criticism , particularly that of M. M.
Bakhtin, has posited many other voices within a text, voices th at are not
necessarily the discourse of a narrator, an implied author, or a character. Often
th ere are voices in a tex t of which perform ers may be only minimally or
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subconsciously aware. A knowledge of these voices can help the performer to
engage narrators, implied authors, and characters and evolve a rehearsal method
th at is based on the attribution model of an interpersonal encounter. Because
they identify these non-individualized voices, the theories of M. M. Bakhtin can
help to provide such a rehearsal method.
The Many Voices of Prose Fiction
The essence of a prose text lies in the manner of its telling, that is, in its
narrative style. This is what makes prose qualitatively different from, say, a
play. Since the narrator is the "teller,n the narrator’s behavior is crucial to the
interpretation of prose texts.
The performer who seeks to use a knowledge of attribution as a critical
tool must, in the final perform ance, foreground a narrator’s voice if one is
present in the text. Other voices, such as those of implied authors or characters,
are usually embedded in the narrator's voice, but have a living presence of their
own.

Unless the direct dialogue of characters is being presented dramatically,

the embodiment of the narrator's voice is the performer's intentional focus.
However, the other voices of the text remain on the horizon of consciousness and
influence that embodiment.
A Russian critic, M. M. Bakhtin, has developed a theory of the embedded
voices of a text that he calls "heteroglossia." I will proceed with a very brief
definition of the theory and its importance, keeping in mind my central metaphor
of interpersonal encounters:

A tex t is an other th at can be thought of as

essentially like the others we met in everyday life. For example, I might tell a
long narrative a t a party. Embedded within that narrative might be the voices of
my story's characters, my social conscience, even my professional language—the
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language of performance or communication theory. It is this image of embedded
voices within an apparent narrative monologue, th at forms the basis for Bakhtin's
conception of the narrative voice.
As Michael Holquist says in his introduction to The Dialogic Imagination,
a "highly distinctive concept of language" is "at the heart of everything Bakhtin
9fi

ever did."*°

Holquist goes on to describe Bakhtin's work as based on the

assumption of a dialectical conflict central to existence: to culture in general
and to language in particular. This almost violent opposition is characterized as
a struggle between the centripetal pull towards understanding and "shared
meaning" on the one hand, and the centrifugal forces of diversity and entropy on
the other.

Bakhtin sees these forces a t work in all cultural and literary

production, but believes th at they are most clearly expressed in the dialogic
form of the novel. Everything Bakhtin says of the novel is theoretically true for
the short story.
The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types
(sometimes even a diversity of languages) and a diversity of
individual voices, artistically organized. The internal stratification
of any single national language into social dialects, characteristic
group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages
of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of
the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions,
languages th at serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day
. . . this internal stratification present in every language a t any
given moment . . . is the indispensable prerequisite for the novel
as a genre . . . . Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators,
inserted genres, the speech of characters are merely those
fundamental compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia
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can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity of
voices.27
These various stratified languages form a major part of the experiential field of
a reader or a perform er. Any particular voice can be the figural voice a t a given
moment in the reading process. As one continues to read there is the constant
shifting and flowing as one level of voice rises to the intentional focus and others
recede.

Yet, as one voice rises, the others remain on the horizon, forming an

integral part of the interpretive experience.
M. M. Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia offers the student of performance
a new method of close reading, a method th at can illuminate and form the basis
for a system atic rehearsal methodology.

This methodology is based on the

conception of the text as a foregrounded other for whose behavior we attrib u te
causes.

I will describe this application of heteroglossia to the building of a

performance by using as examples passages from "A Rose For Emily.”
Bakhtin's theory of prose discourse is based on the assumption th at all
language is a complexity of stratified languages such as social, cultural,
geographical, ethnic, or professional dialects.

All people are capable of using

many of these different languages simultaneously in everyday discourse. Such
dialects often quite literally include other languages.
For example, Cajun French includes both the French and English tongues
as well as Southern regional dialects.

This simultaneous presence of several

national languages is what Bakhtin calls "polyglossia.”

Furtherm ore, a Cajun

lawyer or a Cajun farm er would each be conversant in different professional
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languages. Bakhtin maintains that all language is therefore "polyglot" and, a t
the same time "heteroglot." Heteroglossia refers to the context in which a word
or language is used. The same words can take on strikingly different meanings
when they occur in very different settings, environments, or contexts.
Heteroglossia, then, is
The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any
utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over
text. At any given tim e, in any given place, there will be a set of
conditions—social, historical, meterological, physiological—th at
will insure th at a word uttered in that place and at th at tim e will
have a meaning different than it would have under any other
conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in th at they are functions
of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and
therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a
conceptualization as is possible of that locus where centripetal and
centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a system atic
linguistics must always suppress.
Not only does this definition have a phenomenological core, insisting as it does
on the uniqueness of any given utterance, but, in term s of attribution, the
concept of heteroglossia emphasizes the utterance as a context-bound behavior
th at can always be attributed, a t least in part to the setting or the context of
the utterance.

Not only does practical, everyday language incorporate many

different voices, but these voices are identifiable and dependent on the full
context in which they are used. For example, when I, as a storyteller, im itate
my mother, her voice and all that it reveals of her is incorporated into my voice,
a listener would simultaneously recognize both of these discrete voices:

my

mother’s and mine. The same could be said of a pre-form ative "listening" to a
narrator’s discourse, into which he or she incorporates other voices.
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According to Bakhtin, the condition of heteroglossia (different voices)
enables the production of the novel and, I would add, to a lesser degree, the short
story.

A story such as "A Rose For Emily" might incorporate the dialect of

traditional Southern oratory (as in the use of antiquated adjectives such as
"august"), the language of individual characters (such as the voices of Miss Emily
and the townspeople of Jefferson), and sociological or historical voices (as in the
description of the late Colonel Sartoris as "he who fathered the edict th at no
Negro woman should appear on the stre ets without an apron.")

The story

incorporates these as well as other languages and actually exploits the linguistic
phenomenon of heteroglossia.

According to Bakhtin, there is a constant

interplay between the various stratified voices of a tex t and this dynamic,
29
tensive relationship he calls dialogism.
The dialogic relationship th a t exists
between different voices of a tex t can offer the perform er fresh and useful
tools, not only for literary analysis but also for the free variation of informed
perform ance choices.
It might be wise to pause a t this point and pull together the various
strands of our proposed theory.

We are dealing with the specific situation in

which a perform er tries to embody the voice of a narrated tex t in a public
perform ance. In order to "become" the narrator, to live through the narrator's
experience of the telling of the story, a perform er constitutes the narrator as a
living other, and the narrator's discourse as the symbolic actions of th at other.
In seeking to understand how the ubiquitous phenomenon of attribution
functions in the interpretation of the narrator's actions we cannot forget the
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essential differences between a flesh-and-blood other and the fictional narrator
of a text.

In real life, we can literally see, hear, feel, smell, and touch the

other. In literature we can only imagine him or her. We come to know narrators
through only one sense—we "hear” them tell their tales. Because we apprehend
narrators only through "hearing" their discourse and interpreting its symbolic
actions, it is necessary for our theory to do justice to the contents of th at
hearing.

For this reason, the theories of Bakhtin are of particular help and

enlightenment. Bakhtin never fails to view the text as utterance, as statem ent,
as discourse, in short, as a telling. At the same tim e, he never allows the riches
of a tex t to be reduced by a simple "hearing." Like many perform ers, he keeps
returning to the tex t, looking for the embedded voices within the apparent
monologue of the narrator.
If we are going to think of the tex t as a narrator's verbal behavior, we can
apply the interpersonal structures of attribution to our reflections about the
narrator's acts.

Our everyday discourse is an incorporation of many different

languages (social, historical, and professional, for example), and so is the
discourse of a literary narrator.

The way in which a narrator uses language,

what he is serious about and what he jokes about, what jargon he borrows, what
ideologies he embraces through language, tell us two things about him:

the

environment of the narrator is often revealed by the languages and words he
incorporates, and the disposition of a narrator is frequently disclosed by his
position in relation to these incorporated voices.
For example, in "A Rose For Emily," the narrator uses many legal term s
as we shall see. We might reasonably attrib u te that the legal profession is part
of the narrator's environment, and th at his straight, serious, non-parodic use of
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this professional language indicates some stable disposition in his character.
These primary modes of attribution (i.e. dispositional and environmental) can
become more obvious to the perform er if he knows how to find the languages
embedded in the narrator’s apparent monologue. Bakhtin’s theories can show the
perform er how to find these embedded voices.
Heteroglossia as a Rehearsal Method
Any perform er who has read Bakhtin carefully is in possession of a new
means of analyzing the discourse of a text. That reader can look for the dialogic
relationships that exist between the different identifiable voices or languages
within a tex t. The perform er can then rehearse a physical embodiment of each
particular voice in the tex t. Then the perform er can seek to embody the dialogic
relationship wherein one voice is an invisible presence with another voice, as in
parody.

This method of repeated readings would, in turn, foreground each

discrete voice as it was found in the tex t.

All of the different readings of a

paragraph, for example, would then be blended and be present in the coalescence
of the actual perform ance. Perhaps an old anecdote would serve to illustrate
this coalescence.
An apocryphal theater story describes Orson Welles' difficulty in directing
Agnes Moorehead in a scene in the film The Magnificent Ambersons. It was a
short sequence th at called for Miss Moorehead's character, who was insane, to
run down the long corridor of a family mansion.

Apparently, Welles was not

satisfied with the scene because none of the actress’s versions of it seemed rich
or complex enough. He told her to improvise and play the entire scene as if she
were literally one year old. She complied. Then he told her to play it as an old
man, as a c a t and as a coquette, as a murderer and as a m artyr, and so on
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through an exhausting and seemingly irrelevant list. Yet afte r a few attem pts a t
combining many of these various versions into one scene, both Welles and
Moorehead were satisfied th at they had achieved the complexity and the reality
they had wanted.

Of course, in the final version, Moorehead played only her

character and allowed the other performance possibilities to inform that
character.
A fter reading Bakhtin on heteroglossia, I tried a similar rehearsal method
on a section of Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily." I know the story well. But for
the perform er, fam iliarity with a tex t can be blinding as well as illuminating.
However, in this case I read the story in order to look for what Bakhtin might
call the "sociological voice":

th at voice which incorporates the language and

value systems of social classes and customs. But foregrounding this particular
voice in the text throughout several readings, I was able to recognize new
performance possibilities as well as new themes in the story. This social voice is
manifested chiefly in the tension th at is implied between the social values and
customs of Miss Emily's generation and those of the following one ("the next
generation, with its more modern ideas . . .").
There is a thick layer of ambiguity in many narrational passages in the
story. Nowhere is this ambiguity more apparent and problematic than in several
passages th at refer to the social phenomena of Jefferson, Mississippi.

For

example, in the second paragraph, immediately following a description of "what
had once been our most select street," there is this passage:
But garages and cotton gins had encroached and obliterated even
the august names of th at neighborhood; only Miss Emily's house was
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le ft, lifting its stubborn and coquettish delay above the cotton
wagons and the gasoline pumps—an eyesore among eyesores.30
It is difficult to decide whether this description is straightforw ard or parodic,
whether the narrator is taking sides with Miss Emily's generation or the "next
generation," with the cupolas or with the cotton gins. Even the choice of the
adjectives "stubborn" and "coquettish" is unclear.

Both words carry positive

and/or negative connotations. One of this story's g reat mysteries is the nature
of the narrator's stance in regard to Miss Emily.
"stubborness" or disapprove of her intentions?

Does he admire her

His description of her house

symbolically defines this relationship as an enigma.
In rehearsal, the perform er can experiment with this ambiguity by
alternately attem pting to embody the negative and positive possibilities of the
narrator's ambiguous stance towards Miss Emily. Each dispositional quality of
the narrator is "tried on for size." The final step in this rehearsal method is to
follow the suggestions of Bakhtin and to le t the disparate connotations exist
together, simultaneously, in a dialogic relationship. The narrator's admiration
for Emily can be mixed with a distaste for her "high and mighty" social
affections.
By gathering the complexities of voice into a coalescence, a performer
can avoid what many teachers of the acting "method" call "playing a quality"
rath er than finding the "action in the line." In other words, playing the dialogic
action of approach/avoidance, in this case, will avoid the amateurish trap of
playing qualities such as "admiration" or "moral indignation," both of which

30 Faulkner,

p. 119.
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would be reductions of the story’s essential complexities.

Playing actions that

combine two opposing responses a t once, while not the easiest performance
choice, may be the choice that is the richest and the truest to this text.
It is common for acting teachers to instruct their students to keep the
audience intrigued with a character by avoiding simplistic, quality-based
performances. Learning to ’’play" Bakhtin's dialogic relationships seems an ideal
way

of accomplishing this.

synthesis of several

As in the experience of Agnes Moorehead, the

layers of perform ance choices based on the dialogic

relationship between various stratified layers of language, can enable the
perform er to live through the complex and often contradictory motives and
attitudes of a fully realized narrator.
The third paragraph of Faulkner’s story will serve as an excellent final
example of the heteroglossic approach to forming the performance. It contains
several different ’’voices” th at are unmarked in the tex t and can therefore be
embodied only through "intonational quotation marks.” This term of Bakhtin’s
refers to the actual verbal performance of a person, inflected in such a way as to
make obvious the embedded voices within the discourse.
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of
hereditary obligation upon the town, dating from th at day in 1894
when Colonel Sartoris, the mayor—he who fathered the edict that
no Negro woman should appear on the streets without an a p ro n rem itted her taxes, the dispensation dating from the death of her
father on into perpetuity.
Not that Miss Emily would have
accepted charity. Colonel Sartoris invented an involved tale to the
effect th at Miss Emily's father had loaned money to the town,
which the town, as a m atter of business, preferred this way of

repaying. Only a man of Colonel Sartoris' generation and thou
could have invented it, and only a woman could have believed it.
A close reading of this paragraph reveals a t least several layers of
heteroglossia th at might inform a perform ance. First, there is the temporal pull
between the voice of the past and th at of the present epic situation.

The

n arrator speaks in the immediate present, but his voice exists in a dialogic
relationship with the historical/traditional past of the town. As a perform er I (P)
must engage the narrator (O) about his stance in relation to this past (X). This
phenomenon is marked by intonational quotation marks around such constructions
as
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition . . .
. . . dating from th at day in 1894 when . . .
. . . —he who had fathered the edict . . .
These constructions suggest an alm ost valorized past, a past impossible to
divorce from its rhetorical and oratorical conventions. These sentences seem
qualitatively different from those in the second half of the paragraph. Whenthe
narrator says, "Not th at Miss Emily would have accepted charity," he seems to
ex tricate himself from a formal, alm ost oratorical tone, to a tone more
imm ediately addressed to the listener or the narratee. Obviously, this temporal
tension between the events of the story and the telling of those events is crucial
to any physical embodiment of this tex t.
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In rehearsal, the performance might
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gain much from sustained readings which alternately foregrounded the past
events and the present telling. Eventually, these voices would be gathered into
the final performance.
Another language th at coexists in this passage is the professional language
of the lawyer.

Constructions such as "Dating from the date . . ." and "the

dispensation dating from the death of her father on into perpetuity . . ." are
obvious images of legal language. The same could be said of individual word
choices such as "edict," "rem itted," and "dispensation." This formal, detached
language is the language of a man who is w ell-practiced in retaining his
professional objectivity and in using his professional dialect.

Therefore, th at

language, that symbolic action, becomes the basis for my attribution of
detachm ent to the narrator. I sense th at the narrator’s use of local jargon is
understood and perhaps shared by the listener. Not only th at, but the use of the
embedded language of the legal profession, perm its me to attribute th at the
narrator is quite possibly a lawyer, a judge, or someone closely related to those
professions. Admittedly, this la tte r attribution is only a textual possibility, not a
probability or a certainty.

However, it provides a perform er with a more

definite character to portray without violating the text.
Further, this legal language is in a dialogic relationship with the almost
courtly language of the old South m anifested in phrases like "coquettish decay,"
"hereditary obligation," and "Negro woman." In fac t, if I pause for a moment and
foreground the implied author here, I might ask why he has chosen to place this
description of the "hereditary obligation" th at the town has toward Miss Emily
alongside the description of the edict. I suspect th at Faulkner is making some
subtle comparison between the "white man’s burden" towards Miss Emily and

121

towards the Negro women of Jefferson.

Traditionally, the white rulers of

Southern society have paid the white woman's taxes, and they have insisted th at
the black women wear an insignia of their inferior social position. I could never
have discovered (or attributed) this possible motive of the implied author, had I
not known to isolate the social voice in the tex t.
But I must always finally return to the narrator. These linguistic images
are clues to ways in which this narrator could become more highly defined in
performance:

m ature, but not old enough to have been a contemporary of

Sartoris, gracious, aristocratic, involved to some extent in the legal profession,
and subconsciously racist and sexist in spite of the fact th at he seems to realize
there is racism around him. The la tte r two qualities are in an obvious dialogue
with the aforementioned historical-social voice.
One step in my definition of the narrator is to occasionally foreground the
implied author as an other (O) and to make attributions concerning where the
implied author stands in relation to the narrator who then would become the (X)
of the basic symmetry model. In most cases these attributions would deal with
how the implied author is disposed toward the narrator.

As a perform er I

intuitively sense the voice of the implied author in the juxtaposition of images
and in constructions such as "coquettish decay."

I must, according to this

perform ance method, foreground and reflect on the implied author's voice and
s

eventually incorporate it into the foregrounded voice of the narrator during my
perform ance. In the final sentence of this paragraph, the previously cited
ambiguity in the narrator's view of the past returns. It is not clear whether he
has respect or contempt for Colonel Sartoris ("—he who fathered the edict
. . .").

There is, however, little ambiguity in the final, benignly sexist
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comment that "only a woman would have believed it." Clearly, a performer who
comes to this passage armed with the theory of heteroglossia knows what to look
for and how to find it. That perform er focuses his or her attention on various
textual voices, attributing relationships between the voice in focus and those
other voices that form the ground of the voice being attended to.
Bakhtin's conceptualization of prose fiction as a dynamic interplay
between stratified languages is an especially rich theory for the perform er. One
of its great virtues is its critical generosity. It is able to coexist with other
theories to a remarkable degree. A perform er could use both heteroglossia and
dram atistic analysis to fully define a narrator, as in the case of "A Rose For
Emily."

But heteroglossia, like attribution, is also compatible with the New

Criticism and even deconstruction (which could be viewed as a critical
foregrounding of the centrifugal force that partially anim ates heteroglossia).
Heteroglossia as a performance method is particularly felicitous in relation to
phenomenological criticism and practice. The method I have described is a way
of "walking around" the immanent tex t and viewing it from as many "sides" as
possible. The attractions and the repelling forces that constitute heteroglossia
also, to a large extent, constitute the mutable phenomenon of a perform er’s
creative encounter with a literary tex t.
The Figural Voice
The phenomenological rehearsal and analysis method th at I have outlined
could be clarified perhaps with a simple term that describes the process. I would
like to propose the term "figural voice" to signify the particular language or
voice that is the

momentary figure in the

consciousness during a reading of a text.

ground of the

performer's
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The narrator’s voice is only one of the voices that we attend to when we
prepare a text for performance. We also engage the obvious voices of characters
within the story, the less obvious voice of the implied author, and even those
"voices” within the discourse th at we sense only dimly. Eventually a perform er
will gather all of these voices into an embodiment of the narrative voice; in
order to render our proposed model more generalizable and more able to describe
the complex act of pre-form ance, the term "figural voice" is preferable to more
restricted term s such as "narrator," "character," or "implied author," because it
more accurately reflects the many ways in which we constitute narrative voices
as we form a performance.
If a performer were to follow the methods of heteroglossia, she or he
would concentrate on or attend to one identifiable language or voice a t a time in
the readings preparatory to performance.

Then the reader would attem pt to

describe and embody the dialogic relationships between these voices, attributing
causes for the presence of each discrete voice within the general discourse of
the narrator. In term s of Newcomb's symmetry model the performer (P) would
consider the embedded voice part of the content (X) of the narrator’s (O’s)
discourse, and would try to determine where the narrator stands in relation to
those contents. As a perform er I (P) set the narrator of Faulkner's story (O) in
relation to, among other things, the legal language contained in his utterance.
Then I must attribute environmental or dispositional reasons for the narrator's
use of this language. This process allows me to system atically build up the outer
circumstances and the internal motivations that control the narrator's behavior.
Once I have entered this deep level of the narrator's experience, I should be more
capable of "becoming" th at narrator in performance.

Chapter Four
THE FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTION IN A PRE-FORMATIVE READING
OF "A ROSE FOR EMILY"
All of the major parts of the theoretical model are now in place and the
method can be applied to a specific work. I will continue to analyze my own preform ative encounter with the narrator of "A Rose For Emily." I must keep in
mind that, although the narrator's voice is the focus of my critical attention,
th a t voice also contains the word of the implied author, of characters such as
Emily Grierson and her father, and various other voices that I can now call up
into my consciousness thanks to the theories of Bakhtin.
I begin by making a partial list of the voices I can already discern in the
tex t, voices that I have listed afte r two or three "diagnostic" readings of the
story. These voices include
(1) the voice of the narrator as a single personae
(2) the voice of the narrator as a chorus of different persona
(incorporating the various voices of some possible inhabitants of
Jefferson, Mississippi)
(3) the voices of individual characters in the story (marked in the
tex t by direct quotation marks)
(4) the sociological voice (e.g. "the edict")
(5) the historical voice of the Southern past
(6) the legal voice (the professional dialect of the legal profession)
(7) the formal Southern voice or the voice of the Southern
oratorical tradition
(8) the text-as-entity: Although this voice is almost contradictory
to my proposed model, it is difficult not to think of the tex t as
a complete entity, as a balanced and completed object rather
than as a balanced and completed utterance. This concept
should be avoided (bracketed) in the initial phases of preformance in order to allow the narrator’s voice to be presented
as the voice of a living other. My theory recognizes the great
value of the objectivist approach but privileges the idea of the
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objectified tex t as an utterance rather than as words on a page.
First, though, the perform er must reflect on his or her own
attributions about the narrator. This, in turn, will produce
much valuable information about the objectified text.
During my pre-form ative rehearsals of this story I (P) will focus on the
figural voice of the narrator (O), engaging th at voice and seeking, through
attribution, to understand the causes for the narrator’s verbal behavior.
Throughout this engagement, the narrator and I will be set in relation to certain
objects and events (such as the edict, Homer Barron, or Miss Emily herself).
Subsequent rehearsals will alternately foreground other voices inherent in the
discourse pf the narrator.

By focusing on, say, the sociological voice, I would

tem porarily constitute it as the figural voice; the relationship th a t I discover,
through attribution, between the narrator’s voice and the sociological voice, will
allow me to live through the narrator’s immanent experience and develop a rich
inner life when I embody th at narrator on a stage.

Perform er

Figural Voice

(the edict, the house, Miss Emily, Barron, etc.)
Because my analysis will focus on the initial impressions made by the
narrator of this story, I reprint the first two paragraphs of the story below.
When Miss Emily Grierson died, our whole town went to her
funeral: the men through a sort of respectful affection for a fallen
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monument, the women mostly out of curiosity to see the inside of
her house, which no one save an old man-servant—a combined
gardener and cook—had seen in a t least ten years.
It was a big, squarish frame house that had once been white,
decorated with cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies in the
heavily lightsome style of the seventies, set on what had once been
our most select stre e t.
But garages and cotton gins had
encroached and obliterated even the august names of that
neighborhood; only Miss Emily's house was left, lifting its stubborn
and coquettish decay above the cotton wagons and the gasoline
pumps—an eyesore among eyesores. And now Miss Emily had gone
to join the representatives of those august names where they lay in
the cedar-bemused cem etery among the ranked and anonymous
graves of Union and Confederate soldiers who fell a t the battle of
Jefferson.
One of the more im portant objects discussed by the narrator is Emily's
house. The narrator places his description of the house early in his discourse,
giving it a place of symbolic prominence.

As I "converse" with the narrator

about his description of this house, I must attribute causes to his verbal behavior:
why he places the description in such a prominent place and why he chooses to
describe it the way he does.

If the structure (in this case the order) of the

narrator's utterance is im portant, then I should attribute causes for th at order. I
also must attribute either environmental or dispositional causes for the
narrator's use of oxymorons such as "heavily lightsome" in his description of the
house. If I am going to encounter this narrator as an other, I must decide why he
tells the story in the way th at he does.
I must also be aware th at the narrator's voice incorporates the voice of
the implied author. I find th at, in the first paragraph, it is easy to foreground
the narrator's voice because of the almost informal "conversational" style. In

*William Faulkner, "A Rose For Emily," in Collected Stories of William
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 119-20.
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this functional first paragraph, the narrator's presence is strong as he seems to
launch an involved and often-repeated story; the narrator aligns himself with the
other townspeople ("our whole town") and, because of the conversational feel of
the utterance, the paragraph offers few problems for the perform er trying to
embody this narrator.
But the second paragraph is another m atter. This long description of the
house seems formal and very carefully prepared (i.e. "written"). It has more of a
"literary" feel in th at its language is so obviously calculated.

It is not

conversational style, even for a Southern professional man, to use constructions
such as "the heavily lightsome style of the seventies," or verbs such as
"encroached and obliterated," or adjectives such as "august." The entire passage
has more of the quality of oratory than conversation.

While I must primarily

embody the narrator in a solo performance of this story, I must contend with the
"literary" behavior that distinguishes this paragraph say, from the first
paragraph.

As the discourse is presented to me, I immediately attribu te the

paragraph more to an implied author than to a narrator.

I make this

determ ination by way of the attributional pattern of consistency (discussed in
chapter two).

I recognize the style of the second paragraph as containing

something th at is essentially akin to the other works of Faulkner that I know. I
might not think of this during the final perform ance, but now, in my preform ance, I can. The different figural voices th at I constitute in the first and
second paragraphs, could be the key to solo performance choices or even to a
group staging of the story.
Let us say that, keeping my attributional perspective on the text, I desire
to play the narrator as a highly defined character throughout the performance.
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In such a case I would embody the character in much the same way as an actor
would in a realistic play.
narrator’s consciousness.

That is, I would bracket everything other than the
I would seek, through some combination of method,

technique, intuition, and inspiration, to become th at character. In rehearsals I
find that this approach works well for the first paragraph, but not so well for the
second.
Real people who are engaged in face-to-face encounters do not generally
speak through the voice of an implied author. There may be an element of this
in the everyday situation in which one person tries to get an absent person’s ideas
across to a face-to-face partner, but it is not generally the way we constitute
the speech of an other. And yet, the voice of Faulkner seems to be an essential
elem ent in the verbal behavior of the second paragraph.
How do I know this?

I know it the only way a perform er can:

by

bracketing the existence of Faulkner's voice, that is, by pretending th at
Faulkner’s voice is not part of the second paragraph.

I attem p t to doubt

Faulkner’s presence here in order to justify the discourse as only that of the
narrator I must embody. I then try to perform this bracketed version, privileging
only the voice of the narrator. I attem p t to speak the sentences in an informal,
conversational and naturalistic manner, possibly using the old acting technique of
foregrounding the present lived moment of the narrator and ’’searching for the
right word.” In this performance a comma would mean a natural vocal pause or
th at the narrator is trying to think of the best word to describe an element of
the house.
This naturalistic delivery technique works well—up to a point:
It was big, squarish fram e house th at had once been white,
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decorated with cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies . . .

2

These words could be spoken naturally in a real-life conversation without
sounding contrived or ’'w ritten." However, the phrase "in the heavily lightsome
style of the seventies," becomes problematic when I attem pt to perform it only
as the word of the narrator. It sounds stiff, formal, and is all but impossible to
perform naturalistically.
"Why," I must ask, "does the narrator choose these words?"
attribute

Am I to

this verbal behavior to the narrator's disposition or to some

environmental factor? In the form er case, I run the risk of creating an affected
and possibly unreliable narrator; in the la tte r case I must imagine a very formal
setting for the epic situation—a choice th at perhaps could be supported
textually, but th at could also weaken

the dram atic immediacy of

the

performance. Keeping my interpersonal perspective in focus, I reflect further on
the context of this dyadic encounter between narrator and listener. If I place
myself in the narrator's position, I realize th at the narrator's attention is focused
not so much on the story as on the listener.
Another possible environmental factor could be this implied listener. If I
focus on the narrative voice, and insist on positing causes for its verbal behavior,
then I could posit a listener who is also very formal, highly educated, with an
unusually sophisticated everyday vocabulary: in short, a listener who is in the
same "interpretive community" as the teller of the story.

When the narrator

speaks of "the next generation with its more modern ideas," for example, he
signals a narratee who would know the generation being mentioned and probably
have some definite reaction to it.

^Faulkner, p. 119.
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But if I am to do justice to the text as it is fully presented to me, I cannot
ignore the voice of the implied author.

Therefore, I perform the second

paragraph once as the narrator and a second tim e as the implied author. That is,
I live through the second performance as if I were Faulkner, Eventually, I will
have to return to the foregrounding of the narrator's voice, but this voice will
contain the word of the implied author. In performance, I play only the narrator
and try to live through the experience of the telling of the story. But if, during
rehearsals, I have also played the passage as the implied Faulkner, I can gather
Faulkner’s voice into the narrator's by allowing it to "be'’ in the horizon of my
consciousness. The second reading forces me to deal with authorial intentions by
insisting th at I attrib u te causes (mostly dispositional) to Faulkner's verbal
behavior.
I suspect th at most good perform ers already "allow" this dual presence in
perform ance.

My point is that a discrete and conscious foregrounding of the

different voices of a tex t during perform ance, can make the embodiment of
these voices more clear and a more vital part of the rehearsal experience. This
clarification of the lived experience of rehearsal is a product of the constant
questioning by the perform er of the figural voice in the text.

I must ascribe

reasons for the behavior of whatever voice I am foregrounding a t a given stage
of my pre-form ance.
The exhaustive questioning of a tex t during pre-form ance is rarely a
teleological process. It is often possible to discover new voices embedded in a
narrator’s discourse if one looks hard enough for them . I return to this same
paragraph of "A Rose For Emily" and this tim e I look for Bakhtin's sociological
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voice.

In this text that voice will contain an ideological and sociological

elem ent.

It will call up images of social class, racial distinction, and the

essential "Southerness" of this regional story.

The "dialogue” between these

voices can become the intentional object of our consciousness, helping us to fill
in the fictive world of Yoknapatawpha.

The sociological voice in Faulkner’s

story gathers in the history of Southern racism and sexism.

Rather than

remaining in the ground of our consciousness, this voice can become, briefly, the
figure or intentional object of our reflection, increasing the potential for
clarifying and vivifying our experience of the tex t. Remember th at Newcomb’s
symmetry model could diagram this example as a triangular relationship between
the perform er (P), the narrator (O), and the peculiarly Southern social issues (X)
implied in the text. These relationships are governed by the degree of attractio n
or repulsion between the three entities.
Let us return to th at curious "heavily lightsome style" of Miss Emily's
house. This tim e, in rehearsal, I foreground the social voice implied by the tex t.
I tre a t it as a separate voice th at will eventually be incorporated into the
performed embodiment of the narrator's voice. A ttribution theory would suggest
th a t the phrase is a behavior th at can be attributed to dispositional or
environmental factors. An attributional model of this pre-form ative encounter
with the sociological voice requires th at the perform er (P) ascribe environmental
or dispositional causes for the behavior of the voice. The social voice (now the
figural voice in the text) is set in relation to an object (X), in this case Miss
Emily's house.
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Performer

Social Voice

p ^

- ... ...........

n

"heavily lightsome’

Miss Emily's House
The oxymoronic description could be attributed to an ambivalent feeling
in relation to the house.

The word "lightsome" suggests grace and delicate

beauty; the word "heavy" is just th at, and it suggests something ponderous and
oppressive.

There could be different responses to the narrative use of these

words, but these are, a t least, very possible reactions on the part of a performer.
In attribution theory, the degree of attractio n or repulsion an other has for his or
her discursive objects is a crucial elem ent in the attribution of causes for such
word choices. "Lightsome" seems to place the narrator in a positive relation to
the house, and "heavily" places him in a negative relationship.
Once the foregrounding of the social voice and the use of the symmetry
model have clarified this ambiguity, it is up to the perform er to attribute
reasons for the narrator's implied social ambivalence. Actually, two attributions
are called for, one applicable to "heavily" and the other to "lightsome."

The

narrator seems simultaneously aware of the graceful beauty and the ponderous
dark weight of Southern tradition.
This dual awareness is again suggested a few lines later in the tex t by the
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description of the "coquettish decay" of the crumbling facade. Something in the
voice of the text both pities and loathes the symbolic house.

That tensive

ambivalence could be the key to a perform ative embodiment of a complex
narrator, a perform ance th at is primarily an embodiment of a fictional
character, but that does not betray or ignore the complexities of this great tex t.
The duality of this narrator, his love/hate relationship with the central events
and existents of this story, while not the only interpretational possibility, could
provide the necessary consistency of behavioral objective so im portant to a
perform er's building of a character.
Attribution theory and common sense tell us th at individuals tend to
behave in consistent patterns.

This is the basis for our attribution of

"personality traits" to individuals. It is quite possible th at the most im portant
consistency in this narrator is his ambivalent feelings about the principle
character in his story.

A focus on this consistent behavior could help the

perform er create a more accessible and concrete embodiment of this narrator.
Ambivalence towards Miss Emily could become a consistent through-line, a
general direction in which to develop the performed character.
As a storyteller, this narrator does not try to direct the listener's reaction
to Miss Emily by making simple moral pronouncements about her. He seems to
take pains not to bias the listener for or against Emily. His goal in the telling,
his "through-line," if you will, is simply to keep the listener intrigued until the
final, carefully prepared moment.

At the same tim e, the narrator seems

determined to allow the listener to make up his or her own mind about Miss
Emily and would therefore be keenly interested in his listener's reactions,
especially a t the "shocking" end of the narrative.
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This analysis is only one more example of how the phenomenological
perspective of attribution can inform and illuminate the act of pre-formance.
One could perform similar attributional analyses of such problematic phrases as
"the cedar-bemused cem etery" or the two references to Miss Emily as an "idol."
The point is th at the perform er must first determine whether the verbal
descriptions can be attributed to the disposition or the situational context of the
narrator.

Then, the performer must determ ine whether the behavior of the

narrator is an example of one of the several possible patterns of attribution such
as distinctiveness, consensus, or consistency. To illustrate, I will use another
example from the problematic second paragraph.
Twice in the paragraph, the narrator refers to the "august" names of the
form er neighbors of Emily Grierson. He never uses the word again. Therefore,
the verbal behavior of the narrator here is distinctive. It is also consistent in
th at he only uses the adjective "august" to refer to the names of the former
owners of the houses on Emily’s stre e t. It would be unlikely to attrib u te the use
of the word to social practice or "common usage," that is, to see the word choice
as an example of consensus. Even in the upper classes of the South a t the time
of the story, the word "august" was becoming an affectation or an archaism and
it is certainly often viewed that way by the contemporary reader. That is why,
incidentally, th at the use of the word seems more a choice of Faulkner’s than the
narrator's, and why the word becomes problematic for the perform er who must
essentially play the narrator rather than Faulkner.

Faulkner's word must be

made to "work" as the narrator's word; that is, the perform er must gather his or
her attribution for Faulkner's use of the word into the narrator's use of th at
word. The perform er can engage Faulkner concerning the word "august;" the
narrator cannot.
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As a performer, then, I am forced into a dilemma.

I know th at this

particular word is not uncommon in other works by Faulkner, who consistently
and distinctively uses a style redolent of the high flown rhetoric of the ante
bellum South. Faulkner both censures and embraces the traditional South and I
must preserve this dialectic pull, this essential ambiguity in performance.
Faulkner appropriates archaisms for stylistic purposes. But I must justify the
narrator’s use of these words without distorting the probabilities of the text.
I do this through the process of free cognitive variation of interpretive
ideas. I posit different motivations for the narrator’s use of the word and try
these motivations out in performance. For example, the word ’’august’’ could be
intimidating to some listeners. Therefore, I ’’question” the narrator to see if he
is possibly trying to intim idate the listener. I quickly reject this interpretation
because it is not consistent with the straightforw ard, engagingly suspenseful
development of the story-line by the narrator. The last section of the story is
anything but intimidating.

R ather, it has the feel of a rehearsed, quietly

effective, m aster story-teller.

The narrator certainly seems consciously to

control the effects of his story, but he does not intim idate.
Another possibility for the narrator’s use of the word might be to ’’test"
the listener's reaction to it.

I come to this possibility by incorporating the

aforementioned ambiguous use of the word "august" by Faulkner himself, whose
implied voice I must incorporate into the narrator's.

I try to find a way to

preserve this ambiguity in embodying the narrator’s intention of the word
"august." I attribute ambivalent feelings about Miss Emily to the narrator based
on his alternate descriptions of her which are sometimes positive ("She
vanquished them," "She carried her head high . . .") and sometimes negative (as
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in the la tte r descriptions of Miss Emily as "bloated" and her voice as "dry" and
"cold.")
As I discussed in chapter two, one of the most common causes of
attributions is the close proximity of two item s in one’s experiential field of
vision. The narrator seems ambivalent towards Miss Emily; therefore it is not
unlikely that he might equate the "august names" of her neighborhood with Miss
Emily herself, extending his feeling of ambivalence to all that Emily’s generation
represents.

The word "august," if it were played as a testing word for the

listener, could then be allowed to be non-commital. The narrator waits to see
how the listener will react to it.

This performance choice, while not the only

possibility, lends immediacy to the scene and preserves the essential ambiguity
of Faulkner’s voice by incorporating it into the narrator’s.
Preserving the narrator's ambiguous relationship to Emily and her house
can preserve the authorial intention without sacrificing the lived immediacy of
my performance as the narrator.

Any perform er of literature knows th at

creating a subtext or an "internal monologue" for a character frequently involves
Q
the m ental creation of textual possibilities as well as probabilities. In fact, the
fully lived performance often involves more possibilities than certainties or
probabilities because of the prodigious amount of imaginative "filling in"
required of the perform er.

In this particular case, I could attrib u te the

narrator’s use of the word "august" more to the situation of his face-to-face

3

Beverly Whitaker Long has clearly distinguished between interpretive
certainties, probabilities, possibilities, and distortions in "Evaluating Performed
L iterature," Studies in Interpretation, n, ed. Esther M. Doyle and Virginia
Hastings Floyd (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1977), pp. 267-81.
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engagement of the narratee than to his ambivalent disposition towards Miss
Emily herself.

I might play the action on this line as a testing action. The

narrator (like Faulkner) could be deliberately non-judgmental in his use of the
word in order to observe his listener's reaction to it.

This is hardly unlikely

behavior for a man involved in the legal profession, as I have posited this
narrator to be. More specifically, the narrator might use the term even jokingly,
or with a slight wry smile, in order to see if the listener shares a tolerant yet
critical opinion of the "high and mighty" upper classes of the previous generation
in Jefferson, Mississippi.
I do not mean to suggest th at this is the only right interpretation of the
narrator's motivation. Indeed, I do not even suggest th at it is necessarily the
best interpretation.

It does, however, provide the perform er with a clear

motivation for the use of an unusual word; it is a valid possibility of the tex t th at
does not simplify the essential ambiguities of the story; and, it is an
interpretation th a t gathers the authorial voice into the perform er's singular
embodiment of the narrator.
Focusing on the voices of the others in a text, primarily the figural voice
of a narrator, can help the perform er to reflect upon his or her own attributions
about th at narrator and to avoid possible distortions of the text th at can result
from unexamined subjective responses. There is ample evidence th at individual
readers often allow their subjective reading styles to a ffe ct their interpretive
responses. Much of this evidence has come from psychologist Norman Holland.
Norman Holland's continuing work in the psychoanalytic investigations of
readers' responses to literature has presented persuasive evidence th at when
readers' expectations (of a text or of their world) are violated, they tend to
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construct psychological defenses against these violations. When a tex t violates
our expectations, Holland argues, we mentally defend ourselves by justifying or
ignoring the literary elements (the Xs of my model) that were incongruent with
our expectations. These defenses, according to Holland, lead to interpretational
patterns that fulfill conscious or subconscious fantasies on the part of the
reader—fantasies from which readers construct the story’s them e. Holland does
not use the language of attribution, but he is obviously postulating a
psychological strain toward symmetry th at directs the interpretational pattern
of a given reader.
In his book 5 Readers Reading, Holland analyzes the interpretational
strategies of five readers of "A Rose For Emily." He presents the experiential
record of these readers as transcripts of his interviews with them concerning the
story. Holland himself is a psychoanalyst, and makes an admirable (if not always
successful) attem pt to minimize his own influence on the readers' responses.
It is interesting to note th at all five readers intended the narrative voice
of "A Rose For Emily" as primarily th at of the author. That is, they constituted
the speaking voice in the text as William Faulkner's rather than as a fictional
narrator.

They seem to relate more to the implied values and intentions of

Faulkner than to the narrator as a well-defined other. Of course, none of these
readers intended to perform the story; they read it silently in the traditional
manner. This fact undergirds the often stated hypothesis that silent readers do
not approach a tex t in the same way th at a trained perform er does.

The

attributional theory th at I am proposing, while it is designed specifically for the
perform er, is also a valid method for the general reader, who might not reflect
consciously on his or her own subjective attributions about the tex t until he
knows the structure of those attributional patterns.
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General readers and even those readers who are considered experts in
literatu re may constitute texts in ways th at are fundamentally different from
the methods of a perform er. In term s of the symmetry model, non-performing
readers may be more inclined to focus on the contents of the utterance, the Xs
of the model, rather than on the act of utterance itself or, rather, the
consciousness th at produces th at utterance.

Of course, the contents of the

utterance are of paramount importance in interpretation, but we may often
overlook the relationships between the narrator and the contents of his or her
utterance. It is precisely this perceived relationship between a speaker and the
contents of her or his discourse th at is the concern of Holland, of Bakhtin, and of
attribution theory.
Readers who intend to perform a work often must find ways in which to
make the artifice or the "literariness" of style viable as actual speech.

As I

sta te d previously, one way to handle this problem is to bracket the notion of the
te x t as a printed page and to justify the discourse entirely as an u tteran ce,
lettin g the tex t become the utterance of an other whom the perform er will
embody in perform ance.
In order to justify the style of the tex t as an utterance, I might constitute
th a t very style, not as "literary style" but, rather, as verbal "behavior."
would allow

This

me to use the attributional paradigms as theoretical and

methodological underpinnings for a rehearsal method.

A knowledge of how

humans tend to perceive each other, then, can greatly inform the perform er
about how he or she perceives the other in the tex t. This is particularly true of
the perception of a narrator.
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The silent reader, that is, the non-performing reader such as those
interviewed by Norman Holland, may "lose" the narrative voice in the reading
experience and concentrate only on the events and existents (the contents) of the
tex t.

If so, that reader might forget to look "behind" the text and attribute

motives to the verbal behavior of the narrator (or even the implied author).
On the other hand, the pre-form ative reader, armed with a knowledge of
the structures of attribution, may be more inclined to develop complex motives
for a narrator's actions because he or she is intending to embody that narrator
and live through th at narrator's behavior on a stage. Attribution then, can help
the pre-form ative reader look behind the tex t, and a t the same tim e bring the
printed text into the world of interpersonal encounters: Speaking the tex t and
living through it during performance is a way of allowing the text to fully
disclose itself to us.
The claims that silent readers tend to de-emphasize the narrator as an
other is supported by Norman Holland's ongoing work in the psychoanalytic
investigations of readers' responses to texts such as "A Rose For Emily." One of
the readers, whom Holland calls "Sebastion," is representative of the tendency to
think of the text as an object rather than as an other consciousness. He speaks
of "its" (i.e. the story's) preparation for the surprise ending, rather than as his
(i.e. the narrator's or even Faulkner's) intended final effe ct in the text. Holland
interprets this objectification of the tex t as a defensive strategy growing out of
a fear of total engagement with the story. While Holland's views are extrem e,
they offer another perspective on the feeling of balance th at readers seek with a
literary work—a feeling th a t m otivates attributional behavior. Holland writes
th at
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Where a reader’s projections do not fit easily into a story, he will
tend to drive himself away from th^ story as most people conceive
it, creating distortions or tangents.
Holland’s interpretation of Sebastion’s response to ”A Rose For Emily"
suggests that Sebastion insists on constituting the story as a coldly objective
"work of art"® in order to "remain outside it"® or to avoid an intim ate
experiential involvement with it.

Still, Holland had spent a great deal of
t

professional time with Sebastion prior to his reading of the story, and had
already detected Sebastion’s tendency to insulate himself from strong emotional
reactions and involvements with others.
Sebastion's

reading

was

consistent

with

Holland’s

professional

expectations. Indeed, Holland’s ability to predict the kinds of readings th at his
clients will present is intriguing evidence th at responses to literature are highly
subjective and subject to the idiosyncracies of the individual personality.
In term s of the proposed model, it is interesting to see how Sebastion
exhibits both dispositional and environmental attributions to the behavior of Miss
Emily in the story. For example, Sebastion attributes Emily's murder of Homer
Barron to her dispositional quality of shame, the shame she feels a fte r being
rejected by him.

7

This is an intriguing point. This same interpretation could

also be viewed as an environmental attribution if we foreground the sociological

4Norman N. Holland, 5 Readers Reading (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1975), p. 176.
5Holland, p. 177.
^Holland, p. 177.
7 Holland,

p. 184.
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voice as well as Miss Emily’s voice in the story.
attributed to

Her shame could then be

the traditional Southern code of behavior for aristocratic

unmarried women a t the time of the events of the story. To be single, or to be
rejected by a man, especially a fte r a certain age, was, in the South, a severe
social stigma. My proposed performance method could not only incorporate both
the feminist viewpoint and the subtextual individualization of Miss Emily as a
character, it could project these attributions th at originate inside the reader,
into the performed narrator, creating a full presencing of the text, and one th at
is dram atically viable as the single embodiment of the narrator.
The experiential record of Holland's readers provides information th at can
easily be illuminated by the attributional perspective. By way of example, let us
look very briefly a t several of Holland's readers reactions to another problematic
line in the tex t—the inserted information about Colonel Sartoris' "edict:"
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a
sort of hereditary obligation upon the town, dating from that day in
1894 when Colonel Sartoris, the mayor—he who fathered the edict
that no Negro woman should appear on the streets without an
apron—rem itted her taxes, the dispensation dating from the death
of her father on into perpetuity.
Sebastion, who would be the P in our model, attributes Colonel Sartoris'
"fathering" of the edict entirely to environmental or situational pressures. He
sees the Colonel as a Southern ruler and maintains that
Even the rulers have no choice, because they're so completely
determined by the system th at they work under.
O

Faulkner, p. 119.
9 Holland,

p. 176.
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Sebastion went on to interpret the edict as referring to the sexual victimization
of Southern black women by white men. Our model might analyze this reaction
as an example of m isattribution based on distinctiveness information.

The

distinction exists in the narrative use of the word "fathered." Because the word
has sexual connotations, Sebastion linked it to a racial issue th at is, a t best, only
tangentially related to this story.
Structurally, m isattribution is no different from attribution. The current
theories of attribution deal only with person perception; they do not address the
validity of those perceptions. Likewise, my model is perception-oriented in that
it describes how attribution functions in the perform er’s response to a literary
other. A knowledge of the structures of attribution cannot assure the performer
of a valid interpretation of that other’s behavior; but it can show the performer
how to analyze his or her own reasoning concerning the causes of the other's
verbal behavior. That is, attribution theory can inform the perform er about the
quasi-logical connections th at create his or her interpretation of the others in
the tex t. If we, as perform ers, know attribution theory, we can reflect on our
attributional patterns as we try to interpret texts.

By allowing our own

attributional behaviors to become the intentional focus of our consciousness as
we read, we may indeed avoid some m isattributions and overcome some of the
idiosyncratic blocks in our perceptions of literary others.
Another reader, whom Holland refers to as Saul, also singles out the
distinctive use of the word "fathered" in the third paragraph of the story. Saul
translated the verb as "sponsored" which, according to Holland, was consistent
with

Saul's

other

"safe"

interpretations

of

possibly

controversial

or
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uncomfortable interpretations.*® Likewise, during the interviews Holland had to
remind Saul that the edict refers only to "Negro women."

Saul consistently

lumped the women into the generic category of "Negroes,"*1 thereby divesting
the word of any sexual connotations.
Holland’s analysis of these responses suggests that individual readers tend
to read works with consistent defenses, biases, interpretational patterns, or
doctrinal adhesions (to borrow I. A. Richards' term ). Had Saul had the benefit of
the attributional paradigm and the method of foregrounding the different voices
of the text, he would have been forced to come up with an answer for any
narrative behavior that struck him as distinctive or consistent.
If, in rehearsal, my figural voice is the implied author Faulkner, I might
ask why he seems so caught up with "fathers" in this story. The use of the word
"father" and the employment of other paternal imagery is a consistent behavior
of Faulkner in this story.

He has a good deal to say about Emily’s stern,

autocratic father and he evokes striking images such as the ’’picture" of Emily in
the doorway in the distance fram ed by her father’s foregrounded legs as he
wields a horsewhip.

More im portantly, if my figural voice is that of the

narrator, I must attrib u te the word choice of the narrator to some stable
disposition in him, or to some environmental factor.

Although the word

"fathered" is used distinctively, it can be made consistent or brought into
balance with the aforementioned ambiguous social stance of the narrator.
"Fathered" is an ambiguous word in this case. It could have a warm, positive

*°Holland, p. 176.
11 Holland, p. 176.
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paternal feel, or it could call up all the negative associations about historical and
racial paternalism. The execution of the heteroglossic rehearsal method, allows
me to play both actions (e.g. "to warm" and ’to force"), while privileging the
viewpoint that is critical of Colonel Sartoris.
This attribution might bring about a little laugh afte r I (as the narrator)
refer to the edict. It is a critical laugh, on th at places me in a slightly negative
relation to the edict. But, I also look up into the eyes of my listener and "check"
his reaction before proceeding.

This not only gives the scene dram atic

immediacy, it preserves and justifies the narrator's ambiguous relationship to key
elements in the story. In term s of the model, I have achieved a symmetrical
relationship between all the paired elements in the triangular relationship:
myself (P), the narrator (0), and the edict (X). (Remember that, according to
Newcomb, the relationships between the different elements do not all have to be
the same, either positive or negative, but the valences of the relationships define
the performer's experience).
Through this detailed analysis of some isolated behaviors of the narrator
of "A Rose For Emily," I have tried to make a case for the recommendation that
perform ers encounter the narrators of texts much as they would encounter other
human beings in everyday life. By adopting this interpersonal metaphor, and by
learning the universal structures of human attributional behavior, the performer
can come to know a tex t and his or her own response to it in a clearer way, and
can then use that knowledge to feed a concentrated embodiment of the
narrator's voice.
But in adopting this method, the perform er is cautioned not to reduce the
rich experience of pre-form ative reading by searching the tex t only for narrative
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behaviors. Narration occurs by way of language, and th at language calls the
world of the text into living presence.

We need to define and reflect on the

world that is summoned by the language of a text, and to ask to what degree our
attributions about narrators are a function of th at language.

No intentional

object, including the voices of narrators, can exist independently of the ground
from which it emerges and to which it is inextricably bound. The attributional
model th at I will now describe seeks to embrace rather than reduce the rich
complexities of our experience of textual language and the worlds they summon
and in which they exist.
The Purposes of the Model
The perform er who reads a tex t with the intention of performing it for
some audience is approaching that tex t with a fundamentally different purpose
than th at of the general reader. Because they plan to embody the text, preform ative readers often intend the text more as an utterance than as an object.
Before pre-form ance, th at is, before the reader decides to perform a work
for the public, he or she often does think of the work as an object. The poem,
story, or novel is often perceived as a complete entity, a thing-out-there th at is
to be presented to the reader’s consciousness.

This is the foundation of

objectivist criticism . The text is though of as a w ritten structure of parts that
make up a whole and the structure as well as the individual parts must be
understood by the reader.
The act of interpretation, oral or w ritten, is an attribution. Academic
critics, as well as perform ers, spend a great deal of their tim e and efforts in an
attem p t to understand the causes of a tex t’s symbolic (i.e. linguistic) behavior.
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They may attribute this behavior to characters, implied author's, or narrator's
within the te x t.

Attribution can be used as a central analogy th at forms the

basis of a "performance aesthetics" in regard to narrated texts.

Further, the

attribution paradigm of Theodore Newcomb, when applied to the act of preformance and used in conjunction with Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia, can
suggest a performance methodology of unusual versatility and heuristic value.
Newcomb's model (the P-O-X model controlled by the "strain toward symmetry")
diagrams the perceiver's social encounter with a flesh-and-blood other. In order
to adapt this model to the act of pre-form ance, we must add to it the perceiver's
phenomenological field of experience. That is, we must include in the model not
only the performer's intentional focus a t a given moment, but also any part of his
or her peripheral consciousness th at might affe ct the attributions of cause for
the other's behavior.

This peripheral consciousness is what Martin Heidegger

calls the "horizon" and what Edmund Husserl refers to as the "co-present margin"
of the perceiver's experience.
As I develop this experiential model, I will apply Newcomb's interpersonal
diagram towards the perceiving perform er by placing it in the ever-present
context of the perceiver's field of experience.
The Phenomenological Experience of the Text-as-U tterance
I decide to allow a text to present itself to me as the utterance of a living
other. I le t this other "speak" to me as in a conversation. In doing so, I allow the
tex t to open itself to me. Martin Heidegger defines the word "say" as "to show,
to le t appear, to let be seem and heard."

12

12

I not only listen to the text, I also

Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. Albert Hofstadter
(New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), pp. 29-30.
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speak to it, question it, argue with it, court it, frustrate it, and in short, attem pt
to interpret it.

This hypothetical "conversation” between a perform er and a

narrator is a complicated phenomenon, for, as Heidegger explains:
. . . speaking is a t the same time also listening. It is the custom
to put speaking and listening in opposition: one man speaks, the
other listens. But listening accompanies and surrounds not only
speaking such as it takes place in conversation.
The
simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning.
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is a listening to the
language that we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before
we are speaking.
I have tried to show, in the previous chapter, how the narrator of "A Rose
For Emily” listens to the narratee's reactions as he tells his carefully prepared
story, a story th at the narrator "hears" even as he speaks it. The performer does
the same: his listening to the narrator's discourse is also a critical speaking to
th a t

discourse.

My hypothesis is, th at the essential dynamic of this

"conversation" is determined by the attributional behavior of the perform er.
The attributional perspective requires, then, th at the perform er/listener
must perceive the narrator's discourse as verbal or symbolic behavior. This, in
turn, requires the performer to consciously posit causes for any narrative
behavior on which he or she consciously reflects. If we remember that we tend
to take notice of and attribute causes for "non-common" effects or behaviors, it
is not difficult to see the sim ilarity between attributional behavior and what is
commonly called "interpretation."

When, as we read, we "notice" a stylistic

device, an unusual viewpoint, a striking word choice, we are intentionally

1^

Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, tr. P eter D. H ertz, (New
York, Harper and Rowe, 1971), p. 122.
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focusing on "non-common" elements of textual discourse.

When we attribute

causes for these narrative "behaviors," we are interpreting the text.
Attribution theory deals with the ways in which we interpret everyday
interpersonal events. For many attribution theorists such as Jones and Davis,
the term "interpretation," when applied to person perception, simply means the
degree to which the effects of an action are non-common.1^ We interpret
unusual (i.e. non-common) behaviors according to the degree and force of the
motivation for that behavior. The behavior in question might be highly specific,
like a narrator's use of an unusual word, or it might be a more generalized
perception of the narrator's behavior.

For example, the narrator of James

Joyce's Ulysses or the Benjy section of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury differ
from expected or traditional norms of narrative behavior; and, it is precisely
their behavior th at allows me to form an experiential record of their interior
selves.

I look behind the language, I listen to it, to discover the essential

character of the narrator. I do this anytime the narrator's "style" becomes the
momentary object of my attention and I do this primarily through the process of
attribution.
Some narrators, like the traditional omniscient ones, do not seem to
deviate from the norm to the extent of those mentioned above. Many writers,
Hemingway for example, cultivate a kind of negative capability; as implied
authors they "disappear" behind their seemingly conventional use of the narrative
voice.

In any case, traditional or nontraditional, the "style" of the narration

determ ines what I am referring to as behavior. We, as perform ers, often must

14

Albert Hastorf, David Schneider, and Judith Polefka, Person Perception
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 69.

150
deal in some way with any unusual stylistic devices of a tex t, and justifiably
incorporate those devices into the embodied "speech" of the narrator.

If a

narrator is verbose, or even seems so, we would do well to justify that verbosity
in our performance by attributing specific causes for it. Likewise, if the style is
lean and sparse, we might look for attributes th at give rise to th at aspect of the
narrator’s style.
To summarize, the attributional theory of the act of pre-form ance insists
th at in the final stages of rehearsal the perform er must concentrate on the tex t
as the utterance of the narrator.

All th at has been learned through the

application of any other critical methods must finally be gathered into the
embodiment of a narrator who is conceived of as the speaker of the text, and to
whose symbolic behavior, especially problem atic behavior, we must attrib u te
causes.

A knowledge of the structures of attribution can help the perform er

refle ct on his or her own critical response to the text.

As Mary Louise P ra tt

says, "our knowledge of the selection process is one of the most im portant sets
of presuppositions we bring to bear when we read a literary work." 15
Balance or the Strain Toward Symmetry as the Principal Dynamic of the
Response to a Text
I have determined th at the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" has decidedly
am bivalent feelings about Emily Grierson. I have also, during my imaginative
a ttem p t to live through the internal experience of the narrator’s discourse,
attributed very positive dispositional qualities to him. These include courtesy,
intelligence, authority to tell the story, and great relish in the telling of it.

15

Mary Louise P ra tt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), p. 117.
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Because of my conscious attem p t to constitute the narrative voice as a living,
breathing, human other, I have come to understand him more and more. As my
understanding of him increases, my assimilation of his ambivalent feelings about
Emily not only grows but becomes more comfortable to me.
What I have just described is a good example of psychological balance
principles a t work. It is well to remember th at attributional behavior is usually
motivated by feelings of psychological imbalance or dissonance. Similarly, when
two people discuss an object, the balance-seeking individual will exhibit a
"strain" toward symmetry, a strong desire

for a comfortable triangular

relationship between himself (P), the other (0), and the object (X).

In the

language of attribution theory, if P has a high "degree of liking” for O, then P is
more likely to accept and even assim ilate O's attitudes, beliefs, and values. If I
respect "Emily's" narrator and am a ttra c te d to him, I tend to make his
ambivalent feeling my own.
Theodore Newcomb's symmetry model is the core of my attributional
model of pre-form ance.

Newcomb diagrams the interpretational dynamics

resulting from an assym etrical relationship among the three elements. For the
purposes of illustration, le t us suppose th at, on a first reading, a person found
Miss Emily repugnant.
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Performer
P

_ ^ x

"Emily Grierson"
Then, suppose that reader decided to perform the story for an audience, and read
the story again, this tim e bracketing all the possible textual voices other than
the narrator's. This reading develops a very positive relationship between the
perform er and the narrator—a relationship similar to the one described above.
The narrator's positive estim ations of Emily become apparent, as do his less
numerous negative ones. We now have an assym etrical relationship.
Perform er

+

N arrator

"Emily Grierson"
The essential imbalance is the perform er's negative view of Emily and the
many positive feelings about her th at the perform er attributes to the narrator
based on his symbolic behavior in the tex t. The easiest way to achieve symmetry
is to allow one's perception of the other person (O) influence his or her
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perception of the object (X). I gather so much of the narrator’s apparent respect
for Emily into my own vicarious experience of her, th at my perception of her
also becomes a t least ambivalent, if not altogether positive, so that we now have
a sym m etrical relationship.
Perform er

+

Narrator

’’Emily Grierson"
Newcomb himself presents the idea of this "strain towards symmetry" as an
attributional law:
In propositional form, the stronger P's attraction toward O, the
greater the strength of the force upon P to maintain minimal
discrepancy between his own and O's attitude, as he perceives the
la tte r, toward the same X; and, if positive attraction remains
constant, the greater the perceived discrepancy between his own
and O's attitude, the stronger the force to reduce it. We shall
refer to this force as strain.
Perform ers who know about this interpersonal tendency to reduce
dissonance can reflect more critically on their own responses to narrators. They
might ask why the narrator seems to respect Miss Emily. The answer comes

16
Theodore Newcomb, The Acquaintance Process (New York:
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 12.

Holt,
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from the narrator's utterance, from the tex t itself.

For example, when the

narrator says "She vanquished them , horse and foot, . . . "

I intuitively sense

th at the narrator's behavior on this line (his speech a ct, if you will) is "to praise"
or "to grudgingly admire;" in fac t, I can "hear" a faint chuckle behind the
utterance, a laugh that seems to say "the little lady was too much for the town;
she was more than a match for them." I have attributed this dispositional quality
to the narrator based primarily on his use of the verb "vanquished," a strong word
th at suggests complete and u tte r victory, and the colloquialism "horse and foot,"
which not only brings the narratee into a friendly, comfortable relationship with
the narrator, but also implies that the narrator is "pretty sure" th at the listener
will agree with his estim ation of Emily. I have attributed the behavior of the
sentence, th at is, the narrator, to the dispositional and environmental qualities
th at lie behind the language. My perform ative interpretation is a direct result of
my specific attributions—attributions th at might give rise to exciting and
creative performances or, admittedly, that might, if I am not extremely vigilant
in pre-form ance, result in misguided interpretations.
The Fundamental Attribution Error
The perform er using this method must constantly remember to foreground
the text as a narrator's verbal behavior, in order to avoid projecting his or her
own presuppositions onto the narrator without textual reinforcem ent. Projection
is understood here to mean the attribution to others of attitudes th at are really
our own. Too much projection is aberrant, and can lead to m isattributions and
gross m isinterpretations. In performance, I must embody the narrator and not
the other way around.
Norman Holland's work has produced much evidence th at readers do
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project a great deal of themselves into the texts they read. He concludes that
any individual shapes the m aterials the literary work offers him
. . . to give him what he characteristically both wishes and fears
. . . and he also constructs his characteristic way of achieving
what he wishes and defeating what he fears.
Conceiving of the text as the utterance of an other who may be quite
unlike ourselves, can help us as perform ers to remain rooted in the text, rather
than in our unexamined responses to it. Both tex t and response are important,
but the reasons for interpretations must be inherent in the textual voice.

By

questioning our own attributional response to the narrative voice, that is, by
asking the tex t "why" we have attributed dispositional qualities such as courtesy
and admiration to its narrator, we can insure that there are always textual bases
for our characterization of the narrator in perform ance.
The most recent theorizing about the attribution process has identified
the "fundamental attribution error,"

18

a cognitive pattern of which the

perform er should be wary. Essentially, the error involves the tendency to focus
on only one of the two most general types of attribution—dispositional
attribution—and to selectively forget the environmental or situational reasons
for an other’s behavior. As Shaw and Costanza sta te it,
. . . there is a pervasive tendency in pereeivers to "overattribute"
behavior to the personal dispositions of actors.
17

Norman Holland, "Unity Identity Text Self," in Reader-Response
C riticism , ed., Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Univ. Press,
1980), p. 819.
18
Marvin E. Shaw and Phillip R. Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 249.
19
Shaw and Costanzo, p. 249.
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Living through the complex experience of an other takes an extraordinary
amount of time and reflection.

Often, in our necessary rush to build a

perform ance, we do have to concentrate on the essential character of the
narrator, but we must always remember th at the narrative personality and its
behavior can result from situation as much as from disposition. The atmosphere
of com fort, the masculine social milieu, the fact th at the telling takes place in
Jefferson, Mississippi, and so forth, all contribute to the narrator’s behavior in
"A Rose For Emily.” The degree to which the perform er imaginatively fills in
these situational details can inform and define a performance more fully, and
bring the world of the tex t into a richer presence.
In other texts, situational constraints may override dispositional qualities.
In Eudora Welty's short story ’’Why I Live a t the P. O.,’’ the narrator, a grown
woman who has just run away from home, has set up a ’’perm anent’’ residence in
the local post office, where she is the sole employee. The fac t th at she has only
been there three days, and that she is probably addressing a hapless customer, or
a t least some generalized listener, may have more to do with her behavior than
any inherent dispositional quality she may possess. While it is obvious that she is
a paranoid person by disposition, the situational factor of her favored sister's
return has a great deal to do with the story's hysterical tone (she even begins
with the phrase, "Thing's had been fine until . . . ").
Many of Dorothy Parker’s stories, such as the often-perform ed "The
Waltz" and "The One on the Right," when analyzed according to attribution
theory present the perform er with an intriguing blend of situational and
dispositional reasons for the narrator's caustic verbal style.
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In short, the attributional perspective on the act of pre-formance requires
the rehearsing performer to reflect on his or her own attributions concerning the
narrative voice.

This means that the perform er will, a t some point in the

rehearsal process, stop and ask whether particular narrative behaviors are the
result of situation, disposition, or a combination of both. These constraints on
the narrator’s behavior can then become definite elements in the performer's
"inner monologue" or subtext during the actual performance. An understanding
of the causes of a narrator's behavior can allow us, as performers, to fully livethrough and embody the narrators and characters we m eet in fiction and poetry.
Our questioning of the narrative

will often bring forth into our

consciousnesses individual behaviors that might have gone unnoticed had we not
reflected on our attributions during pre-form ance. Focusing on interesting or
unusual behaviors of narrators can obviously aid the perform er in individualizing
and concretizing the persona he seeks to embody.
Non-Common Narrative Behavior
Thus far, the attribution
concentrated

on the

performer's

model of the act of pre-formance has
constitution

of the

narrator,

and

the

complicated triangular relationship th at exists between the perform er, the
narrator, and the various events and existents (Xs) in the tex t. The model has
also detailed how the "degree of liking" or the attraction level between these
three elements can create an asym m etrical relationship th at produces a strain
toward symmetry th at, in turn, m otivates the attributions of the perform er.
We should keep in mind the fact th at no perform er could reflect on every
discrete "behavior" of a narrator. In pre-form ance, some perform ers will single
out some narrative behaviors as the most im portant or "non-common" while
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other performers might concentrate on different actions of that same narrator.
The point we must emphasize is that people tend to attribute causes more
to "non-common,” (that is, unusual or non-characteristic) behaviors.

I have

shown how the non-characteristic use of the term "august" led me to make
attributions about the narrator and the implied author of "A Rose For Emily."
Non-common textual behaviors are often problematic for the perform er. During
pre-form ance, the perform er must, of necessity, attribute causes for the non
common effects of the discourse, and must justify those attributions only
through the symbolic action of the text itself. When the non-common behaviors
of a tex t force the perform er to recognize levels of textual voice other than that
of the narrator, the perform er must deal with those voices before incorporating
them into the final embodiment of the narrator. This is where the concept of
the figural voice must be added to the pre-formance model.
The Figural Voice
Because we are appropriating the attribution model from the social
sciences and, more specifically, from theories of interpersonal communication,
we must account for and adapt th at model to the situation in which one member
of the dyad is a written tex t. It is not enough to say that, experientially, the
perform er must constitute the text as an other's utterance. There is still the
objectified text, the printed page, to contend with in the pre-form ative
experience. In many ways the interpersonal analogy will still hold. However, the
tex t as an objectified "work of art" is, in its permanence and stasis, essentially
unlike a living other. It is like the printed text of a public address: its linguistic
constituents are the same as those of the delivered speech, but our experience of
the two modes, w ritten and oral, is quite different.

In order to preserve the
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sanctity of the tex t, and to avoid the inevitable accusations of relativism , I have
proposed th at the concept of the "figural voice" be added to the model. This
perspective, suggested by the theories of M. M. Bakhtin, allows us to deal with
the various "voices" th at exist within the narrator"s discourse.

Such voices

might include the sociological voice, the voice of history, the ethical voice or
the voice of the implied author, character voices, even specific sociological
voices such as Marxist voices or the "feminist voice."

20

By including in our pre-form ative strategy, the discrete questioning of
each identifiable voice in the tex t, particularly the voice of the implied author,
the perform er does not run the risk of reducing the tex t to a simplistic reading
or privileging his or her own response to the text over the authorial intention.
All can exist together and be incorporated into the final, crucial embodiment of
the narrator, as I have shown.
The model, as it now stands, closely resembles the original symmetry
model of Theodore Newcomb and the dynamics are the same as his.
(O i, 0 2, O3, . . .)

"degree of liking'

x2> x3> • • •)
on

Wayne Booth has pointed out an interesting omission in Bakhtin’s
otherwise inclusive list of possible textual voices—th at of the fem inist voice.
See Booth's article "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of
Fem inist Criticism," C ritical Inquiry, 9 (Sept. 1982), pp. 45-76.
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As we look a t the model in term s of literary response, we should keep in
mind that the attributional behavior of the perform er is motivated by the "strain
toward symmetry" that results from feelings of psychological imbalance.
Imbalance could be a function of many types of emotional responses to the
literatu re, lack of literal understanding, inability to empathize with the narrator
or characters, personal distaste for the subject m atter or other works by the
same author, even the mood the perform er is in a t the tim e of a particular
reading of the tex t. The strain toward symmetry causes the mind to make quasilogical connections based on consistency information (how often has the actor
done this in the past?), distinctiveness information (how often has the actor done
this in different circumstances?), and consensus information (how many other
people have done that sort of thing in those sorts of circumstances?). Behaviors
th at violate our expectations about consistency, consensus, or distinctiveness
will often initiate our attributions of causes for those behaviors.
attrib u te behaviors to one of two general sources?

We tend to

dispositional or internal

causes, and environmental, contextual, or external causes.
These la tte r two patterns, dealing with internal or external causation, are
the most common attributional styles in humans. This is true whether we are
responding to social others or to the others we encounter in the reading
experience. We might illustrate this point with an example of one of the most
basic determinations about dram atic literatu re—whether or not a tex t can be
said to fit into the category of a tragedy or not.

Internal versus external

causation is still the test for whether a tragedy can be called a tragedy of fate
(external causation) or a tragedy of character (internal causation). But there are
several other attributional patterns of which it is helpful to be aware as we focus
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on the interconnecting lines of our model.
Closely related to internal/external causality is the concept of impersonal
versus personal causality.

This dimension of attribution requires that the

perform er decide whether or not the narrator is consciously trying to cause the
effects th at he or she produces. This perspective, sometimes referred to as the
"perception of try" was first articulated by F ritz Heider, the founding father of
attribution theory.
Heider also divides perceptions of causality into instances of
personal causality and impersonal causality. Perceived personal
causality is a subset of perceived internal causality and
encompasses only those events which the other intended to
produce.
Conversely, "perceived impersonal causality" refers to actions th at the
narrator "did not try to produce."

22

A person, in this case a narrator, would be

held responsible only for effects th at he or she consciously tried to produce.
Only such internally motivated effects would yield information about the
dispositional properties of th at narrator.
Consider, for example, the central mystery of "A Rose For Emily." This
story shares an essential quality with all "mystery stories" in th at the answer to
the major dram atic question is withheld until the carefully prepared ending of
the story. The essential presence in such stories is the absence of the answer to
the mystery. Indeed, what happens up in Miss Emily's bedroom on the night of
Homer Barron's death remains a mystery a t the close of the narrator's tale. The

21
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Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 65.
Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 65.
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reader must ask, then what the central m ysteries or absences are th at keep the
reader reading or the listener listening.

In Faulkner’s story, the narrator

continually drops hints throughout the discourse th at point toward the concluding
sentence.

One such device is the narrator's teasing references to "the smell”

around Miss Emily's house. This smell is mentioned several tim es in the story,
but it is essentially developed in the page-long inserted report about the
nocturnal liming of Miss Emily's yard by four men of the town. At this point in
the narrative, the cause of the smell is a mystery and the listener might wonder
why the narrator makes such a point of it.
At any ra te , the references to the smell become obvious (i.e. distinctive,
noticeable, or "non-common”) actions of this narrator.

As a pre-form ative

reader using the proposed attributional model, I am required to reflect on and
attrib u te causes to any behavior th at I notice as unusual or distinctive. "What,” I
ask, "is the narrator up to here?"

As a listener, I sense th at this and other

seemingly irrelevant details (such as the rat-poison episode) are leading up to
something.

I interpret the narrator's symbolic behavior in this passage as a

"teasing" or a conscious attem p t by the narrator to keep me guessing. He is, in a
sense, preparing me for the story's climax. The references cause me to think
forward briefly to th a t point in the story a t which the narrator will explain the
smell. Following the method I have outlined, I must then ask whether or not the
narrator is behaving this way because of the epic situation, because of some
internal disposition, or some combination of both.
My first impulse is to attrib u te the narrator's teasing references to his
own relish in telling a rom antic and gruesome story—a telling th at he may well
have perfected through years of practice.

But I know th at the "fundamental
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attribution error” is to overattribute behaviors to dispositional qualities of an
actor and therefore I "ask" the text whether or not there could be less obvious
situational causes for the teasing references of the narrator.
I have already described the easy, masculine, professional context in
which this narration seems to occur.

If I em pathetically put myself in the

narrator's place, looking out a t the epic situation through his eyes, I find th at the
focus of his attention must be the listener. The most powerful situational factor
in the narrator's environment is the listener.
The listener, I decide, is new to Jefferson. Otherwise, he would already
know this famous local legend. As I try to enter the narrator's experience of the
listener I develop an inner monologue th at goes something like this:
Here is a fine young man who is new to the town. I suppose he sees
me as a kind of mentor, or a t least his initiator into the ways of
Jefferson. What good fortune'. He has asked me about Miss Emily
Grierson. So, he doesn't know the story. Well, he's certainly come
to the right place.
This subtext is a possibility in the tex t. As a performance choice it has
two benefits. First, it helps me to create a concrete world for the story and a
highly defined context for the epic situation. Secondly, in attributing the very
presence of the listener as the chief cause of the narrator's teasing references to
the end of the tale, I provide myself with a dynamic partner in the scene.
Whether I decide to "place" the imaginary face of the listener somewhere on
stage, or to use the various faces of the actual audience as my listener(s), I have
given myself a face to which I can rea ct and whose reactions I can constantly
monitor during the telling of "my" story. By attributing the narrator's behavior
to the situational factor of the naive listener's presence, I have provided myself
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(as performer) with actions to play and with a definite focus for those actions. I
have known how to vary my performance choices by consciously attem pting to
avoid the fundamental attribution error—th at is, to avoid the overattribution to
disposition.

By consciously attem pting to foreground the epic context of the

telling, I can do more than enter the narrator’s internal experience, I can
construct the epic world called forth by the language of the tex t and transfer
th at world from the page to the lived experience of performance.
The most im portant result of the conscious avoidance of the over
attribution to disposition is that it channels the perform er’s attention toward the
world of the story. The context or environment of Faulkner's story is manifested
on two levels. First, there is the aforementioned epic situation, the world-ofthe-telling. And there is also the context in which the past events of the story
occur. This is the world of the American South, of Jefferson, of Yoknapatawpha,
the world in which Miss Emily lives. Both levels of world are essential to the
story and essential to the successful realization of the text in performance.
The concept of the figural voice is the means by which a perform er can
allow the world of a text to fully disclose itself. If, during pre-form ance, I keep
in the back of my mind the less obvious levels of textual voice, levels such as the
sociological, the historical, the fem inist, or the parodic, and if I attend to each
one as I notice it, I am allowing the contextual world of the story to fully present
itself to me. A trained reader often does this intuitively, but it is a complex
experiential process and must be included in the model. This is accomplished by
the simple surrounding of the "figural voice" with the matrix of "all co-present
textual voices."
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The model now becomes a phenomenological description of the heteroglossic performance method I have outlined. Whatever level of voice happens to
be the momentary focus of my intention, exists and is experientially defined by
the co-present ground of voices from which it arises. For example, if I focus my
attention on the feminist voice in "A Rose For Emily," I will experience that
voice in a dialogic relationship

23

with the social and historical voices in the tex t.

The implied sexism in the narrative voice of this story, must be analyzed in
term s of the socio-historical context from which it arises—the context of
Yoknapatawpha in the early years of this century.
And yet, if we continue this example, it is obvious th at a complete
description of the perform er’s experience of this feminist voice is also influenced
by the context or world in which the perform er exists—the world of the post
fem inist decade of the nineteen-eighties.

23

The performer's attributions and

M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans.
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp.
411 ff. The basic idea of Bakhtin's theory is the interconnectedness of or dialogue
between the various embedded voices within a discourse.
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possible feelings of dissonance or imbalance might be heavily influenced by the
social milieu in which he or she has lived.

The world of the performer

encompasses the world of the text and enters into a dialogue with it during preform ance.

We represent this graphically in the model by surrounding the

perform er with all of his or her ’’co-present lived experience," because our
readings of texts are inextricably bound to our experiences as human beings in
our own world.

As a person prepares a perform ance, the co-present lived

experience of the perform er includes the moment-by-moment reading-inprogram as well as any previous reading of the text during the perform er’s
lifetim e.

Analogically, the pre-form ance model is bounded by this lived

experience.

The perform er, within the context of his or her experience,

constitutes or attends to one of the possible figural voices in the text. As the
arrows show, th at perform er then attributes causes to the "verbal behavior" of
the figural voice.

The attentive reader might well ask a t this point why the

arrow is a double arrow.

This study has concentrated almost exclusively on

attributions made by a perform er concerning a narrator; but the attributional
model is an analog of a social experience and is therefore dyadic. A narrator
may also make attributions about a reader or listener to his or her discourse.
The speaker of "A Rose For Emily” has been shown to make several minor but
im portant attributions about his listener.
chapter

three

and

include

masculinity,

These attributes were detailed in
professionalism,

and

relative

unfam iliarity with the local legends of Jefferson, Mississippi. A ttributes made
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by a narrator about his or her listener are not new to critical theory. They are
m ost clearly dealt with in recent criticism as a "signaling of the narratee."

24

24
Seymour Chatm an, Story and Discourse; N arrative Structure in Fiction
and Film (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 253-62.
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But our focal concern is more with the act of pre-formance than with
narrative theory in general, even though the model has obvious applications in
both areas. As we analyze the attributional behaviors of the perform er in regard
to the narrative voice, we must include the subject m atter of the encounter, for
it is this content that sets up or resolves any psychological imbalance on the part
of the perform er, motivating his or her attributions.
This final element in the model is difficult to nominate.

When we

encounter an other and speak with th at other, we always speak about something.
The discourse of a text always contains subject or objects. A tex t may produce
images, events, characters, objects, and it may also produce concepts, ideas,
dialogues, tones, attitudes, beliefs, values, symbols, and any number of other
constituents.
When we engage an other in a "dialogue," the other’s discourse contains
(symbolically) certain subjects or objects.

These may be concrete, such as a

house, the image of a woman a t a window, or the description of an event such as
the nocturnal spreading of lime around an old house.

Or, the contents of a

discourse may be conceptual, such as a description of death as "the long sleep
A C

th at outlasts love,"

A tf

or "the newer generation, with its more modern ideas."

The point is that, when we "listen" to a figural voice, we always place it in
relation to its specific subject. And the strain towards sym m etry that motivates
our attributions to a narrator is controlled by the tensive relationships th at exist
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Faulkner, p. 130.

26Faulkner, p. 120.
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between ourselves and the narrator, ourselves and the subject of the narrator's
discourse, and the narrator's relationship to the subject of his or her discourse.
Seymour Chatman provides a helpful perspective on this quality of
narrative when he distinguishes between story and discourse.

A story, says

Chatman, is composed of events, characters, and details of settings, as well as
conceptual ''things'' such as love, death, and honor.

He refers to story as

"contents” and distinguishes it from discourse, which he calls "expression."^ In
an attributional theory of literary response we would include all contents of a
narrative as the Xs of the model.

We would characterize the discourse or

expression of those contents as the "verbal behavior" of a narrator, an implied
author, or a character. These individual contents become the momentary focus
of our attention as we read through the tex t.

They exist, not alone, not

discretely, but as figures called up and viewed against the ground of all the other
contents of the story. It is not possible to focus the intentional consciousness on
Emily Grierson's house without setting it against the "garages and cotton gins"
th a t surround it. The attributional model would graphically depict the house as
an object (X) that is called into a presence by the narrator and is configured
against the background of the described setting.

27

Chatman, pp. 23-26.
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Conclusion
The completed model now highlights the psychological process of
attribution in the pre-form ance of a tex t, and also places th at attributional
behavior in its appropriately phenomenological context. At the critical moment
o f pre-formance described in the above model, the figural voice is constituted by
the perform er as the voice of the narrator, and the perform er's valuation of the
object in question, Emily's house, is a function of the "degree of liking" or
empathic understanding th at the perform er has of that narrator. If the narrator
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calls the house "an eyesore among eyesores" the perform er is likely to
experience the house in somewhat the same way, since this narrator has been
shown to be credible and fair-minded. Furtherm ore, the perform er would, either
consciously or subconsciously, make attributions about the narrator based on the
le tte r’s verbal behavior in describing the Grierson home in this particular way.
The perform er comes to know the narrator as he would come to know an other in
a face to face engagement—by attributing causes for the verbal behavior of the
other.
Attributional behavior is the principle mode of the human perception of
others. 28 As Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka have summarized it,
We begin with the phenomenological fac t th at our perception of
others does not stop with observations of their behavior. We also
perceive other people as causal agents or a t least as capable of
being causal agents. The perception of causality is central in our
perception of other people.
When perform ers constitute a tex t as a series of utterances, they
experience the same psychological patterns in determining the attributes of the
speaker of that utterance.

This critical method of focusing on the speaking

voice in a text is similar to the method of dramatism and has been shown by such
critics as Kenneth Burke and Don Geiger

30

to yield valuable insights for the

perform er who desires to embody a narrative voice.

28
29
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Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 89.
Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 89.

Geiger’s principal statem ent on the subject of dramatism is The
Dram atic Impulse in Modern Poetics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press,
196751
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The attributional model of pre-formance embraces the perspective of
dramatism but also goes beyond it phenomenologically.

Whereas dramatism

focuses on the personae of the narrative voice, this model allows for and includes
all possible perceptions of who is speaking the tex t. The figural voice might, a t
various dynamic moments of pre-form ance, be conceived of as the implied
author, a character, or the narrator. These are the principle others in an uttered
tex t, but the human experience of these others is configured by any and all
experience that bears on our perception of them . As Susan Lanser has said, "The
textual voice must be reconstructed by taking into account all levels of narration
and focalization in their hierarchical relationships.

31

This is why the

introduction of Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia was necessary to the model.
Less obvious levels of voice such as sociological or political levels, make present
to us the world in which the epic and dram atic events of the story occur.
Letting this world fully disclose itself through textual voices makes it possible
for us to avoid over-attribution to dispositional qualities of a speaker and to
focus on context and situation as equally im portant factors in our attributional
behaviors, thereby improving the quality and fullness of those attributions.
When we (P) engage a narrator (O) or an implied author (O), we let him or
her speak to us concerning "things" (Xs). Any dissonance we might feel in this
engagement is likely to result from assym etrical relationships among the three
principles of the model:

perform er, narrator (or whatever figural voice is

constituted by the performer), and whatever "things" the figural voice is bringing
into presence through the language of the text. If we constitute this language as

3*Susan Sniader Lanser, The N arrative Act (Princeton:
Press, 1981), p. 146.

Princeton Univ.
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verbal behavior and consciously vary possible situational and/or dispositional
causes for that behavior, we are reducing psychological dissonance and "looking
behind" the uttered text while remaining firmly rooted in it.
While not the only valid approach to pre-form ance, the attributional
model provides a perspective and a method th at can create a socially immediate
atmosphere for the engagement of a narrator by a perform er. In this atmosphere
we deny nothing that might influence our attributions to the narrative voice. It
is hoped th at this perspective can help a perform er to balance his or her own
OO
responses to a tex t with a "passionate attention"
to the text itself, so th at, in
the words of Theodore Roethke, we might "greet a poem, now, like a living
person: with curiosity and respect."

32
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Richard Maguire, Passionate Attention:
Study (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. viii.

An Introduction to Literary

This term is used by Mary Frances Hopkins and Beverly Whitaker Long
in the afterw ord to Performing L iterature (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-H all,
Inc., 1982), p. 357.
33
Theodore Roethke, "Five American Poets," New World Writing (May
1953), pp. 83-84. Quoted by Long and Hopkins in Performing L iterature, p. 357.

Chapter Five
CONCLUSION
The Performing Consciousness
The consciousness of perform ers is a t the heart’s core of everything th at
the discipline of performance studies seeks to know. A full description of the
performing consciousness would gather in everything th at influences a particular
perform ance, regardless of whether those influences come from the printed
page, extrinsic factors, or even the relevant lived experience of the performer.
When we "take on" a work of literature in performance we are manifesting a
desire to encounter that work in a way th at is essentially different but still
similar to critical writing about literature.

Like the publishing critic,

perform ers wish to make informed critical judgements th a t will illuminate the
tex t, and, like the critic, they need to articulate their judgements clearly and
fully.

But performers need to be able to do more than articulate their

understanding of a text; they must also be able to embody it.
Perform ers, of necessity, must express the tex t in term s of their own
human behaviors.

Their performance behaviors, in turn, are the result of

attributions about the tex t gained during various pre-form ative engagements
with it. The study of narrative theory has proven particularly fruitful in regard
to this translation of critical judgements into the behavioral dimension of
perform ance.

P art of the reason for this may be th at its focus is on the

narrative voice in the literary tex t, a perspective th at privileges the behavioral
communication channel of voice or utterance. When we focus our attention on
the narrative voice, we are essentially willing ourselves to constitute that text
175
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as an other, usually human, consciousness; how we perceive that consciousness,
the motives we posit for its verbal behavior, form the spine of our critical
understanding of the tex t. This is especially true for the perform er who will
"take on" the epic voice and embody it.
Attribution in the Perform er’s Engagement With the Text
It would seem logical th at one of the most credited theories in current
social psychology, a theory concerned with how people perceive each other,*
might illuminate the experience of a perform er seeking to come to an
understanding of the speaking consciousness of a tex t. In a sense, both the social
encounter and the literary encounter are dyadic.

When we seek a deep

knowledge of a narrator, an implied author, or a character in a text we need to
examine critically our own subjective reactions to him or her. That is, we would
do well to reflect on our attributions about the other more closely than is usually
possible in the face-to-face social engagement.
Wolfgang Iser characterizes the essential difference between social and
literary engagements as a function of "ascertainability." Iser reminds us that in
face-to-face engagements both parties constantly monitor each other and
regulate their communication according to their perceptions of "how far their
images have bridged the gap of the inexperiencability of one another’s
experience."

Texts cannot constantly adapt and regulate themselves to the

reader's experience.

Readers cannot ask a tex t for the simple answer to the

*Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, Person Perception, pp. iv-v.
chapter in this book is devoted to attribution theory.
2

The major

Wolfgang Iser, "Interaction Between Text and Reader," in The Reader in
the T ext, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1980), p. 109.

direct question, "What is your intention here?" In his attem pt to articulate the
text-reader relationship, Iser unconsciously uses the language of attribution
theory:
. . . it is the very lack of ascertainability and defined intention
th at brings about the text-reader interaction, and here there is a
vital link with dyadic interaction. . . .
it is the gaps, the
fundamental assymetry between text and reader, that give rise to
communication in the reading process. With dyadic interaction,
the imbalance is removed by the establishment of pragmatic
connections resulting in an action, which is why the preconditions
are always clearly defined in relation to situations and common
fram es of reference. The imbalance between tex t and reader,
however, is undefined, and it is this very indeterminacy that
increases the variety of communication possible.
Iser, then, sees the imbalance between the reader and the voice of the
te x t as the m otivator of communication between them just as Newcomb's
symmetry theory sees such imbalance in social encounters as the m otivator of
interpersonal attributions.

Other critics have also evoked symmetry theory in

defining the communicative act of literary interpretation, but have described the
voices of a text as being more, rather than less "ascertainable." Their arguments
suggest that attribution may be even more im portant to literary encounters than
they are to interpersonal perception.
Because of the essential stablity of a text, (see Chapter Three) the
relative permanence of its w ritten discourse, we can examine our attributions
about its strategies more fully than we can in the temporal flux of the social
world. Both pre-form ance and social discourse are tem poral acts, but the former
is essentially different in th at the linguistic contents of one side of the

3

Iser, "Interaction Between Text and Reader," pp. 109-10.
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’’conversation"—the textual side—are permanent and unchanging.

This is why

Georges Poulet can say that a text is different from a flesh-and-blood other
because its discourse
. . . is open to me, lets me look deep inside itself and even allows
me with unheard of license to think what it thinks and feel what it
feels.
The degree of "ascertainability" of a given text, the degree to which a
figural voice allows me inside itself, is a function of the essential communicative
nature of the individual tex t. For example, the central consciousness of Isabel
Archer, the heroine of Henry Jam es’ The P ortrait of a Lady, is remarkably open
to the reader who engages it.

However, the central consciousness of that

author's governess in his The Turn of the Screw is infuriatingly closed to the
reader, a fact that has allowed for a variety of possible communications and
attributions by readers about this character. While we are best advised not to
make sweeping generalizations about literary others, it is nonetheless obvious
th at attributions are always a part of our perception of those others. And it is
also true that, in pre-form ance, we are in control of the tem poral aspects of the
reading process and are more able to focus on our own attributions to characters,
implied authors, or narrators.
Time

is

the

enemy

of

valid

attributions

in

the

social

world.

Communication with other humans is dynamic and ephemeral; a given moment of
social intercourse is impossible to freeze and analyze. This is also true of our

4

"Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The Structuralist
Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1972), p. 57.

179
encounters with literature, but to a significantly lesser degree. The language of a
literary other is stable. The words of a text do not change. Our perceptions of
those words may alter drastically on repeated encounters with them, but the
words themselves are immutable. It is for this reason th at attribution theory is
so valuable to interpretation.
We have time, during pre-formance to reflect on and examine the
behaviors of, say, a narrator. We are not bound by the inexorable phenomenon of
social conversation. Rather, we can stop in the middle of a narrator's sentence
and reflect on inconsistencies, word choice, valuation, or any other aspects of
the narrator's disposition and environment. In social discourse, attributions often
remain subconscious due to the rapidity with which they must be made and the
constant influx of new information as the conversation progresses.
Attributional behavior is ubiquitous and almost constant in everyday
social life. Because it is pre-reflective and intuitive we tend to overlook it. So
it is not surprising that it has also been overlooked in investigations of literary
response.And yet, ironically, it is here th at attributional behavior can more
successfully be focused on and analyzed due to the objective nature of the
textual language and the control the reader has over the temporal aspects of the
reading process. Finally, the fact that a text has an objective quality does not
preclude our simultaneous constitution of it as both object and as an other
consciousness. As Walter Ong has stated it,
. . .
in a valid but not exclusive sense, each work of a rt is not
only an object but a kind of surrogate for a person. Anything that
bids for attention in an act of contemplation is a surrogate for a
person. In proportion as the work of a rt is capable of being taken
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in full seriousness, it moves further and further along an asymptote
to the curve of personality.
The purpose of this study's attributional model of the act of pre-formance is to
describe and illuminate the gestalt experience of a text.

It privileges the

reader's constitution of the tex t as the utterance of some other, but does not
deny our simultaneous constitution of th at utterance as a balanced and complete
"thing-out-there" th at is presented to our consciousness and about which we
make attributions.
Reflections on our attributions is a means of exploring deeply the
psychology of our responses to literatu re. Examining our attributions about texts
is self-reflexive and yet it keeps us inextricably connected with the other, th at
is, with

the

tex t.

It

is,

like

Husserl's

pure

cogito

performing

the

phenomenological reduction, a rigorous means to a fuller knowledge, not just of
our selves, but of the others we encounter and with whom we are connected by
the tissue of experience.

An attributional perspective on literary response is

phenomenological in its breaking down of distinctions between self and other (or
object). However, in its focus on person perception, it allows th at other, in our
case the figural voice of a tex t, to remain a complete other, for whose behavior
we infer causes. The process of attribution, then, is phenomenological, and its
methods have been applied throughout this study. But I hope I have shown that
the perspective of phenomenological attribution also preserves the sanctity of
the tex t by focusing on its intrinsic ''behavior” as the source of our attributions
about it.

We are concerned here as much with the discursive tex t itself as we

Walter J. Ong, S.J., "The Jinnee in the Well Wrought Urn," in The
Barbarian Within;
And Other Fugitive Essays and Writings (New York:
MacMillan, 1962), p. 24.
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are with our responses to it.
David Bleich has said th at "interpretive knowledge . . .
from

the

is constructed

uncontrolled experience of the interpreter, and the

rules of

construction are only vaguely known by anyone observing the interpreter."® The
attributional model I have proposed does not deny the "uncontrolled prereflective experience" of the interpreter:
present experience of the interpreter.

It is determined by all of the co

This is what keeps the model from

reducing the complex experience of literary response.

What the model does

accomplish is to render less "vaguely known" those "rules of construction" that
directed the interpretation.

Like dram atism , the attributional perspective

centers on the speaking voice in literature; but it does not stop there.

The

concept of the figural voice takes this theory beyond dramatism into a more
holistic description of literary experience. It keeps the dram atistic elements of
speaker and context, yet allows for the inclusion of a reader's subjective
response into the paradigm.
Attribution as an Aid in Forming a Performance
Attribution is perhaps the most im portant principle in the psychological
construction of a response to a literary te x t. Human beings in the social world
engage in attribution almost constantly as they posit causes for the behaviors of
others. A knowledge of this fact is implicit in all human behavior. But when this
generalized awareness is coupled with a more specific knowledge of the most
common attributional patterns (e.g. consistency, consensus, distinctiveness, and

g
"The Subjective C haracter of C ritical Interpretation," College English 36
(March 1975), p. 740.
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the "fundamental attribution error"), we are b etter equipped as interpreters to
focalize and validate significant attributions that we make. A knowledge of how
people attrib u te can lead us to a fuller knowledge of one of the most im portant
means by which we construct experience.
Three of the major claims in current attributional research

rj

will serve to

summarize the phenomenological importance of this theory to the act of preformance.

The first claim is th at there is an essential difference in the way

actors and observers make attributions (see chapter two of this study). Research
suggests that the perform er, who is principally an observer of a narrator’s
O
discourse, might "tend to attrib u te behavior to stable dispositions of the actor."
rather than to contextual or environmental causes. This brings us to a second
major claim in recent studies of attribution—the claim th at the "fundamental
attribution error," the tendency to over-attribute to disposition and under
attribute to environment, is a primary cause of m isinterpretation. Finally, the
claim th at people are largely unaware of the cognitive processes th at influence
and explain their behavior

g

suggests th at anyone who wishes his or her

perceptions of others to be more accurate and less superficial or idiosyncratic,
may be helped by findings of attribution research. This is certainly also true of
the perform er who attem pts to embody the often enigmatic others contained in
g reat literature.

7

Don Locke and Donald Pennington, "Reasons and Other Causes: Their
Role in Attribution Processes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42
(February 1982), pp. 212-23.
Q
Kelly G. Shaver in William D. Wilmot, Dyadic Communication (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1980), p. 58.
g
Locke and Pennington, p. 223.
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Attribution theory, then, offers the perform er a perceptual perspective on
his or her response to a tex t. It provides a theoretical model th at describes the
cognitive patterns we use in our perceptions of others.

A sound knowledge of

these attributional processes can help the rehearsing perform er to more
system atically analyze im portant attributions about narrators, characters, and
implied authors. This is why the model is perhaps most valuable in the formation
of a perform ance, the rehearsal process th at I have designated ’’pre-formance.1'
When we embody a tex t we are providing an audience with an instance of that
text; a full understanding of both the text itself and our experience of it is
necessary if we are to avoid reducing the te x t as we in-stance it.

A final

example will serve to summarize the perform er’s use of attribution in such an
instance.
A Final Example
L et us suppose th a t a perform er is rehearsing the final a c t of King Lear.
He is engaging the character of Edmund a t a problem atic (non-common) moment
in the tex t—his final, uncharacteristic ’’good a c t.” A perform er would very likely
reflect consciously on Edmund’s motivations for this apparently significant
action.

This is a good example of the violation of consistency patterns that,

according to Theodore Newcomb, produce the strain toward symmetry that
m otivates attributional behavior in the observer. Just before he dies, Edmund,
who up to this point in the play has exhibited an apparent disposition of
consummate evil, tries to save the lives of Lear and of Cordelia by rescinding his
writ of execution on them.
I pant for life. Some good I mean to do
Despite of mine own nature. Quickly send—

Be brief in it—to th1castle, for my writ
Is on the life of Lear and on Cordelia.
Nay, send in tim e.
(V, iii, 244-48).
It is not uncommon to see this moment played as the genuine repentance
of a man who has had some spark of good in him all along; that is, to attribute
the action to Edmund’s inherent disposition. This is a possible interpretation.
But let us, as Heidegger suggests, le t Edmund’s words themselves, his verbal
behavior if you will, speak to us. Let us reflect on them fully and, a t the same
tim e, make a conscious effort to avoid the fundamental attribution error of
emphasizing disposition over context as the primary cause of Edmund’s action.
This effort, rather than imposing attribution theory on our interpretation of
Edmund’s action suspends the usual human behavior of dispositional attribution.
This suspension of the w rits of behavioral convention remember, is the primary
operation in the phenomenological reduction.
Edmund's speech occurs as he sees the bodies of Goneril and Regan, his
compatriots in evil, covered in death. He has linked himself to them in death
with his previous speech (’’. . .

all three/Now marry in an instant.”). If we

attribute the ’’good" th a t Edmund "means to do" here to a dispositional
repentance, we may well be correct, but we have probably not been complete.
We must also look to context for the cause of Edmund's act if we are to avoid
the fundamental attribution error. He knows th at he is dying and his "Nay, send
in tim e

. . ." suggests a sincere desire to see Lear and Cordelia saved. If we

William Shakespeare, The Complete Works, ed. Alfred Harbage
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 1102. All subsequent citings are from this
edition.

185
allow Edmund’s repentant language to resound in the world of the play, and in the
contextual moment of this scene, we may remember th at he has, much earlier,
repudiated all influences of "the gods" or "fate."

He is a man who has placed

himself rhetorically in the philosophical camp of existential free will, refuting
any notion of divine intervention in human life.
Thou, N ature, a rt my Goddess;
0, ii, 1)
I should have been that I am
had the maidenliest star in the universe
twinkled on my bastardizing.
0, ii, 127-29)
And yet, as soon as Edmund’s body is invaded by his brother’s sword, he
seems to do a philosophical and moral "about face," saying,
The wheel has come full circle; I am here.
(V, iii, 175)
This line (this speech a c t, if you will) evokes the medieval Christian world view
of the inexorable wheel of fortune and the m utability of individual human
achievement. In a sense, Edmund’s speech is in a dialogic relationship with that
medieval world picture precisely because he has rejected it earlier in the play.
If we consciously look to the context, the world in which Edmund "repents," and
attrib u te a t least some of his motives to the pressures exerted by that world, we
are lead to an interpretation th at sees the very philosophy th at Edmund has
previously rejected as executing a final and crucial influence on him. He is at
the bottom and realizes he will not rise again.

The results of his unnatural

disposition are all around him, and prompt him to this repentance.
interpreters we can allow the moment to live fully by

As

partially attributing
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Edmund's act to the tragic victory of the medieval Christian world of the play, a
world that expels the evil in it, but a t great cost. And as we speculate on this
point, the voice of Edmund may well recede in our consciousness as the implied
voice of Shakespeare becomes figural.
Edmund may well be surprised a t his own utterance when he says "Some
good I mean to do

. . ." What I am suggesting here is th at the motivation for

the utterance is much more complex than a simple death-bed repentance. The
phenomenological context of Edmund's world is exerting more of an influence
here than any element of his disposition. The perform er who decides to play the
scene with this interpretation in mind, that is, to let Edmund be surprised a t his
utterance and to experience the epiphany of the triumph of the medieval world
picture, possesses all the ingredients of an instructive, critically sound, and
dram atically vibrant performance moment.
Other Applications of the Attribution Model
The performance situation described above exemplifies the practical use
of attribution theory by a perform er. When a perform er engages a figural voice
in a tex t, usually the voice of a character, a narrator, or an implied author, th at
perform er needs to fully live through any problem atic or non-common behavior
of the figural voice. As we have seen, such non-common moments often result in
an assym etrieal relationship between the perform er (P), the figural voice (O),
and the object of the discourse (X).

A basic knowledge of attributional

structures helps the interpreter to investigate whether the behavior of the
figural voice violates expectations of consistency, consensus, or distinctiveness.
The motives for th at behavior can then become the object of the interpreter's
reflection as he or she seeks a balanced relationship with the figural voice in
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relation to the object of the discourse. But attribution theory can aid in the
performance of literature in several other ways.
Intrinsic Applications
F irst, there is the possibility of using the model to explore the intrinsic
qualities of a tex t.
other characters.

Not only do characters engage readers, they also engage
Others within a text can therefore make attributions about

each other and it is im portant to our understanding of a work th at we understand
the attributions they make.

The narrator of "A Rose For Emily" engages his

central character in a sense—he certainly attributes motives to certain actions
of Emily Grierson. For example, when he describes Emily's refusal to allow her
father to be buried, he says
We did not say she was crazy then. We believed she had to do that.
We remembered all the young men her father had driven away, and
we knew th at, with nothing left, she. would have to cling to th at
which had robbed her, as people will.
Whether we intend this voice as th at of narrator or implied author, an
attribution is being made about Miss Emily—an attribution that denies the
dispositional cause ("She was crazy") but th at attributes her action to the
situational presence of having "nothing left."
narrator's

implication

th at

Perhaps more important is the

Emily's behavior does not

violate

consensus

expectations; she merely behaves "as people will." Placing the elements on our
model may tell us a great deal about the world of this tex t. The narrator, and
probably the implied Faulkner, do not condemn Emily for her behavior here:

^ F au lk n er, p. 119.
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rather, they seem to agree that this is usual (that is, common) human behavior
for someone in Emily's situation. Such a perspective makes it more likely that
the narrator, a t least, views Emily as a tragic figure, a victim of her world and
her times.
Another intrinsic aspect of a tex t that would be illuminated by the
attribution model is the relationship of implied authors to narrators. As always,
when we focus our consciousness on one literary elem ent, we see it in relation to
a background of related elements.

In the example above, the narrator's

discourse, and the implied author's discourse are both contained in the text.
They exist in a dialogic relationship with each other. One of the ways in which a
critic would determine the essential nature of this relationship is to set both
elem ents, narrator and implied author, in relation to some im portant element in
the discourse.
Implied
Author

Narrator

Emily
In this case we return to our heteroglossic rehearsal method and
constitute the text first as the utterance of a narrator. We determ ine that the
narrator primarily respects Emily and attributes some degree of tragic stature to
her. This is a positive valuation. Then, we bracket the narrator and attend to
th e voice of the implied author. We have already noted several passages, such as

189

the one in the first paragraph of the story, in which Emily's house is described, as
sounding more "literary,” more "written," and attributed them more to the
implied author.

We have also noted ambivalent valuations in such oxymoronic

adjectives as "heavily lightsome." If we, with the help of our model, determined
th at the narrator's attributions to Emily and her house were essentially positive,
and th at the implied author's attitudes towards them were ambivalent, we could
want to determine how the implied author feels about the narrator.
The model would direct us to look for the "degree of liking" or
identification between these two levels of textual voice. Without it the model
would look like this:
Implied
Author

Narrator

Emily's
House'
Until a relatively positive or negative attribution by the implied author
toward the narrator is determined, we cannot determine whether our trip artite
psychological relationship is in or out of balance.

We search the tex t for any

negative attributions made by "Faulkner" to the narrator. In term s of tone, the
two voices seem to merge rather than to diverge a t any point. We decide then
th at the implied author is sincerely "in balance" with his narrator. We place a +
in the attributional channel between the two voices and the model describes a
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sym m etrical relationship

12

but one that reveals an implied author who is slightly

more critical of Emily than the narrator seems to be. In order to fully embody
this tex t, the perform er must place the narrator’s figural voice, with all its
attributions to Emily Grierson, against the ground of the implied author's
estim ation of her. The perform er may focus on the narrator's voice in the actual
perform ance, but the tensiveness of the tex t depends on th at voice containing
the word of the implied author as well.
Extrinsic Applications
A great deal of highly specific clinical work has been done in inter
personal attribution (or person perception). These studies open up vast heuristic
possibilities for the study of psychological responses to texts.

A specific

example will illustrate the structure of such inquiries.
Forsyth and Pope (1983) recently conducted a study of students moral
attributions to certain human behaviors such as telling the truth and keeping
promises.

The subjects were presented with the behaviors through w ritten

narratives. The findings, while adm ittedly not conclusive, strongly suggest that
(1) Moral character is assumed to be a prime cause of behaviors
th at are low in distinctiveness and high in consistency, (2) actions
th at are high in distinctiveness and low in consistency are less
likely to be attributed to the actor's moral character, and (3)

1o

A*Theodore Newcomb, The Acquaintance Process, p. 12.
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consensus inforniation
judgements. > 14

has

a

lesser

impact

on

moral

Such findings suggest normative patterns in our moral evaluations of
others; a knowledge of such evaluational patterns may alert us to human
tendencies in literary response as well. Edmund’s aforementioned "good deed" in
King Lear is a good example of behavior that is "high in distinctiveness but low
in consistency," and is therefore, according to Forsyth and Pope, less likely to be
attributed to some moral quality of Edmund’s character.

Forsyth’s and Pope’s

study is experiential human evidence of Shakespeare's mimetic authority—a
clinical reinforcem ent of the view th at Edmund's attem pt to save Lear's life is
externally motivated by the situational crisis in which he finds himself.
These examples remind us to look to the fictional world for causes of the
actions of its characters and narrators, for it is here that we are more likely to
find fuller, less stereotypical judgements. The findings of social psychologists
can affirm or deny our assumptions about how we perceive others; and these
assumptions are the basis of literary as well as of social attributions.
Conclusion
Robert R. Hellinger has said th at to read well we must make vulnerable

13

Donelson R. Forsyth and William R. Pope, "The Attribution Cube and
Moral Evaluations," Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 21 (March 1983), pp.
117-18.
14Similar findings were reported in Jennifer Crocker, Darlene B. Hannah,
and Renee Weber, "Person Memory and Causal Attribution," Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 44 (January 1983), pp. 55-56.
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our id e n tity .^

To do this we must enter the world of the text as fully as

possible, but we must still be able to come out of th at world and, in our own
persons, attrib u te causes for the behavior of the shifting voices that sing the
song or tell the tale.

Obviously, a knowledge of the cognitive structures of

attribution can help us to analyze our response to the frequently unusual (non
common) behaviors of the great texts.
When we are aware of attributional patterns we can bring into fuller
presence the consciousnesses of the literary others we embody, lending those
consciousnesses mimetic authority and deep psychological life by the textual and
subtextual embodiment of their attributions.

As performers of literature we

need to, as one critic has recently suggested, look into experience rather than at
it.”

16

Looking into experience is the purpose of the attribution theorist as well

as the purpose of the poet and the perform er. By sharing what they have learned
with each other, all three can perhaps more deeply and humanly realize that
noble purpose.

^"W hat is Literary Experience Like?" New L iterary History, 14 (1982), p.
115.
16
William C. Johnson, Jr., "L iterature, Film, and the Evolution of
Consciousness," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , 38 (Fall, 1979), p.
37.
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